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Abstract
THE UNITED STATES OF THE WORLD
by
Marriah Star

Adviser: Professor Andrew Polsky
This study examines how Political Entrepreneurs in the United States Congress responded to
human rights abuses in six countries during the 1970s and 1980s: Cambodia, El Salvador, South
Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and Uganda. It presents a four-point model for approaching
the study of United States human rights policy. The key element in all the cases is bonding social
capital, also called affective politics. American policy towards the Soviet Union and Uganda
both demonstrate the integration of international, transnational, and domestic politics. Taiwan
receives special attention because U.S. Taiwan policy continues to exemplify the integration of
international relations, transnational relations, and domestic politics.

The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) represents Taiwanese-Americans who care
about promoting democracy on Taiwan and, ultimately, Taiwan’s legal status as an independent
country. FAPA cultivates and sustains relationships with members of Congress and their staff to
create the Taiwan Caucus in the House and Senate, second in influence only to the Israel Caucus,
which is cultivated by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). This study
investigates how the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) learned, in part from AIPAC, to
become politically viable as an ethnic lobby in the 1980s after limited success in the 1960s and
1970s, despite lacking the voting power and financial resources of Jewish-Americans.
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This study examines how bonding social capital (affective politics) is used to compensate for
deficiencies in financial capital and voting power (rational politics), thus creating the political
capital that political entrepreneurs use to shape U.S. foreign policy. Political entrepreneurs
include citizens, congressional staff, and members of Congress, who have an impact on U.S.
foreign policy that is greater than we would expect if we studied their resources by using only a
rational choice framework. This study demonstrates that scholars of international relations,
transnational politics and American politics can analyze the biographies of political
entrepreneurs and their emotional relationships to more fully understand U.S. foreign policy.
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For this section I am going to tell the story of the past 35 years. If I don’t tell it, no one will.
This dissertation started, in a sense, the day I was born: January 2, 1976. I was the love child of
two Hippie parents: my father Clay Adams (“Black Man Clay”) and my mother Vivian
Swearingen (“Vivian the White Woman”). He was a black retired United States Air Force
Officer who had spent 20 years as a technical sergeant. He left the Air Force after returning from
Vietnam. She was a white college graduate, 15 years his junior, who had recently moved out to
the west coast of the United States from Indiana and Ohio. As a liberated woman, my mother
chose not to marry my father. They also gave me a name that was unconventional: “Marriah”,
meaning “the wind”, and “Star”, because they wanted me to be a Star in everything I do. This is
normal for Hippie culture: my sister is named Crystal Sunshine Star. This unique name helped
me identify as a “flower child.” I was normal in the Hippie community of the American West,
but different in other environments. This feeling of being different has stayed with me over 27
years of living in other environments, and has influenced my approach to research and thinking
about the world. It has convinced me that, solely because of my name, I must make a unique
contribution to society, a contribution that builds on the Hippie critiques of Western society
while accepting the benefits of Western society. This dissertation is one element of that
contribution.
My father left behind his first family to go on his Hippie journey. His first wife, Veda Adams,
had four children: Albert, Sandra, Anthony, and Alton. My father’s exodus started a chain
reaction of events that has culminated, 35 years later, in me, his middle son out of nine children
completing a Ph.D. Veda succumbed to paranoid schizophrenia and her three male children
eventually followed. As I moved around the country with my parents, living occasionally in a
car, a teepee, a friend’s house, and other places in the Rocky Mountains and the Mohave Desert,
my older brothers turned to drugs, gangs, and crime as coping mechanisms. I knew at the age of
8 that my life had to go in the opposite direction. I entered public school at that age and vowed
that I would create a new pattern for my family. It is because of this long-term effort that I
identify with the political entrepreneurs examined in this dissertation. It takes one to know one!
27 years later, on the exact day I called my stepmother to tell her I finished writing my
dissertation, my older brother Albert went to my father asking for money and help because he
had stopped taking his medications. My father had no choice but to call the police to put Albert
in prison. As I completed editing my dissertation, my father and stepmother searched for ways to
put Albert into a hospital so that he would not endanger himself or other people. My father told
me that mental illness has plagued his first family since he was in Vietnam, and likely affects his
extended family as well.
Nothing has changed. I was in junior high in 1989 when Albert first became a menace to my
family. I remember when the police came to Albert when he was intruding in my father’s house,
where I lived with Alton, Sandra and Anthony. Albert could not remember his name and he did
not know what time of the year it was. He was placed in a hospital. Five years later I celebrated
getting accepted to Harvard in June 1994. I sat around a camp fire one night with my brother
Alton as we talked about how bright my future surely was. I told him that, since I had
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accomplished this great thing, I wanted him to succeed as well. He told me that he knew within
five years, by the time he was 40, he would have $10,000. He did not know how he would do
this, but he was sure he would be rich. That was the last night I saw him. He is currently living
homeless on the streets. Alton had a run-in with the police, which triggered his paranoia,
followed by time in a group home. My sister Amber last saw him homeless as she walked to her
college graduation in 2009.
My siblings have shaped, for better and worse, my entire academic career. It breaks my heart
every time I think about them. It was because of them that I refused to give up when my studies
seemed too difficult. I knew I had to be the example for my younger brothers and sisters to
follow if they also wished to avoid a life of homelessness, drugs, gangs and prison. The Hippie
drug culture I grew up in, and the shadow of mental illness in my family, motivated me to
constantly verify and measure reality. I had to convince myself that I was neither stoned nor
mentally ill if I accepted an argument within academia. This has helped me be comprehensive
and thorough as a researcher, always challenging my own assumptions.
In the past 20 years, thanks both to my example and the positive values instilled by my parents, I
have seen my sister Crystal complete her college education, followed by Amber. Ava is currently
embarking on the school of life, developing a range of practical skills that will always help her
and other people. My youngest sibling, Austin, is embarking on the same promising academic
path that I started at the same high school I attended. He is the same distance from me (4
siblings) that I am from my brother Albert. However, instead of trying to avoid mental illness
and drug abuse, Austin can be a healthy, normal teenager -- the kind I never had the freedom to
be. My academic efforts for the past 25 years have been my gift to them.
This dissertation is, in a very real sense, my love letter to them. I dedicate this dissertation to
them because they taught me that, no matter how educated I get, I must be a voice and an
advocate for the sick, the abused, the weak, the drug-addicted, and all other people who have
been cast aside by a supposedly affluent society. I owe a debt of gratitude to Stephen J. Dubner
for writing about the life of Harvard Professor Roland G. Fryer Jr. in “Toward a Unified Theory
of Black America” (New York Times Magazine, March 20, 2005). Fryer proved that other at-risk
black males can turn their lives around, just like he and I did.
It has taken me 20 years to place my life on the proper academic foundations. In 1992, after my
sophomore year of high school, I realized that I had become lazy and undisciplined. I thought I
had built the necessary academic foundations for my life in junior high and my first two years of
high school. However, in August 1992 I discovered that these foundations were crumbling
beneath me. For four years I had seen my friends get involved with street gangs and drugs, saw
gang signs spring up around my neighborhood, and gang activity in both my junior high school
(Miles Exploratory Learning Center) and my high school (Amphitheater). I was a staff writer on
my high school newspaper as it did one story after another on gang members, gang violence,
drug sales, and the ongoing battle between the Crips and the Bloods. Every night I watched a
news report about drive-by shootings between rival gangs, with young black and Hispanic kids
being killed by stray bullets. I saw stories about drug overdoses, teenagers dying before they
made it to college. In my home town gang activity was nearly everywhere. My high school had
to close its campus in 1992 because the gang violence was getting so severe that it was claiming
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the lives of students. I spent half of my time in "regular" classes, overhearing black and Hispanic
students talking about their gang activities while they earned Bs and Cs on homework, and the
other half of my time in "advanced" classes surrounded by white and Asian students talking
about their perfect grade point averages while discussing class work. I knew where I wanted to
be.
The year from September 1991 to September 1992 was critical for me. It divides my life into
“before” and “after.” It was during this year that I became very aware of my prospects for a
happy and successful life. I realized that, even though I was racially mixed, I was considered
African-American under the one-drop-of-blood theory. I watched Boyz n the Hood and realized
that most young African-American males ended up dead or in prison. I listened to Body Count,
with its song “Cop Killer”, and realized just how dangerous the world was for people of my
ethnicity and gender. I listened to Ice T talking about the fact that more black males were in
prison than in college. I listened to Easy-E and learned about the life of a gangster through
Gangsta Rap. I watched the television as Rodney King was beat by white police officers and Los
Angeles burst into flames during race riots after the officers were acquitted. The riots
overwhelmed me emotionally. I watched Grand Canyon and realized that the biggest problems
American society faced involved race and poverty.
Between September 1991 and May 1992 my high school grades fell from A’s to B’s and C’s. I
feared the worst: That I would end up dead or in prison, mentally ill, a drug addict, and
homeless. I had changed my self-perception from being the smartest person in the room to being
the most stupid. The bad grades had that effect on my psyche and self-esteem. I felt ridiculed by
everyone around me for the first time in my life and I thought my life would be over if I did
nothing to save myself. Yet, my daily habits were not intelligent. My life revolved around video
games, watching television sitcoms almost all the time, watching horror movies and reading
comic books. I knew I had to transform myself completely if I hoped to escape my environment.
I made a choice. I gave up the friends and lifestyle that I associated with the ridicule, the
mockery, and the bad grades. I vowed to get only A’s after that year. I killed the person I had
been and gave birth to a new, very serious, very intellectual personality. I entered survival mode.
I stopped listening to “Gangsta rap.” I stopped “hanging out” with my friends in high school and
in the Boy Scouts. I stopped spending time with my family. I stopped playing video games,
reading comic books, watching television, and watching horror movies. I went cold turkey. I
stopped living during the day. I started studying non-stop, mostly at night. My life became the
“life of the mind,” between 10 pm and 6 am, and my friends became books. I read politics,
history, psychology, economics, philosophy, English literature, science, mathematics, and
anything else I found interesting as the best way to train my brain and myself. I forced myself to
think in completely different ways, to replace all of my mundane thoughts with intelligent
analysis. I dissected fictional books, TV shows, movies, and songs (mostly from the 1960’s) for
philosophical themes. I owe a huge debt to my therapist at that time, Jean Ware, who helped me
remember during my junior year of high school that there is more to life than reading books.
There is also spontaneity and fellowship in a loving community.
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In September 1992 I was starting from nothing. The person I had been no longer existed. The
person I am today did not yet exist. I had only emptiness, fear for my future and dread for the
present inside me. I looked for signs of hope anywhere I could find it.
I shifted my circadian rhythms. I stopped waking up at 6 am and going to bed at 10 pm or
midnight. Instead, I pushed myself to be awake for 48 straight hours until I physically collapsed.
By December of 1992 I measured myself getting a total of 8 hours of sleep between Monday and
Friday. I learned I could function very well on 3 to 4 hours of sleep per night. That has been my
pattern for 20 straight years. At the time I knew this was abnormal and unhealthy. My
stepmother reminded my constantly to get more sleep. However, as I looked ahead to the next 20
years – essentially to this year, 2011 – I realized that I could not get through the years of
studying if I went back to my former personality. I had to sacrifice my body and my comfort to
develop my mind.
By November 1992, I started calling 1992 the “year of change” to correspond with Bill Clinton’s
campaign theme and I increasingly turned my attention to politics. This was my first true
political awakening. I turned for inspiration to such stories as Flowers for Algernon. I knew my
only chance for success was for me to develop my mind, and that could happen only if I
crammed as many books into my brain as I could read and remember. Wendelyn “Wende” Julien
and other top students who were a year ahead of me (class of 1993) became my inspiration after I
changed, and I owe them my gratitude. Greg Arnold helped me get excited about Algebra and
Trigonometry, and wrote letters of recommendation. Karen Jocame helped me get into the
REACH program. Teresa McCrory instilled in me a passion for art and culture. My classmates
Matthew Scrivner and Sarah Taylor inspired me to keep writing.
Thanks to Sam Caruso who sparked my passion for American History. His class gave me the
foundation for reconstructing my mind by helping me to develop my memory. I was in his class
in January 1993 as we were discussing the Progressive Era in the United States, in particular
muckraking journalism. After we talked about Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel “The Jungle”, Mr.
Caruso referred to this book as the Bible of the Progressive Movement because its important role
in American History. He then asked the class, “What is the Bible of the Native American Rights
Movement?” In that class, whoever spoke first became an intellectual hero. I rarely spoke first, if
at all. We had covered Native American rights in November 1992. Immediately after he asked
this question I formed a clear mental picture of the book he was talking about: “A Century of
Dishonor” written by Helen Hunt Jackson in 1881. I was the first to speak and Mr. Caruso
nodded his approval. I realized from that point on that I have a photographic memory. All the
reading I had done since September 1992 gave me instant recall of the exact paragraph on any
page. In order to remember something, I simply recall the page as an image in my mind and read
the paragraph or sentence that I want to remember. I have since developed the ability to read
what I remember and to compose paragraphs mentally. When I sit down to type what I have
written in my mind, the only remaining challenge is mechanically transforming the mental image
into a digital image on a screen.
That was one day of lucidity and perfect clarity. I would have two or three lucid days every
week. The rest would often be cloudy as I swam in a pool of despair and anxiety. Another day of
crystal clarity came in April 1993. It started again with AP American History. We had taken a
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Mock AP American History test. I received the score back – 88 points out of 100. I was
disappointed that I had not achieved 90 points, but Mr. Caruso had written on the bottom, “You
are a strong writer. I encourage you to take the AP American History exam.” Based on this note I
registered for the test. On the morning of the test, in the middle of May, I completed reading
every page of the American History book and immediately walked to the designated classroom
to take the test. With everything fresh in my mind I finished the test early with a strong sense of
energy. It is because of Mr. Caruso’s class that I was able to achieve the top score, a 5, on the AP
American History test. When I saw Mr. Caruso in the library in September 1993 he told me
“You are the elite of the elite.” I was shocked. I assumed most students had earned a 5. He said
“You are one of only two students in the entire school to earn a 5 on the test.” It is my
knowledge of American History, and my passion for analyzing it, that gives me the ability to
remember the past 35 years of my life.
Thanks to Bill Bendt who sparked my passion for political theory. Thanks to Cheryl Lockhart
who sparked my passion for literature and helped me respect all things from William
Shakespeare. Thanks to Rick Shorrock for giving me a passion for photography. Thanks to Jim
Vinal for leading me through a great experience at Amphi Town. Thanks to Kelly DeForge,
Brandon Gallego and Kim Lomanaco for helping to make Amphi Town so memorable.
Special thanks to Patricia Childers, who helped me discover that I had academic talent when I
was in 7th grade. I met with her and Omar Moreno at their flower shop in Summer 2002, before I
started graduate school. They both told me about the sad fates of most of my classmates in junior
high. Most of my friends were, by that time, dead, killed by the Mexican drug gangs, or in jail. It
was Mrs. Childers who not only helped me survive a similar fate, but helped me realize that I am
a survivor, and that I must never forget the people I left behind.
Thanks to Claire Torre who helped restore my academic confidence when I became editor-inchief of the Desert Gazette Alternative in high school. Thanks to Aminifu and Bah Kaburou,
Patrick Hruby, Daniel Telles, Rose and Tim Do, Pablo Pinheiro, Angelo Lopes, John Steen,
Mike Brunson, Stephanie Brunson, Christopher Brooks, Muriel Brooks, Mark Braun, Mike
Preble, Cara Hughes, Jason Bushmire, Steven Nagel, Jessica Biagi, Kendra Kaye, Chris Kreulen,
Kyle Herman, Peter Lee, Alexandra Fisher, Julia Hunt, Amanda Kelley, Richard McKay, Sky
Watson, Marta DeLeon, Lea McLaughlin, Cynthia Floyd, Julie Moen, Audrey Saxton, Mark
Templin, Kirpal Johnson, Dan Myrmo, Nhan Nguyen, Oscar Ho, Jason Stasiak, Emerson
Whitley, Joe Legros, Lena Amanti, Adam Hall, Jacob Hall, Adam Taylor, Saundra Taylor, Mike
Oranski, Randy Karger, Phillip Kim, Jennie Lascelle, Kat James, Jason Misner, Brad Sokal,
Tony Gomez, Taren Hines, Shiho Yoshinara, Jennifer Barbuscia, and Danielle Rhodes for giving
me the motivation to continue my education over the past 20 years.
Thanks to God, who helped me be at the very bottom of the list of the top 10% of high school
students in September 1992. That list generated a letter to me from my counselor, Beverly Dutz,
who told me that she could get me into Cornell Summer School, with the help of Cornell
graduate Sally Shumaker. Over the next nine months I earned A’s in all my classes, top scores on
AP tests, and a full scholarship to Cornell for the summer. Thanks to Nancy Evans, who replaced
Mrs. Dutz in September 1993 and helped me get into Harvard. Over the past 20 years I have
realized how much God, The Universe, Spirit, or some kind of intelligent force helped me at
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critical times in my life. It was God who, in October 1997, placed me next to Maria Mitreva, a
Bulgarian student at the Intercollegiate Model United Nations conference at Yale, who led me to
my wife. It was God who gave me enough time to avoid being under the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001. It was God who kept Rep. Stephen Solarz alive long enough for me to
contact him and read his memoirs.
Thanks to Professor Marc Busch who taught “International Conflict and Cooperation” during my
senior year at Harvard. It was this class that gave me a passion for game theory, rational choice
analysis, and international relations theory. It was because of this class that my first two years at
CUNY Graduate Center were so easy. Thanks to Lawrence Hamlet for serving as my thesis
adviser at Harvard as I researched Social Capital on the Internet. Thanks to Robert Putnam for
writing “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, Making
Democracy Work and Bowling Alone. His ideas on game theory and social capital are the
foundation for this study.
I decided to enter graduate school on September 11, 2001. I was in Washington Square Park that
day and saw both of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center fall. Apart from the
psychological scars that experience gave me (it took me ten years to talk about it without crying)
I also realized that the world had changed. That event gave me a deep yearning to investigate
how international relations in the 21st century worked. Thus, I started graduate school with a
single question in mind: How does the world actually work? I had taken three years after my
college graduation to explore this question in New York City. I had written hundreds of personal
essays in those three years as I tackled this question daily. I approached this question from a
variety of perspectives: my life experience, philosophy, psychology, politics, economics,
spirituality, anthropology, historical examination, and literary analysis. I tried to include micro
perspectives and macro perspectives.
By the time I started attending classes at CUNY, I knew I needed theoretical grounding for
answering the question, “How does the world actually work?” I started with a focus on
international relations and foreign policy because I had already studied American politics
extensively. I had no interest in studying Congress. Moreover, I assumed most decisions at the
international level involved rational analysis of structural constraints. When my colleagues
talked about human rights I ignored it because I assumed human rights concerns were
unenforceable at the international level. I started my research on this question -- “How does the
world actually work?” -- with the aim to update Kenneth Waltz’s Structural Realism with a more
comprehensive view of the world. Specifically, I wanted to bridge the gap between domestic
politics, foreign policy, and the international system. Over nine years of research and thinking, I
discovered that Congress is where all the action occurs, and most of the international action
during the 1970s and 1980s was driven by human rights concerns. Contrary to my assumption
that human rights concerns were unenforceable, I learned that human rights can easily be
enforced through congressional resolutions and legislation. This has been the shock of my
graduate education. My assumptions about how the world works were contradicted by my
research.
Thanks to Nancy Lublin, CEO of Do Something, and Prof. John Davenport of Fordham
University for writing the recommendation letters that secured my admission to CUNY in Spring
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my dissertation and CUNY for the majority of the writing. Without his guidance for the past 18
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international relations. She was very respectful and tolerant as I experimented with different
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The United States of the World
Chapter 1 Introduction

A Decade of Change
•

The Democrats were not happy. It was 1969 and the party had just lost the presidency to
Republican Richard M. Nixon in a close election after occupying the White House for eight
years. If that were not bad enough, the United States Congress, controlled by the Democratic
Party, was not producing policies favored by most Democratic lawmakers. Long-serving
conservative Southern Democrats controlled powerful committee chairs and refused to hold
hearings on or mark up liberal legislation. Progressive Democrats knew they had to do
something, so the Democratic Study Group (DSG), which had been instrumental in paving
the way for the Great Society legislation in the 1960s, took the lead in reforming the House
to make it possible to advance liberal Democratic proposals. In 1970 the DSG helped pass
the Legislative Reorganization Act, which, among other things, liberated subcommittees
from control by the committees. By 1975, powerful committee chairs who fell out of step
with mainstream Democratic positions were losing their chair positions.

•

On Dec. 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced, without consulting Congress, that the
United States would officially recognize the People’s Republic of China on January 1, 1979,
and transfer its embassy from the Republic of China on Taiwan. This action shocked and
angered Congress because President Carter had pledged to consult it on all major foreign
policies before making a decision. Representatives in the House decided to take immediate
steps to adjust America’s relationship with Taiwan. By April 1979 Congress passed and
Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
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•

Stephen Solarz was a liberal Democrat from a heavily Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn,
New York. He was elected in 1974 in the so-called Watergate Class, which included 70 new
Democrats in the House of Representatives. He joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee
so that he could have a say in U.S. policy toward Israel and he rose up the ranks of various
subcommittees. Within five years he became chair of the Africa Subcommittee and
frequently visited African presidents and officials in the Middle East. In 1980 he switched to
the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee because he anticipated interactions with China.
In 1981 he became the subcommittee chair after the previous chair died in office. Solarz used
his new position to advocate democracy for Taiwan and promote military and economic aid
for rebel factions in Cambodia, among other policies. He became a shadow secretary of state
(Winik 1993), using congressional junkets to perform shuttle diplomacy by visiting
numerous heads of state to negotiate realistic and acceptable policies toward Cambodia.

•

Cindy Sprunger was a human rights activist in the 1970s. She went to work for
Representative Jim Leach (R-IA), who was the ranking minority member on the Asian and
Pacific Subcommittee. After President Carter announced recognition of China, the
government of Taiwan began a crackdown, postponing indefinitely the scheduled elections
and then, on Dec. 10, 1979, killing and arresting hundreds of protesters who were
recognizing Human Rights Day in Kaoshiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city. Sprunger’s
family had spent a great deal of time on Taiwan as ministers for the Presbyterian Church. She
encouraged Rep. Leach to take a public stand and condemn Taiwan’s actions. Cindy’s
colleague, Fulton Armstrong, had lived on Taiwan and he also urged Leach to enter a
statement in the congressional record. Dr. Edward Friedman worked for Rep. Solarz. He had
completed his dissertation research on Taiwan in the 1960s and worked for Solarz
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immediately after he became chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. Solarz started
organizing hearings about Taiwan, including the murder of Taiwanese-Americans by the
agents of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The Asian and Pacific Subcommittee
produced legislation banning arms sales to any country that killed citizens who became
Americans.
•

The Taiwan Relations Act had changed the immigration quota for the Taiwan, merging it
with the immigration quota for all of China, which severely limited the immigration of
Taiwanese citizens to the United States. Dr. Peng Ming-Min, Trong Chai, and Mark Chen
were Taiwanese independence activists who started the Formosan Association for Public
Affairs (FAPA) in 1981. The three men met with Edward Friedman to explain this problem,
and Friedman wrote legislation that created two separate immigration quotas for Taiwan and
Mainland China. Mark Chen met with Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Edward Kennedy
to get Senate support for Taiwan. Soon, Solarz, Leach, Pell and Kennedy began holding press
conferences together, calling themselves the “Gang of Four” to encourage Taiwan to
democratize. Rep. Leach made speeches on the House floor and Solarz traveled to Taiwan to
bring the message to the government. Senator Kennedy gave the John F. Kennedy Prize to
Taiwan democracy activists. Senator Pell helped pass Senate resolutions stating that the fate
of Taiwan was to be determined by the people of Taiwan, not its government. Although the
membership of FAPA has averaged a mere 5,000 since its inception, it has managed to
organize the Taiwan Caucus in the House and the Senate. The Taiwan Caucus is the secondlargest ethnic caucus, second only to the Israel Caucus.
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Explaining Change at All Levels
What do these examples have in common? From members of Congress to congressional
staff and organizers of interest groups, they all involve the exercise of political entrepreneurship.
At first glance this may seem puzzling. After all, senators, representatives, congressional staff,
and political organizers have vastly different social and political resources. From the ordinary
citizen who gets people to meet together to discuss a common problem to a member of Congress,
every actor plays a different political role. Yet, what unites all of these actors is the ability to
create long-lasting change beyond their limited official roles, whether change starts at the
grassroots level or in the halls of Congress.
A study of political entrepreneurship requires not just examining change of degree, but
also change of kind. A change of degree occurs within the boundaries of a political actor’s
responsibility. Changes of degree can be reversed easily and thus they seldom last. In order for
change to become durable reform, change of degree must become change of kind, and only a
political entrepreneur can create that kind of change. A political entrepreneur creates a change of
kind by adjusting the boundaries of responsibility, the jurisdiction, and acquires more
responsibilities. The examples above demonstrate this: members of Congress changed the
selection of committee chairs and the rights of subcommittees; members of Congress acted like
cabinet secretaries; congressional staff acted like members of Congress; citizens acted like
congressional staff. The political entrepreneur, regardless of the level of activity, changes the
fundamental nature of the role in practice. This change may eventually be codified in law, but it
starts with a political entrepreneur changing the boundaries of his/her formal jurisdiction to
create lasting changes within institutions and within society (usually by stretching the boundaries
to acquire more responsibilities).
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This study contends that understanding what political entrepreneurs do and why they do
it is essential for understanding political changes at the domestic and the international levels.
Most studies of political entrepreneurship approach entrepreneurship as a change in degree
instead of a change in kind, and thus the focus of the studies are confined to discrete political
domains and fixed jurisdictions. These studies are effective within their specialized fields but
they fail to elucidate the phenomena described above. A main purpose of this project is to extend
the study of entrepreneurship to illustrate its radical or transformative possibilities.
Why would Rep. Solarz, a Jewish representative from a safe Jewish district, care so much
about Taiwan? Taiwan was just one of many countries that Solarz became intensely focused on
during his career. He became one of the most-traveled members of Congress, visiting countries
in Africa, the Middle East, Central America, South America, and Asia, meeting with heads of
state and dissident groups. He became such an expert in American foreign policy that he was
rumored to be a prospective secretary of state in a future Democratic presidential administration.
What explains his deep interest and involvement in so many different areas of American foreign
policy that were of little if any concern to his constituents? What allowed Rep. Solarz to be so
effective on American foreign policy as a member of Congress with less than 10 years of
experience in the House?
Why do congressional staff have so much influence on a member of Congress when the
literature would lead us to predict that the member of Congress leads the way? What incentives
did Cindy Sprunger have for making suggestions to Rep. Leach, and what incentives did Rep.
Leach have for following her lead?
How did a small number of Taiwanese-American activists manage to have such great
influence on members of Congress and congressional activities? How does a small, grassroots
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organization manage to organize so many members of Congress to vote in favor of Taiwan,
especially for an island that no longer has strategic significance for United States foreign policy?
How did this small organization become influential despite the lack of resources that the
literature would predict, including votes in congressional districts and financial contributions to
campaigns?
By studying these entrepreneurs, this dissertation explains a set of policy outcomes that
defy most expectations we have of how foreign policy works, and much of what we think we
know about elected lawmakers, their staffs, and the interest groups and issue activists with whom
they interact. In addition, this dissertation focuses on what motivates political actors, especially
elected officials. Some of them do not choose issues on which to focus based on our
conventional understanding of rational political action. Instead, they are moved to act by their
emotional attachment to an issue.
More generally, this study focuses on the impact political entrepreneurs have on
American foreign policy and international relations. When we look at the making of American
foreign policy from the 1970s onward, specifically human rights policy, we see that many key
players seem to lack the motives or means to exercise influence. Most of the literature on
international relations, foreign policy making, Congress, and interest groups focuses on elite
actors who have significant institutional resources. They are supposed to be motivated primarily
by their immediate interests. Yet in the area of human rights, policy reflected the influence of
different actors, both lawmakers and organized interests, who often derived no direct political
benefit from their efforts.
This study claims that much political entrepreneurship in foreign policy has an affective
foundation. Powerful emotional responses, both in the short-term and over long periods of time,
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have led to significant foreign policy outcomes that we would not expect from limited traditional
political resources. In turn, affective entrepreneurship has changed the nature of international
relations.

Competing explanations for change
Following America’s official recognition of China, the Taiwanese government postponed
scheduled elections. Then, in December 1979, the Taiwanese government started arresting
human rights protesters, dissidents, and other activists after December 10, UN Human Rights
day. This provoked many Taiwanese-Americans to pool their resources and contact Congress
about Taiwan’s human rights abuses. The TRA had included a line saying that the United States
thought human rights on Taiwan were important (an amendment submitted by Rep. Jim Leach),
but nothing obligated members of Congress to actively push for human rights on Taiwan. Yet,
that is exactly what Congress did during the 1980s. To explain congressional activity on behalf
of Taiwan, in the TRA as well as through hearings, press conferences, binding and non-binding
legislation, from the 1980s to the present, we turn to theories of domestic policy change.
Scholars of American politics draw on two general approaches to explain policy shifts.
The first approach is the rational actor model: individual actors, including elected officials and
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), make policy changes to win re-election (Mayhew 1974).
Mayhew’s approach has been influential because it describes members of Congress as singleminded seekers of reelection. This approach is useful, but limited, because members of Congress
are emotional human beings in addition to rational actors. Elected officials change policies to
respond to both electoral pressures in their districts and to their own emotional needs.
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It is possible for affective politics and rational electoral politics to co-exist and reinforce
each other. We see this in the example of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC). Passionate Jewish voters care deeply about Israel and evoke memories of the
Holocaust, but they also have high net worth. Jewish donors give money to political candidates
and have large voting blocks. If another ethnic group wants to accomplish the same political
influence in Congress, it can have money and voting power, and/or affective concerns about
human rights abuses in their home countries. Rep. Solarz responded to human rights abuses in
Asian countries, then found to his surprise that Asian-Americans are wealthy and active voters.
He cultivated this donor base after realizing that it existed. Other politicians may go for the
rational calculation first, collecting money from ethnic voters in their district, and then, second,
discover that they really care about the human rights abuses that these voters bring to their
attention. This research gives a fuller, more comprehensive picture of how members of Congress
actually work.
The second approach to explain policy shifts is analyzing collective action through social
movements or organized interests. A policy window may occur in which a policy entrepreneur
senses that an old policy no longer works and a new policy is needed, but no one except the
entrepreneur is offering a new policy. Social movements convince many policy makers at
different levels to change polices simultaneously as a response to various forms of collective
action (Allen 2007; Bernstein 1997; Jenkins 1977, 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). Some
scholars of American politics have tried to connect these approaches, explaining that individual
entrepreneurs lead policy coalitions, cohering social movements that are otherwise fragmented
(McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).1
1

Some scholars of international relations apply this logic internationally by merging the lenses of collective action
and states. They have coined the term “complex interdependence” to analyze transnational politics (Keck and
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These theories of domestic change have their own limitations. They can explain shortterm changes in policy at a specific time by a specific group of actors. Yet, collective action is
difficult to sustain over very long periods of time, and thus the results of collective action tend to
be limited. In the case of Taiwan, in contrast, the specific actors, including members of
Congress, staff, and activists, remained the same from the 1980s until the present. The policy
targets have changed over the decades, but the goal has remained the same: maintaining a
democratic and economically vibrant Taiwan even as the PRC grows in military power,
economic power and international influence. This study aims to explain this continuity in both
the actors and their goals despite three decades of changes in American politics and SinoAmerican relations.

Transnational Actors
One of the ways this study tries to explain the continuity of specific political actors in a
changing political environment is by highlighting the unique nature of transnational activists in
the international community, and how democratic countries filled with immigrants behave as a
result of their presence. The U.S. has been the destination of choice for many immigrants,
refugees, and exiles from around the world. America’s global economic and military dominance
has made American foreign policy a subject with global implications. Thus, it was natural for
foreign governments, ethnic lobbies, and transnational groups to lobby Congress (Tierney 1994).
America’s destination status has turned the United States into a foreign policy tool for immigrant
groups who retain their ethnic or homeland identities. “Diasporas are an inherent part of the
imperfection of the nation-state. Almost no states match perfectly territory with populations,
Sikkink 1998; Adamson 2002; Risse-Kappen 1995; Huntington 1973; Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye
1972; Rosenau 1980).
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whether they define themselves in civic-nationalist or ethno-nationalist terms. Diasporas are thus
an endemic feature of the international system, and transnational ethnic ties are an inevitable part
of international relations.” (Shain and Wittes 2002, 177-178) (See also Shain, Yossi, and Barth
2003)
Thus, the interaction between the transnational level and the domestic level can be
analyzed in terms of diaspora politics. The issues that motivate diasporas include human rights
abuses, foreign aid, and democratization. Diaspora politics are “homeland political practices
confined to those groups that are barred from direct participation in the political system of their
homeland - or who do not even have a homeland political regime of their own to
support/oppose.” (Cohen 1997, cited in ∅stergaard-Nielsen 2003, 763) Diaspora politics are one
source of inputs, among many, in shaping U.S. foreign policy because immigrant groups are one
source of pressure on Congress if political entrepreneurs can mobilize them to have a stable
political identity. The Taiwanese-American community constituted a diaspora, with exiled
academic, political, and business leaders searching for ways to make Taiwan democratic so they
could return home. U.S. Taiwan policy became one of their targets.
We need to use different theories to explain entrepreneurship over time on international
human rights issues. Major international relations theories are of little value in explaining
diaspora politics in the United States. Neither state-centric Realist theories, institutional Liberal
theories, nor relationship-based Constructivist approaches can account for the specific actors, the
Taiwanese-American exiles, involved in helping to shape U.S. Taiwan policy in the 1980s.
Realism ignores them. These actors were not official representatives of Taiwan at international
institutions because Taiwan was no longer represented in any institutions. The relationships that
the China Lobby had developed over 30 years were with the KMT government, not with the
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exiles who lived in the United States. In sum, theoretical approaches in international relations
would lead scholars to ignore this small group of activists who affected U.S.-Taiwan relations
over three decades.
Many theories of domestic political change would also ignore these actors. TaiwaneseAmerican activists lacked resources to put sufficient political pressure on policy makers at any
level of government. A theory of political entrepreneurship helps us explain the impact of these
actors. The only way these activists could make any impact was by finding political
entrepreneurs in Congress, including staff, representatives, and senators, who would act on their
behalf.
Finally, the only way to account for the durability of the entrepreneurship is to use the
concept of Bonding Social Capital (Auerbach 1995; Bourdieu 1986; Gittel and Vidal 1998;
Loflin 2003; Putnam 2000). When we shift from a state-centric explanation to an explanation
that includes individuals and collectives we encounter problems: How do collectives form? Why
do certain individuals act and others do not? Political scientists and social movement theorists
have offered explanations for collective formation. These explanations include pressure on
people in a stressful environment; possessing the financial and social resources to organize;
encountering a favorable political opportunity structure; receiving psychological, social and
economic benefits by taking part in the social movement. Political scientists and psychologists
offer explanations for why some individuals take action and others do not. These explanations
include financial incentives and ambition (within a rational choice framework), and social
relationships. This study combines these explanations to understand the motivations of the
Taiwanese-American activists. The concept of bonding social capital emphasizes the importance
of the affective, emotional relationships that members of a social group develop as they organize.
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A stressful environment causes citizens with high socio-economic status to form a
movement. Taiwanese-American activists had faced this stressful environment on Taiwan, then
they faced it again as they received news about the government’s crackdown in December 1979.
These activists confronted economic depression, oppression by the KMT, and military conflict.
They were forced to confront these problems together, and they derived psychological benefit
from being part of the collective. Individuals who also have financial resources will use their
social capital and financial capital to start organizations that will distribute social and financial
resources to less capable people within the movement and through to society they live in.
Taiwanese-American activists started the Formosan Association for Public Affairs to do this for
the Taiwanese-American community. The problem is that these individuals usually do not
receive a direct economic benefit from starting such organizations, and members have no
incentive for paying dues to these organizations when they get the social benefits for free, thus
presenting a collective action problem (Olson 1965). This brings us to the central problem: Why
do individuals start organizations that present little, if any, financial reward and may not provide
the desired political outcomes for years or decades? The question leads to the study of political
entrepreneurship.

Defining Political Entrepreneurship
Scholars have approached political entrepreneurship from a variety of perspectives, most
of them viewing entrepreneurship as a change of degree, within jurisdictional boundaries, rather
than a change of kind, to expand jurisdictional boundaries. This study builds on entrepreneurship
scholarship that focuses on changing boundaries to permit policy change in kind. Political
entrepreneurs are people who expand the jurisdictions of authority by engaging in “speculative
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acts of creative recombination in ways that challenge existing boundaries of authority”
(Sheingate 2003, 18). Political entrepreneurs operate within complex institutions where the
boundaries of authority are ambiguous. These boundaries are constantly shifting as different
parts of an institution lose authority over specific policy areas and gain authority over other
areas. Political entrepreneurs are likely to be more common when there is more money to
allocate. “Entrepreneurs will … be attracted by the possibility of redeploying … budgets to
achieve the policy goals they prefer.” (Schneider and Teske 1992, 743). Combining these
approaches, we can predict that political entrepreneurs will be more numerous when there are
ambiguous jurisdictions and bigger budgets to allocate to preferred policy goals.
Congress is a likely place to find political entrepreneurs for three reasons. First,
congressional committees and subcommittees have ambiguous jurisdictions. Second, legislation
is often referred simultaneously to multiple committees because the subject matter often crosses
committee boundaries. This leads to conflict between committees and subcommittees, also
known as turf wars (King 1997), in which members of Congress and their staff are constantly
trying to expand their jurisdictions and protect their jurisdictions from encroachment by rival
committees. Third, members of Congress must serve on multiple committees, often more
committees than they have time to attend, and so they sometimes are forced to sit on relatively
obscure committees that rarely see any relevant action related to their districts or their policy
interests. Thus, members of Congress and their staff have incentives to expand their committee
jurisdictions to enhance the visibility with their constituents and increase their stature in
Congress (Maltzman 1997). These factors provide incentives for members of Congress to
become political entrepreneurs.
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However, not all members do so, and few successfully expand or change the jurisdictions
of their committees and subcommittees. This leads to the question: what factors allow a member
of Congress to become a successful political entrepreneur? Like business entrepreneurs, political
entrepreneurs usually succeed because they make savvy investments with their time and energy
on policy issues. Unlike business entrepreneurs, who do not have fixed jurisdictions, political
entrepreneurs have been identified mainly because they propose new policies in fixed
jurisdictions (Polsby 1984; Weissert 1991; Ainsworth and Sened 1993; Mintrom 1996, 1997;
Polsky 2000; Moukarim 2008). Scholars have argued that success depends on the role of the
person proposing new policies and on the environment the political actor is in. The environment
creates a “policy window” (Kingdon 1997) and political entrepreneurs use issue or policy
networks (Heclo 1977) within that window to build coalitions and create new policies.
Subsequent studies have advanced the study of issue entrepreneurs and policy entrepreneurs in
different policy areas and at different levels of political activity.
Like many fashionable terms in scholarship, “political entrepreneurship” is applied to a
wide range of activities, some with little in common with the others. The only way to avoid
conceptual confusion is by using the word “entrepreneur” sparingly to prevent “conceptual
stretching” (Sartori 1970, 1984; Collier and Mahon 1993). A concept is an information container
or “data container” (Sartori 1970) that is meaningful only if a scholar is very selective in
choosing data for the concept. From this perspective, an “entrepreneur” is meaningful in a
business context because the entrepreneur must make an investment of financial resources. For
the concept to apply to political science, there must be similar kinds of investments and risks.
Most scholars focus on the payoffs – the profit – that an investment generates in politics, such as
when a policy becomes law. If the word “entrepreneur” is going to mean anything in political
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science, it is more effective to focus on the investments that are required instead of the payoffs.
By focusing on the payoffs, it is impossible to distinguish between an entrepreneur, who works
to make a profit, and a gambler who just gets lucky with a momentary windfall. In contrast, by
focusing on the investment we can distinguish the likely successes from the failures.
I define “political entrepreneur” as someone who makes an investment in his or her social
network and consistently advocates policy ideas through various media until the social network
includes people working in government who decide to implement the favored policy. The
entrepreneur absorbs the transaction costs of assembling the coalition needed to bring about the
political outcome the entrepreneur seeks. Transaction costs derive from trade-offs in the use of
scarce resources. These trade-offs become more obvious as resources become more scarce. For
members of Congress and their staff, the trade-off is time spent in the district versus time spent
on Capitol Hill writing legislation, meeting with interest groups, and holding hearings. For
interest groups, the trade-off is time spent assembling a coalition versus time spent maintaining
the interest group. For citizens, the trade-off is time spent assembling a coalition versus time
spent with friends, family, and business associates. The lower these transaction costs, the easier
the trade-offs, and the more likely a person is to become a political entrepreneur.
To identify a political entrepreneur according to this definition, we must examine the
working alliances, friendships, and advocacy groups that the entrepreneur develops. Thus, it is
useful to think of “issue networks” (Heclo 1978) as well as “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier
1988). These networks take time and energy to develop, and they change as policies are
implemented and generate feedback.
We also need to understand what a political entrepreneur is not. “Organizer” and
“advocate” already describe people who use the media as resources to start social movements.
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The media cover such events as sit-ins, marches, protests, picket lines, civil disobedience and
acts of terrorism. The people who innovate these tools help people identify a common problem
and take action to solve that problem. However, these political acts are high-risk, possibly
leading to arrest or death. Few people have the fortitude to take such risks. Therefore, a less risky
way to promote a policy change is to become an advocate by writing letters to the editor,
publishing newspaper articles, and speaking through television and radio. Whether a person
chooses a high-risk or low-risk approach to policy change, these activities merely represent good
citizenship. These actors are not political entrepreneurs if their social networks do not include
people working in government who decide to implement the favored policy
Since a political entrepreneur must build social networks that include elected and
appointed officials who will implement the favored policy, once those social networks are built,
the political entrepreneur must use them. Initially, politicians and policy makers will likely
oppose the favored policy. Thus, the political entrepreneur must be able to convince them to
change their minds or help elect people who approve of the policy. The political entrepreneur
must set the agenda for the policy makers (Cobb and Elder 1983).
Once the entrepreneur sets the agenda, a political actor within the governing body must
codify the issue in legislation. Lawmakers often use legislation to take a position on a policy
issue in order to please constituents (Mayhew, 1974), knowing that there is almost no chance of
the bill becoming law. “Bill sponsorship seems to be the irrational act of otherwise rational
members of Congress. From 1947 to 1998 only 4.74% of the bills introduced in Congress
became law.” (Platt 2008) A political entrepreneur can sponsor, cosponsor, or amend legislation
at some point along the legislative process (in subcommittee or committee markup, on the House
or Senate Floor, or during a conference session). At the local level there are more opportunities
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for policy to become law, so there should be more political entrepreneurs in local government.
At the state level, with 50 governments, there should be fewer political entrepreneurs. At the
federal level there should be a very small number of political entrepreneurs (Schneider and Teske
1992).
Given the difficulties and low probability of turning policy into law at the federal level,
there are two conditions that allow a citizen or political actor to see policy through the legislative
process to become law: a policy window opens independent of a political actor’s efforts or a
political actor helps to create a policy window. A policy window opens when the supporting
coalition and the policy ideas coincide at the right moment. Usually, the “right” moment occurs
after a “focusing event” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Birkland 1997; Sabatier 1988; Saikaly
2009; Corbin 2010). A political entrepreneur sees the opening and rushes to get his or her policy
voted into law, or the political entrepreneur may submit the policy for consideration by the
governing body over many sessions (Weissert 1991). Political entrepreneurs help to create policy
windows by their continuous advocacy of specific policies.
The political entrepreneurs in this study fit under Riker’s (1980) label “heresthetics”
because they structured the world so they could win. Taiwanese-American activists and members
of Congress used rhetoric to build coalitions of policy advocates, and the people within that
coalition helped shape the environment so that the policy becomes acceptable. The composition
of the coalition is critical for the political entrepreneur, and the ways the political entrepreneur
composes the coalition are just as important (Mintrom and Norman 2009). The TaiwaneseAmerican activists used precise language to target members of Congress and congressional staff
who were sympathetic to the cause of human rights on Taiwan. The activists also supported
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sympathetic candidates for Congress who won their first elections, in part with funding from
wealthy Taiwanese-Americans, and maintained the support over the decades.
This long period of time was critical for Taiwanese-Americans to develop relationships
with citizens, congressional staff, and politicians. The metaphor of a policy window is appealing
precisely because it captures the short time period in which new policies are considered and
implemented. Yet, in order to understand sustained entrepreneurship, we must know what
motivates political actors over long periods of time.

The Congressional Environment
A narrow understanding of political entrepreneurship is a key tool for resolving the
puzzles of change in U.S-Taiwan relations during the 1980s. All the action took place in
Congress. The congressional environment poses a critical test for political entrepreneurship on
foreign policy for three reasons. First, as previously mentioned, passing laws at the federal level
is incredibly difficult, discouraging political entrepreneurship. Second, because foreign policy is
not traditionally considered to be the domain of individual members of Congress, it is
counterintuitive when a member of Congress acts like a surrogate secretary of state or defense.
Finally, a common expectation for members of Congress is that they are always trying to win reelection, so it is also counterintuitive when members of Congress become political entrepreneurs
in foreign policy in ways that do not promote their own reelection.
The congressional environment matters as we try to account for the motivations of
members to become political entrepreneurs. Aspects of the congressional environment provide
incentives for entrepreneurship, including electoral imperatives, an opportunity structure with
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many openings for individual initiative, leadership positions that reward entrepreneurs, media
organizations that show entrepreneurs to the public, and fundraisers who reward entrepreneurs.
One influential scholarly view of Congress maintains that its members rationally focus on
doing what they can to win re-election (Mayhew 1974). They serve on committees that serve
their district’s interests. They do constituent case work and meet mainly with people from their
districts. They may meet with interest groups, but only with those that affect their district’s
interests. They get involved in foreign policy issues if it helps their district or enhances their
standing among constituents. They meet mainly with people who will either give them votes for
re-election or money to campaign. They take positions that matter to the constituents even if the
position does not lead to a legislative outcome or a position on a committee. In addition,
ambition theory recognizes that members of Congress may take positions that will help them
advance to higher office.
The scholarly literature on congressional staff leads us to predict that staffers have little
influence over members of Congress. Staff members do not initiate legislation or new policies,
instead working as agents who do the bidding of the member of Congress or the committee.
Finally, the scholarly literature leads us to predict that interest groups get the attention of
members of Congress only if they have the ability to sway a large number of votes or contribute
money to a campaign (Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Weil 1974; Said 1981; Watanabe 1984: ch.
3; Tierney 1994). Thus, we would expect that large and/or wealthy interest groups get more
attention than small, poor interest groups. We would also expect interest groups to succeed only
if they can apply electoral pressure on enough members of Congress to affect election results.
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Broadening the Opportunities for Political Entrepreneurship within Congress
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Congress is a complex institution characterized by
multiple (and sometimes competing) committees and subcommittees in the House and the
Senate. Therefore, we can expect to find many political entrepreneurs within each chamber, and
indeed we do. However, at the start of the time period that is the focus of this study, lawmakers
who might pursue political entrepreneurship in the U.S. Congress faced several constraints
Obstacles included the powers of the leadership to appoint committee and subcommittee chairs
and direct legislation to relevant subcommittees, the powers of committee and subcommittee
chairs to hold hearings, and the powers of members of Congress to submit legislation and
amendments during markup sessions within committees and on the House floor. These powers
presented significant obstacles to political entrepreneurs.
A brief review of House reforms will help us understand why members did not become
entrepreneurs until the 1970s. The first House reform was in 1910. Before 1910, Speaker Joe
Cannon had appointed committee chairs in a very arbitrary manner, satisfying his personal
political preferences and effectively curbing any initiative by individual lawmakers. The reforms
centralized power in the House leadership, taking personal political preferences out of the
selection of committee chairs. The new tool was seniority (Polsby et al 1969). This system still
stifled entrepreneurship because members could accomplish nothing without the chairs’
cooperation.
In 1975 Democratic House members rebelled against the powers conferred by seniority
and created a more open political environment that was conducive to entrepreneurship. This
rebellion happened because conservative Southern Democratic committee chairs had views that
matched the Republican White House more than the rank-and-file democrats who came from the
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Northeast (Ornstein 1977). To counter an assertive Republican President and the monopoly
power of conservative Southern democrats, liberal Northern Democrats stripped committee
chairs of their power. This rebellion also happened in part because Congress began to lose trust
in the executive branch, particularly in its monopoly over information on international issues that
allowed executive officials to distort what they presented to Congress and the public (Bennet
1978). Moreover, the partisan division of national institutions, with the Democrats controlling
Congress and the Republicans dominating the presidency, led to increasing congressional
assertiveness (Rohde 1994).
Congressional assertiveness reflected other developments that involved foreign policy in
particular. The postwar consensus, premised upon the need to resist Communist threats, took a
particular institutional form in which the executive branch developed and managed a national
security state and an intelligence community. Congress followed the president’s lead, permitting
various parts of the executive branch latitude to deal with international Communism. As liberal
Northern Democrats became more numerous in the late 1960s, they recoiled against executive
dominance over foreign policy. This spilled over into opposition to Southern Democrats because
they controlled the committees that set foreign relations and defense policy, and they often sided
with the executive branch. The Northern Democrats sought to change the institutional rules to
take power away from the Southern Democrats and make foreign and defense policy reflect
liberal ideas (Rohde 1994).
Congress faced three pressures at the start of the 1970s that triggered changes that, in
turn, improved the opportunity structure for entrepreneurship by lawmakers, their staffs, and
others. First, within the House the views of the committee chairs no longer reflected the views
of the committee members, much less those of the whole chamber. Second, Congress had

21

inadequate resources for managing issues. Finally, Congress had to figure out how to effectively
manage the new demands of interest groups and political entrepreneurs.
For the first pressure, committee chairs whose views no longer reflected the views of the
committee members, Democratic reformers made it easier to amend measures and insisted on
recorded floor votes (Whalen 1982). Floor transparency thwarted the committee chair who might
try a final vote on a bill he had drafted himself, sometimes with little committee say. Without
transparency, rank-and-file representatives had no incentive to challenge legislation because no
one in their district would know how they voted. Once legislative action became public through
recorded votes, members could put together majorities to amend bills. Transparency in the
selection of committee chairs was intended to accomplish the same goal of giving power to the
rank-and-file. Before the 1970s the House members voted on committee and subcommittee
chairs as a block and were unable to challenge individual chairs. During the 1970s House
reformers changed the voting procedures so that representatives could approve or reject
committee chairs individually by secret ballot. Lawmakers gained more influence over chairs,
even if they exercised it infrequently. Further, the approval of the so-called Subcommittee Bill
of Rights transferred control over legislation to subcommittee chairs and gave them their own
staff resources.
These changes within the House lowered the obstacles for political entrepreneurs. During
the 1970s, rank-and-file House members started to move more quickly into leadership positions
on subcommittees and committees, and they started to expand the boundaries of acceptable
behavior for representatives. For example, they started to challenge committee and subcommittee
chairs who had greater seniority, replacing them with members who had barely arrived in the
House. In addition, representatives started to propose many more amendments on the House
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floor. Republicans, accustomed to minority status in House, accepted transparency to force
liberal Democrats to take a stand on controversial issues on the floor (Smith 1992). The
Democrats followed the Republicans’ lead and submitted floor amendments if they could not get
amendments approved in subcommittee or committee markup sessions. Subcommittee
empowerment meant a large number of lawmakers in the majority party now had resources to
influence the legislative agenda and the content of legislation.
The second pressure, inadequate resources for managing issues, derived from revelations
that the Nixon administration frequently lied to Congress about foreign policy activities, and
from the increasing merger of international and domestic issues as “intermestic” issues (Manning
1977). The Nixon administration’s lies demonstrated to Congress that the House and Senate
needed professional staff that equaled the staff in the executive branch. To fix this, Congress
passed the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act that gave Congress more oversight
over executive branch activity (Fox and Hammond 1977). The merger of domestic and
international issues forced members of Congress to spend more time on case work that merged
foreign policy and their constituents’ interests, but members of Congress simply did not have this
time, and committees did not have the staff. Thus, Congress gave itself more staff in the 1970s.
With more staff, members of Congress suddenly found more issues to place on the agenda as
entrepreneurs (Loomis 1988; Burgin 1991; Burgin 1993) and they delegated more authority to
staff. Congressional staff began to accept more input from interest groups (Tierney 1993;
Tierney 1994).
The addition of more expert staff to Congress, especially to the House, reversed the
historical dynamics in foreign policy. Before 1970, the foreign policy environment had been
filled by the executive branch and the Senate according to their prescribed constitutional roles.
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By 1980, in contrast, the House took the lead in the foreign policy arena for three reasons. First,
the executive branch became more deferential to Congress, especially to the House, and
consulted members of Congress before making foreign policy decisions (with exceptions such as
America’s China policy). Second, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went from being very
active to largely inactive. Third, the House Foreign Affairs Committee moved in the reverse
direction, from being inactive to being very active. The declining activity of the Senate
committee and the increasing activity of the House committee were largely the result of changes
in committee chairmen in the House and Senate during the 1970s (Johnson 1975; McCormick
1985; Noble 1993). After 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lost influence as it
became ideologically divided, filled with inexperienced senators and thus unable to pass
legislation. Simultaneously, the powers of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were spread
out to its subcommittee chairs and staff, and the chairs became very active.
Members of Congress responded to the third pressure, managing the new demands of
interest groups, by delegating tasks to staff and interest groups through a legislative enterprise
system (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) in which congressional offices functioned like small
businesses (Loomis 1979). House members created enterprises that helped them to coordinate
domestic and international policies, from writing legislation to final signature by the president.
House subcommittees became routine, focused and aggressive in monitoring policy behavior in
the executive branch (McCormick 1993).
In sum, the House increased transparency, increased staff resources, and increased
organization at the level of the individual member and subcommittee. These changes shifted
influence from the foreign policy elites in the executive branch and the Senate to House
members who sat on committees overseeing defense policies and appropriations. As these
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developments converged in the 1970s, political entrepreneurs took advantage of both the
openness of Congress and the synthesis of international and domestic issues to become national
political figures with high levels of ambition. This ambition compelled them to seek an impact
on a range of international and domestic policy issues from the moment they entered Congress,
whether as a member, or as congressional staff, or as a lobbyist for an interest group.

Opportunity Structure and Personal Motivation
The developments within Congress during the 1970s transformed the political
opportunity structure. A closed political structure will present no opportunities for political
entrepreneurs. Conversely, an open one will provide opportunities, but no incentives: political
entrepreneurs will see no long-term benefits because their accomplishments can be easily
undone. As Sheingate explains, “Consider for a moment the impact of very high or very low
entry barriers on political entrepreneurship. Where entry barriers are too high, entrepreneurship
will be discouraged as innovations that would challenge existing jurisdictions of authority fail to
see the light of day.…Where entry barriers are too low, entrepreneurs find it comparatively easy
to engage in speculative acts of creative recombination, but the consolidation of innovation –
transforming institutional boundaries in a way that perpetuates new jurisdictions of authority –
may be exceptionally difficult.” (Sheingate 2003, 200)
Applying the idea of political opportunity structures to Congress, Sheingate articulates a
“congressional opportunity structure” based on the jurisdictions of committees and
subcommittees. The more ambiguous a committee’s or subcommittee’s jurisdiction, the more
opportunities there will be for hearings on different issues.
Central to the concept of a congressional opportunity structure is the notion that
committee jurisdictions are not uniform. Whereas some committees maintain
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relatively homogeneous jurisdictions and a degree of redundancy in issue
attention, others have more complex jurisdictions characterized by a diversity of
issue attention. Because of these manifold qualities, issue attention will be
contingent upon the characteristics of specific policy domains and the manner in
which they engage particular committee jurisdictions. Whereas some issues will
touch upon multiple jurisdictions, … others will not, instead falling within the
purview of well-defined committee jurisdictions that offer few opportunities for
issue entrepreneurship. (Sheingate 2006, 847)
Political entrepreneurs will likely be members of Congress and congressional staff who serve on
committees that have ambiguous, overlapping jurisdictions. The more ambiguous the
jurisdictions of committees and subcommittees, the more hearings, indicating political
entrepreneurship on the part of both members of Congress and their staff, Sheingate argues. In
addition, committees that control appropriations should attract more political entrepreneurs
(Schneider and Teske 1992). We can also see political entrepreneurs on committees that
authorize policies because, within these committees, it is still necessary to push an agenda item
and forge coalitions. Setting the committee’s agenda and building coalitions on the committee
are entrepreneurial activities because both entail transaction costs. Sometimes members of
Congress become both authorizers and appropriators (Fisher 1980; Gist 1981; Champoux and
Sullivan 2006; Ginieczki 2010), and fund policies without authorization.
This logic leads us to expect that every member of Congress and every staff can become
a political entrepreneur, but we know that few people choose this path. We are left with the
original puzzle: Why do some members of Congress and congressional staff become political
entrepreneurs? The only way to solve this puzzle is to examine motivations. Committee
assignments, district representation, and number of years serving in Congress are necessary but
not sufficient conditions for entrepreneurship.
District representation and number of years serving in Congress are necessary conditions
for entrepreneurship because a member of Congress is more likely to become an entrepreneur if
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his or her seat is safe, as indicated by the political composition of the district and the margins of
victory in past elections. Starting in the 1970s, congressional seats became increasingly safe as
landslide victories replaced marginal victories (Mayhew 1974). This happened for a couple
reasons. First, party loyalty declined as voters defected from their registered political parties and
voted for incumbents based on casework (Yiannakis 1981). Second, the advantages of
incumbency increased as members of Congress used increased staff to devote more resources to
casework (Epstein and Frankovic 1982). Paradoxically, as casework replaced political parties as
voting cues for citizens, they became more important for political entrepreneurs as a way to
reduce transaction costs (Aldrich 1995). This leads us to predict that a member of Congress is
likely to be a political entrepreneur in foreign policy if he has won a series of landslide victories,
has sufficient staff to devote to casework, and has a high enough political rank in Congress
(subcommittee chair, committee chair, whip, minority leader, majority leader, speaker) to know
that his or her party will support entrepreneurial activities. The entrepreneurs I study in chapters
two and three have all of these characteristics.
However, even with a safe seat and the backing of the political party, the initial incentive
for a member of Congress is to not get involved in foreign policy issues because the transaction
costs are too high. The executive branch usually has more information about foreign policy
issues. If the executive branch does not have a policy on a specific foreign policy problem, there
is likely at least one member of Congress, out of 535, who “owns” the issue. Thus, a member of
Congress will likely learn who else is active on the specific foreign policy issue before becoming
active. This is because, with scarce time and resources, no member of Congress wants to
duplicate efforts. If the effort to learn about a foreign policy issue is high, but the political reward
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is low, then the member of Congress will likely delegate the foreign policy issue to the executive
branch or another member of Congress (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
Once we know that a member of Congress has a secure enough position to take political
risks as an entrepreneur, and learns that neither the executive branch or another member is acting
on a foreign policy issue, we can use a microfoundational approach to extend the application of
the concept of political opportunity structure beyond the committee level to include all of
Congress. We can approach a more complete understanding of the rational and affective
motivations for political entrepreneurship. “Microfoundation refers to considering how decisions
…aggregate into larger phenomena. Basically, it aims to trace a causal path through individual
decisions. It is based on the understanding that the external incentives structure is only half of the
story; the individual decision is the other, and both halves of the equation are equally important.”
(Fan 2000, 9) A microfoundation approach requires examining the demographic profiles of the
subjects of study. Fan argues that a subject’s demographic profile affects “a movement’s
organizational and tactical repertoires as well as its interaction with political opportunity
structure.” (Fan 2000, 12-13)
As the House and Senate opened up their opportunity structures, members of Congress
claimed ownership of specific foreign policies. Representative James Oberstar (D-MN, 19752011), held no seat on a committee related to foreign affairs but was “the universally recognized
congressional expert on Haiti (having lived there for several years in the early 1960s)” and
“earned the privilege of being consulted whenever United States actions concerning Haiti were
considered.” (Tierney 1994, 104) Representative Joe Moakley (D-MA, 1973-2001) chaired the
Rules Committee and “had tremendous influence in cutting military aid to El Salvador because
he got interested in human rights abuses there.” (Tierney 1994, 104) Moakley became an expert
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on the issue and rewrote the 1990 immigration law to allow more Salvadorans to immigrate to
the United States Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT, 1981-2011) became influential on Central
America issues because of “his stint as a Peace Corps volunteer in the Dominican Republic, his
fluency in Spanish, and his demonstrated expertise on the issues.” (Tierney 1994, 110) For these
members of Congress, biography mattered more than the demographics or needs of the senator’s
state or the representative’s districts.
One obvious motivator for a politician is ambition. During the 1970s, members of
Congress became more ambitious. Schlesinger identifies three types of ambition: discrete, for a
specific political office for a specific time period and no other political office; static, for a long
career in a specific political office; and progressive, for an office that is more important than the
current one the politician seeks or holds (Schlesinger 1966). A political opportunity structure
describes the situational responses of politicians as their ambition is facilitated by the political
environment they occupy (Day, 1974). House members shifted from static ambition to
progressive ambition. Members of Congress became more ambitious in the 1970s because the
Watergate class that was elected in 1974, the “Watergate Babies”, was younger and less
experienced in politics than the rest of the House of Representatives (Loomis 1988). Before
1970, representatives aimed for higher leadership roles within the House over decades of service
through seniority. By 1980, representatives sought more prominent leadership roles without
relying on seniority, and they focused more quickly on being elected to the Senate or even
running for president.
The Watergate Class reformed Congress as an institution and the way members organized
their offices because they knew of different organizational repertoires (Clemens 1997). They
formed personal offices that were open and non-hierarchical, and allowed staff members and
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constituents to have frequent and direct access to them. In addition to the organization of their
personal offices, these House freshmen brought a new emphasis on intra-party organization: they
organized themselves rapidly into informal caucuses immediately following the November
midterm elections and were thus able to quickly mobilize their numerical resources to change the
institutional structures in the House.
The House of Representatives consists of multiple layers of political opportunity
structures. The top layer is the structure of leadership opportunities for representatives. The
middle layer is the structure of opportunities for congressional staff. The opportunities include
the ability to impact legislation, the ability to translate a congressional staff position into an
elected political office, an appointed position on a government agency, a staff position in the
senate or executive branch, and/or a paid position as a lobbyist for an interest group or a law
firm. The bottom layer is the structure of opportunities for concerned citizens, constituents, and
interest groups who want to set the agenda for legislation in the House of Representatives. We
can also use this approach to look at the Senate with equivalent layers.
Congressional staff became more numerous, more specialized, more professional, and
more entrepreneurial as well. The staff became an autonomous force, writing legislation before it
reached markup in subcommittees and committees (Jones and Woll 1979, Malbin 1977, 1980).
Franck and Weisband (1979) illustrate the increased influence of congressional staff on members
of Congress. Representative Vanik’s legislative aide helped secure passage of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment on Jewish emigration for the Soviet Union. He called every congressional office to
secure co-sponsorship from members and he negotiated directly with Jewish lobbying groups. In
a second example “Representative Tom Harkin has acknowledged that the human rights issue
was of little interest to him until Rebecca Switzer of his staff handed him the fully drafted
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amendment to that year’s foreign assistance authorization that became the first mandatory human
rights legislation.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 236) Senator Hubert Humphrey and Henry
Kissinger had to rely on Humphrey’s staff to interpret the language in a foreign aid bill to
facilitate negotiations.
Congressional staffs have generally two types of motivations: professional and
entrepreneurial (Price 1971). Professional staffs know the policies of the members of Congress
and the committee chairs so that they can reflect those policies in legislation. Entrepreneurial
staffs actively initiate legislation and seek out members who will sponsor or co-sponsor the
legislation, regardless of party, even when the policy views do not match the views of the
members for whom the staff work (Romzek 2000). Congressional staffs tend to have short
tenures in Congress if they are personal staff, but they have professional ambitions outside of
Congress that relate to their work as staff. They may later work in the executive branch or for
government agencies that implement the policies they wrote as staff, or they may become
members of Congress (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981; Romzek and Utter 1996, 1997; Henschen
and Sidlow 1986; Herrnson 1994).
With more staff and greater expertise on a wider range of policy issues under their
control, rank-and-file representatives were able to set the agenda of Congress at the individual
level instead of relying solely on positions in subcommittees and committees. The congressional
staff found allies among other lawmakers through networks of staffs. These became informal
issue or policy networks (Heclo 1977) that enabled the staff to provide a great deal of support to
their representatives. Thus, representatives developed multiple resources: intellectual expertise
with more and better staff; financial capability with better fundraising from individuals and
interest groups; access to decision-makers in both Congress and the executive branch through
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their experienced staff; and access to expert policy through policy networks. The issue networks
that congressional staff cultivated connected with transnational advocacy networks (Keck and
Sikkink 1998) to give members of Congress access to expert information around the world
through subcommittee and committee hearings.

Interest Groups and Opportunity Structures
Congressional staff members are often the first points of contact for a lawmaker,
suggesting the importance of the relationship between interest groups and legislative staff for
understanding how groups influence Congress. For this study, the important literature is on
interest groups that influence foreign policy through Congress (Ambrosio 2002; Al Qahtani
2001; Almond 1950; Arnson and Brenner 1993; Brenner et al. 2002; Dent 1995; Dietrich 1997;
Fischer 2004; Milbrath 1967; Skidmore 1993; Tierney 1993, 1994; Trice 1976), with a focus on
ethnic interest groups that attempt to influence foreign policy toward their home countries or
home regions (Aziabu 1992; Cosgrove 1993; Davis and Moore 1997; Fernandez 1987; Goldberg
1990; Greve 1995; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Heindl 2004, 2007; Huseynov 2003; King and
Melvin 2000; King and Pomper 2004; Lindsay 2002; McC Mathias 1981; Mearsheimer and Walt
2006; Moore 2002; O’Gara 2000; O’Grady 1996; Paul and Paul 2009; Podbielski 1997;
Rampersad 2007; Said 1981; Saideman 2002; Shain 1995; Silverman 1996; Smith 2000;
Watanabe 1984; Woodruff 2005).
Ethnic interest groups have had increasing influence on U.S. foreign policy since the
early 20th century. There are three historical periods for interest group influence (Smith 2000). In
the first period, the 1910s to the 1930s, the most active groups were German, Scandinavian,
Irish, and Italian. These groups helped maintain American international neutrality, and there
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was often a tension between ethnic loyalties to the homeland and national loyalties. During the
second period, the Cold War, ethnic and national identities coincided. AIPAC became the most
powerful lobby during this period because its devotion to Israel fit with America’s strategic
interest in Israel as an ally against Soviet influence in the Middle East, and as an asset for
projecting American influence into that region (Silverman 1996). The end of the Cold War
marked the transition into the third period. The post-Cold War international environment
provided a great opportunity for ethnic and other interest groups to dominate an otherwise
aimless American foreign policy. Indeed, the threshold of entry for an ethnic interest group to
influence American foreign policy is very low: access is available to an ethnic lobby that can
spend at least $1 million in campaign contributions and control about 250,000 votes in select
congressional districts. “The influence of such a group might well be ‘considerable,’ providing
that the group had no powerful enemies, a clear agenda, and the capacity to find at least some
credible allies.” (Smith 2000, 88)
Ethnic activism on foreign policy has interacted with the more open congressional
opportunity structure and increased political entrepreneurship by lawmakers and congressional
staff. Paul and Paul (2009) give examples of both representatives and senators who become
active in U.S. foreign policy issues because of ethnic group influences. Consider two examples
of lawmakers who chose to speak for the Armenian cause. “Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)
championed Armenian issues because the doctor who nursed him back to health after World War
II was Armenian” (Greve 1995, cited in Paul and Paul 2009, 66). In 1988 Rep. Frank Pallone (DNJ) succeeded the deceased James Howard and retained as his first staffer Armenian-American
Rosalie Chorbajian. Pallone also lives across the street from an Armenian church and thus has
close contact with the Armenian community. Chorbajian “told Pallone about her family's
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experience, specifically that her father’s family was massacred during the Armenian genocide,
and her father only escaped because he was not home at the time. She gave Pallone information
on the issue, including that opponents of the genocide call the events a civil war. Pallone became
a champion of recognizing the genocide, and Armenian Americans were very grateful for his
support.” (Paul and Paul 2009, 207) Rep. Pallone co-founded the Armenian congressional caucus
in 1995 (Auerbach 1995 cited in Paul and Paul 2009, 206).
Closer examination of the details demonstrates causal mechanisms for representatives to
become active in a foreign policy issue. The Pallone case suggests the likelihood of activism
when (1) a new member of Congress hires staff from previous (retired or deceased) members, (2)
develops a close relationship with his personal staff and is influenced by that relationship, (3)
uses formal (e.g. subcommittees and committees) and informal (e.g. caucuses) institutional
mechanisms in Congress to promote the issues he/she learns about through the staff, and (4) is
motivated by a personal connection with the community (living next to a community, having
relatives from a community, visiting a specific country) to promote the issue. The Pallone
example highlights a key motivational element in entrepreneurship. As his experience shows,
affective politics often drive a member of Congress to get involved with a foreign policy issue.
Lawmakers who develop close relationships with people who are affected by a foreign policy
issue, especially human rights abuses in a specific country, or who visit foreign countries with
human rights abuses are more likely to become foreign policy entrepreneurs (Carter et al 2004).
In sum, congressional entrepreneurship on foreign policy reflects the convergence of two
developments, a new opportunity structure that facilitates individual lawmaker and staff
entrepreneurship and increased ethnic diaspora activism.
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To understand why lawmakers embrace causes with no obvious and immediate political
payoff, we must broaden our understanding of congressional motivation. Members of Congress
and their staff often become foreign policy entrepreneurs because of chance associations between
a lawmaker and a particular group, especially one that has been exploited or victimized. In order
for the chance association to turn into an affective relationship, two elements need to be present.
First, the member of Congress makes a rational decision that there is a policy window: the
member discovers a policy that no longer works, learns that no one else is trying to find a
solution, and decides to fill the void. Second, the member of Congress forms long-term
relationships with ethnic interest groups and staff, and these relationships become the motivation
for foreign policy entrepreneurship over years or decades. The longevity of the relationship
strengthens the affective connection between the lawmaker, staff, and interest groups. The longer
the relationship, the more potent it becomes as a source of motivation.
These changes within Congress, and the sources of motivation, emphasize the individual
politician over the institution or the political party, so it is the individual politician who becomes
identified with a specific foreign policy and a specific concern over human rights abuses in a
given country. Thus it is no longer sufficient to understand foreign policy through Congress from
a macro, institutional perspective. Instead we require a micro perspective, one that examines the
biographies and lives of specific members of Congress and their staff, to fully explain the origins
of foreign policy entrepreneurship. By extension, the micro perspective accounts for the
persistence of such legislative entrepreneurship.
The legislative process is difficult and long, with many possible veto points along the
path for any member of Congress who is opposed to the specific policy. It takes a long-term
strategic view and a great deal of commitment to submit legislation over years and decades with
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the hope that a “policy window” will open for the specific policy. If lawmakers were motivated
only by short-term electoral calculations, they would have little incentive to push hard for
legislation likely to require a long period of time and a measure of luck to be successful. It would
be better for the rational politician to content him/herself with a few speeches to please the home
audience. Persistence demands a deeper commitment to a cause and affective ties are the most
likely basis for such a commitment.
Diaspora organizations also practice entrepreneurial politics. They do so in various ways
that include writing legislation for a member of Congress to submit in a committee or on the
floor and working with other interest groups, members of Congress, and their staff to build an
advocacy coalition that will pass the legislation. Paul and Paul (2009) describe the
entrepreneurial model of organizing ethnic groups: “The organization is run by an individual or
two, and these few people wear all of the hats, including fundraising, public relations, advocacy,
and contacting members of Congress and their offices. Many of these organizations are run by
the same individual(s) who founded the group, and some of these founders … established the
organization because of the absence of ethnic entities that focused on foreign policy.” (Paul and
Paul 2009, 56) The authors include in this category the Polish American Congress, the Irish
National Caucus, the American Kurdish Information Network and the Albanian American Civic
League. “Despite their relatively small size, such organizations can have influence.” (Paul and
Paul 2009, 56)
For the ethnic lobby, the challenge is to sustain influence over time. An acknowledged
policy “crisis” increases the likelihood that the ethnic entrepreneur gets a hearing, but once the
focusing event passes entrepreneurial activity usually stops. There is no continuing relationship
between the member of Congress and the entrepreneurial immigrant or interest group that
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originally submitted the legislation. This is why building personal relationships can prove
decisive. Ethnic activists who forge affective ties to a member of Congress will have more
opportunities over years or even decades to turn their ideas into successful legislation. They have
a better chance of influencing American foreign policy, regardless of how big the ethnic lobby is
in terms of membership or how financially wealthy it is. As I will show, Taiwanese-Americans
have managed to accomplish this. They continue to have a relationship with members of
Congress and their staff, through the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA).

Rational Motivations for Entrepreneurship
Since the president normally leads the way in a domestic or foreign policy crisis,
members of Congress become foreign policy entrepreneurs when (1) the executive does not yet
have a policy toward a specific country and (2) when the member of Congress wants to change
policy toward a specific country (Carter and Scott 2010). Senators are more likely to be
entrepreneurs. Members of the majority party in Congress are likely to be entrepreneurs.
Members of the non-presidential party are likely to be entrepreneurs. Members serving on
foreign policy committees are likely to be entrepreneurs (Carter and Scott 2010). This helps
explain why Rep. Solarz became a foreign policy entrepreneur: he chaired a foreign policy
subcommittee, he was a member of the majority party in the House, he was a member of the nonpresidential party from 1975 to 1977 and 1981 to 1991.
Carter and Scott (2010) offer evidence on the targets of foreign policy entrepreneurs.
They provide a fourfold typology: policy specialists, process specialists, policy strategists, and
process strategists. Policy specialists care about what the United States does about specific
problems in specific countries, or specific problems shared by many countries. Process
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specialists care about how a specific issue should be handled. Policy strategists are concerned
about the best approaches to long-term problems like economic development or dealing with
rogue states. Finally, process strategists are concerned with such issues as war powers and who
makes the rules regarding foreign military sales procedures.
From the literature on policy networks and advocacy coalitions, we can also predict that a
member of Congress, or congressional staff, will become a political entrepreneur when (1) he or
she thinks that a specific policy is not working and (2) he or she is persuaded by an interest
group that a specific policy should be changed. According to the policy literature, a sense of
“crisis” builds in a policy coalition such that there is an incentive to change a policy. In this
context, a “crisis” in a specific policy, warranting change, is different from a domestic or foreign
crisis that the president must address. During a foreign or domestic crisis involving the United
States the president leads and Congress follows. This leadership provides a “policy window”
around a focusing event that gives policy experts the opportunity to change policies according to
their preferences (Corbin 2010). Academics and researchers in think tanks use various strategies
to get Congress to pursue one policy instead of another. However, when there is not a focusing
event, the president usually does not take the lead. This lack of leadership gives policy advocates
and interest groups an opening to contact entrepreneurial staff and members of Congress.
This dissertation examines three types of political entrepreneurship targeted at policy
windows. The first is by a member of Congress; the second, by congressional staff; the third, by
an ethnic interest group based on transnational activism. In the last type, an ethnic interest group
based on transnational activism: immigrants, exiles, or people with strong ethnic identities
organize by pooling their resources to target congressional staff or a member of Congress. In the
next chapter we will examine how policy windows affected the scope of foreign policy
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entrepreneurship by members of Congress. Starting in 1970 there were numerous policy
windows opening for American foreign policies toward various countries. These windows
included civil wars in Latin America and Africa; human rights abuses by governments in El
Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Cambodia, China, South Africa, Sudan; humanitarian
crises brought on by natural disasters. These crises drove citizens of the affected countries to
emigrate, many to the United States. In turn members of Congress and their staff started taking
the initiative to produce legislation to affect the countries in the crisis.
American policy toward China was settled until President Carter suddenly recognized the
People’s Republic of China in 1979. This abrupt decision created a policy window for Congress
to take the lead on U.S. China policy. The result, as previously mentioned, was the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA). The TRA unintentionally created a policy “crisis” among the TaiwaneseAmerican community because it changed the immigration quota for Taiwanese citizens, merging
the quota for Taiwan with the quota for Mainland China and dramatically reducing the number
of Taiwanese who could immigrate to the United States Finally, the recognition of China
provoked a human rights crisis on Taiwan that became a catalyst for Taiwanese-Americans to
organize themselves and contact Congress for help. There were many political entrepreneurs
among Taiwanese-Americans, congressional staff, and members of Congress, all converging
simultaneously to rapidly affect American policy toward Taiwan from the 1980s to the present.
Taiwan stands out because it is the only example, next to Israel, that has sustained affective and
rational relationships with members of Congress to maintain its political influence over three
decades.
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Chapter 2
Human Rights Abuse as Catalyst for Affective Political Entrepreneurship
The changes within Congress during the late 1960s and early 1970s created an
environment that encouraged the emergence of political entrepreneurs. However, these changes
do not suffice to explain the emergence of political entrepreneurs who focused on human rights.
To understand the rise of human rights, we must examine contemporary changes both within the
United States and around the world.
The changes within the United States and around the world changed the topics that
members of Congress cared about. In the United States the Civil Rights movement brought home
to many activists the importance of human rights. The Watergate scandal demonstrated the
willingness of people in the executive branch to abuse power. The Vietnam War showed that the
U.S. was supporting an immoral regime and was becoming immoral in the process. The invasion
of Cambodia and the killing of students at Kent State convinced many members of Congress that
the Vietnam War had shifted from being a military problem to being a moral problem (Schneider
1979, 5). Human rights abuses by a Greek military junta, the Brazilian government, the
Indonesian military in East Timor, and the military junta in Chile convinced members of
Congress that the American government had to stop sending financial and military support to
such governments. This led Congress in 1973 to adopt the War Powers Resolution, which limited
the President’s ability to deploy American troops, and to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to
deny economic and military assistance to governments that committed human rights abuses
(Schneider 1979, 6-7). Congress extended human rights amendments to trade agreements and
bilateral economic assistance.
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The emergence of human rights concerns in the Democratic-led Congress and among
Democratic voters persuaded Jimmy Carter to use human rights as a campaign tool to win the
Democratic nomination for president in 1976 and then make human rights a centerpiece of
American foreign policy during his inaugural address (Schneider 1979, 9; Muravchik 1986).
President Carter used human rights rhetoric for two reasons. The first was to provide the moral
center to U.S. foreign policy that Democrats believed had been missing from the Nixon and Ford
administrations. The second was to aggressively counter the Soviet Union’s actions in places like
Afghanistan and Angola. Carter viewed policies that emphasized human rights as replacing Cold
War military activities in post-Vietnam America (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 1987; Cohen R 1982;
Cohen S 1982; Cohen M 1983; Hartmann 2001).
However, Carter was inconsistent in his human rights policies: his administration, led by
Patricia Derian, the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the State
Department, seldom used human rights to formulate foreign policy. When it did use human
rights to shape foreign policies, these still supported regimes that committed human rights abuses
(Loescher 1979). In reaction, some members of Congress decided that President Carter was not
serious about human rights, and that general human rights amendments and legislation were
insufficient to deal with specific countries. Senators and representatives began to invest a great
deal of time and energy in rights violations in Angola, Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.
Interestingly, the lawmakers received no rewards from their constituents for their efforts.
Why would senators and representatives invest so much time and energy in specific countries
while knowing that their constituents did not care? To solve this puzzle, this chapter provides a
model to explain the motivations of members of Congress and how a human rights abuse in a
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specific country translated into American foreign policy toward the country committing the
abuses.
First there are the international provocations: A country decides to imprison, kill, and
torture its citizens or to deprive its citizens of rights that are acknowledged by the United
Nations.
Second, information about these international provocations reaches people in the United
States through an intermediary. Refugees from the country may travel to the United States to
testify before Congress, as may political exiles living in the United States. They also may
communicate to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or citizens’ groups, which then
communicate the information to Congress. Members of Congress and/or their staff may travel
abroad to meet with NGOs and/or political prisoners. Members of Congress may employ staff
who have traveled to an afflicted country, have friends/relatives there, or may themselves have
had formative experiences there.
Third, regardless of how the member of Congress gets information about human rights
abuses in a specific country, he or she is deeply personally affected by the information and
decides to take action through a variety of mechanisms. This is where we see the concept of
bonding social capital, but it is called affective politics. Once members of Congress are deeply
personally affected by information about human rights abuses, they form close relationships with
the sources of information and with the country suffering the abuse. The words are different, but
they refer to the power of emotional attachments to connect people to each other and trust each
other so that they can work as a collective.
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Fourth, the member of Congress chooses the path of least resistance to advance his/her
concerns. If the member of Congress is in the majority party and a member of the president’s
party, the easiest path is to communicate privately with the president about the situation in order
to spur immediate action through the executive branch.2 If a member of Congress is in the
minority party and a member of the opposition party, direct communication with the president
will likely be difficult. Moreover, communication with the congressional leadership will likely
produce few results.
Thus, the motivation to become a foreign policy entrepreneur will depend first on how
deeply affected the member of Congress is by the specific human rights abuse, and second on the
member’s assessment of the probability of getting a result from communication with
Congressional leadership and the president. The more deeply affected the member of Congress
is, and the more difficult the institutional and political environment, the higher the probability
that the member of Congress will exert extraordinary effort to become a foreign policy
entrepreneur over years and decades.

Amnesty International
We can apply this model to the work of Amnesty International (AI). AI started in London
in 1961. It enlisted many anti-war activists to go to college campuses to start groups that wrote
letters to oppressive governments requesting freedom for political prisoners (Cmiel 1999). Most
of the information that Congress received about human rights abuses came from AI, whose
volunteers went on fact-finding missions around the world to gather information for published
reports on human rights abuses in every country. Prisoners of conscience and priests wrote letters
2

Ideology may also be a factor: if a member of Congress is ideologically opposed to the president, direct
communication will likely not produce the desired results. However, ideology is difficult to measure.
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to AI that described the horrible conditions in prisons and the various kinds of torture that states
used against their populations. The information that AI published helped other human rights
groups to start around the world, especially in the United States. “Between 1965 and 1980 the
sheer quantity of information available on human rights abuses around the world rose
dramatically. Fact-finding missions, academic studies, and congressional hearings all poured out.
There were books on the subject, annual reports, and special reports.” (Cmiel, 1999, 1236) All of
this took place mainly during the 1970s, which indicates that “the 1970s should be treated neither
as a moment of flagging liberal energy nor as a simple adjunct to the sixties but as a moment of
more basic political restructuring.” (Cmiel, 1999, 1234) AI led an information revolution on
human rights with a global network of agile activists. This network provided information that
had not been available 10 years earlier, and the global network sent this to politicians who could
get media attention (Cmiel, 1999, 1238).
An interaction between the executive branch and AI in 1976 reveals how Congress
became dependent on AI for information. In 1976, Ronald Palmer, the deputy coordinator for
human rights in the State Department visited Stephanie Grant in the London office. He told her
that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was circumventing human rights legislation by ignoring
the congressional mandate to report on human rights abuses. As a result, Palmer's office was
receiving almost no information. Palmer argued that AI should develop questions based on its
research and give them to members of Congress so that the member could send an inquiry to the
State Department that would have to be answered within two days. This way, AI would be able
to get information to Palmer. The London office sent a memo of this discussion to the American
office of AI and suggested that the American office follow Palmer’s suggestion (Cmiel, 1999,
1238-1239)
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The Increasing Human Rights Sensitivity of Congress
Three factors contributed to the increasing sensitivity of members of Congress to human
rights abuses around the world: the pioneering investigations by Representative Donald Fraser
(D-MN), starting in 1973 (Fraser 1977, 1979; Fraser and Salzberg 1979); the personal
background of many new members of Congress who entered the House in 1975; and House
members’ desire to focus on human rights to challenge Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s
focus on détente with the Soviet Union during the Nixon and Ford administrations.
Rep. Fraser had been an activist in the civil rights and anti-war movements before
entering the House, and in 1973 he became the first House member to hold hearings on human
rights abuses around the world. Fraser chaired the Subcommittee on International Organizations
and Movements. The hearings allowed human rights groups to testify and convinced many to
seek congressional champions who could apply pressure to oppressive governments and change
American foreign policy to embrace human rights. Rep. Fraser thus created the first policy
window for paying attention to human rights in Congress.
Human rights activism in the 1970s was an extension of the successful social and
political movements of the 1960s. Three parallel movements -- civil rights, the anti-war,
women’s rights -- had achieved their goals by 1975. The civil rights movement had achieved
legal victories with the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas, and political victories with the Voting Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of
1965. By 1968 the civil rights movement had produced congressional representatives in
majority-minority Southern districts. Civil rights activists shifted their attention from the human
rights issues posed by Jim Crow to the human rights abuses around the world.
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The anti-war movement achieved a political victory in 1973 as President Richard Nixon
withdrew all American troops from Vietnam. Many anti-war activists were elected to Congress
in 1974. Other anti-war activists took positions in the federal government after Jimmy Carter was
elected president in 1976. After the Vietnam War ended, many organizers of anti-war
demonstrations shifted their focus to human rights abuses around the world.
The women’s movement reached maturity in the 1970s as many women graduated from
college and started professional careers. Many feminists shifted their focus from the plight of
American women to the plight of oppressed women around the world. Civil rights, anti-war, and
women’s activists shifted naturally from domestic political concerns to the growing international
human rights campaign.
Movement activists entered Congress, the executive branch and various human rights
organizations. Representative (and later Senator) Tom Harkin (D-IA) traced his commitment to
human rights to his time as a congressional staff member when he discovered South Vietnam’s
“tiger cages” for prisoners. Representative Andrew Maguire (D-NJ), who entered Congress with
the Watergate class of 1974, “began his political education by being punched in the mouth
during a civil-rights march” (Vogelgesang, 1980, 122) Maguire also demonstrated against the
Vietnam War and was part of the efforts to stop South African Apartheid. Rep. Fraser was active
in the civil rights and anti-war movements. Andrew Young was Martin Luther King’s
collaborator during the civil rights movement, and then was elected to the House in 1972 from
Georgia before becoming the highest black official as Ambassador to the UN during the Carter
Administration (See also DeRoche, 2003; Haskins, 1979). Allard Lowenstein (D-NY, 19691971) was an activist in the civil rights movement and anti-war movement before and after
serving a single term in the House. Lowenstein became the U.S. representative to the UN Human
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Rights Commission in 1977 under the Carter Administration. (See also Chafe, 1993). Patricia
Derian was an activist in the civil rights movement before being appointed by President Carter as
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
This spillover from social movements into Congress and the executive branch was based
on an implicit recognition of the connections between the movements and international human
rights. “By the 1970s, both blacks and whites saw promotion of international human rights as a
logical extension of their own work within the United States during the 1960s. Patricia Derian,
the highest-ranking political appointee in the Carter administration with the most explicit
mandate on human rights, found remarkable overlap between what she experienced as a civilrights activist in Mississippi and what she found abroad in nations like Argentina, most notable
for their violations of human rights. Concern with South African apartheid became a focal point
for U.S. student activism in the 1970s because of the connection between concern about racial
discrimination in both the United States and the Republic of South Africa.” (Vogelgesang, 1980,
122-123)
These social activists were inspired by the idealism of President John F. Kennedy. “A
disproportionate number were veterans of the Peace Corps, the symbol of Kennedy-era idealism.
Their approach to politics was not rooted in party loyalty or interest-group advocacy. They were
Kennedy's children, and, like him, they were committed to a new kind of politics-a politics of
ideas.” (Schneider, 1989) They grew up comfortable with television and focused on using
government to achieve social justice. The social activists who entered Congress in 1975 had very
little political experience in terms of holding previous elected offices. Instead, they had been
community organizers and Peace Corps volunteers. “Many members… had grass-roots
organizing experience as activists in various liberal movements of the 1960s and early 1970s.
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‘We were the sixties generation that did not drop out,’ [Representative] Bob Edgar [D-PA] said.”
(Schneider, 1989)
By examining the biographies of House members who entered Congress in 1975, we find
many links between grassroots activism and their congressional activities. Rep. Edgar started as
a minister and street activist in Philadelphia and helped establish a shelter for women and
families. “I spent the late 1960s and early 1970s dealing with racial issues, gang-related issues,
and housing issues in the city.” (Schneider, 1989) Representative Toby Moffett (D-CT) had
entered the Peace Corps with his wife and then moved to Washington to start a family. Moffett
had worked with street gangs to do storefront-school training projects. He worked in the Office
of Students and Youth at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, during the Nixon
Administration. After Kent State and the invasion of Cambodia he quit and worked for Senator
Walter Mondale (D-MN). As a staffer in Sen. Mondale’s office, Moffett organized hearings for
the Select Committee on Children and Youth. After that he went to Connecticut and started the
Connecticut Citizen Action Group for Ralph Nader. After running this group for three years he
entered Congress.
Once social activists entered Congress in 1975, they turned their attention toward human
rights abuses in many countries, including El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, the Soviet Union,
South Africa and Cambodia. Refugees and exiles from afflicted regions of the world either
traveled to the United States or communicated with activists within the United States. They sent
information about human rights abuses to both activists and members of Congress. Information
about torture in Soviet prisons, death squads in Latin American countries, racial discrimination
in South Africa, and killing fields in Cambodia spawned human rights groups around the world
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and inspired members of Congress to hold hearings and write amendments to laws to deal with
these abuses.
The hearings held by the Fraser Subcommittee revealed many countries committing
human rights abuses. After the Fraser Committee published its report in 1974, Congress passed
legislation that targeted three main areas: foreign aid, lethal aid, and voting power for
developmental aid. With foreign aid, Congress cut off funds to any country found to be in
systematic gross violations of human rights. With lethal aid, Congress cut off sales of police and
military equipment to countries found to be arresting people without following due process and
then torturing prisoners. With voting power for developmental aid, Congress instructed
representatives to the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development
Association, to vote to cut off development aid to any country that was found to be in gross
violations of human rights (Loescher 1977; Salzberg 1986).
In nearly every case of foreign policy entrepreneurship that followed the model described
above, the international provocations (human rights abuses in a country) led to outputs (changes
in American foreign policy toward the abusing country). To demonstrate the utility of the model,
I apply it to the cases of the Soviet Union, Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa.
The cases will be discussed in two categories. The first category includes countries that
were the target of human rights legislation in a Cold War context, for which the Soviet Union
serves as an example. The second category includes countries that were the targets of
amendments and stand-alone legislation in an exclusively human rights context, such as
Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, and Uganda. In each of these cases I will examine the
specific human rights abuses in the country, the intermediaries who brought attention regarding
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the abuses to members of Congress, and the congressional political entrepreneurs who both
invested time investigating the abuses and invested energy trying to pass legislation that would
help end the abuses. I will also discuss the final legislative outcome and its impact.

The Soviet Union
The activists from the social movements of the 1950s and 60s entered Congress just as
the Ford administration was pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, which meant a reduced
American focus on human rights issues with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.
This conflict of policy interest produced a growing tension between Congress and the executive
branch. Human rights legislation became an important tool for Congress to keep the reluctant
Ford administration, and specifically Secretary of State Kissinger, focused on human rights. The
Soviet government arrested and tortured political dissidents, producing political activists within
the Soviet Union who self-published newsletters and books detailing the many ways that the
regime systematically tortured its citizens, both physically and psychologically. The Soviet
government also prevented its Jewish citizens from emigrating to Western Europe and North
America. These Jewish citizens became known as “refuseniks”.
Members of Congress responded to Soviet human rights abuses by shepherding
legislation that made American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union dependent on the Soviet
government improving its record with both political dissidents and refuseniks. Representative
Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) was instrumental in creating the American delegation to the Helsinki
Accords, an international alliance that monitored human rights abuses in the Soviet Union
(Albright and Friendly 1986; Korey 1993). Representative Thomas Vanik (D-OH) and Senator
Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) successfully promoted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which
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made American-Soviet trade policy contingent on Jewish citizens being allowed to leave the
Soviet Union (Franck and Weisband 1979; Robson 1989).
After Israel was founded in 1948, the Soviet Union began a series of actions to suppress
Jewish culture. “The period between Israel’s birth in May 1948 and Soviet Premier Joseph
Stalin’s death in March 1953 witnessed the gradual elimination of Jewish religion and culture
and their institutions in the Soviet Union. In addition, the open Soviet assault on assimilated
Jewish ‘cosmopolitans’ during these years resulted in discrimination and the imprisonment of
hundreds of Jews.” (Frey 2002; See also Ro’I 1991; Pinkus 1998, Pinkus and Frankel 1984) The
Soviet crackdown on Jews was part of a larger crackdown on dissidents. In the mid-1960s a
human-rights movement emerged in the Soviet Union. “It sprang up in 1965 because of the
arrests of several established dissenters…. Underground writing known as samizdat also made an
explicit connection between Soviet protest and internationally recognized human rights.”
(Vogelgesang 1980)
The plight of Soviet Jews became the focus of American Jews, the Soviet Jewry
Movement (SJM), during the 1960s as a distant echo of the Second World War and the
Holocaust. Memories of the Holocaust were being reintroduced to the American public.
American Jews felt guilty about ignoring the genocidal actions of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
As Soviet discrimination against and persecution of Jews in the 1950s and 1960s increased, the
actions reminded American Jewry of the Nazi efforts preceding the Holocaust (Frey 2002).
American Jews put pressure on members of Congress and the executive branch to condemn the
actions of the Soviet Union and help facilitate emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.
These efforts reached legislative fruition when Senator Jackson introduced an amendment
in 1972 tying U.S.-Soviet trade relations to the Soviet Union’s granting permission to Jews to
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emigrate. Jackson introduced his amendment because he believed that “something should have
been done about repression of Jews in the 1930s in the interest of world peace.” (Robson 1989,
33) More than that, though, he and his allies, doubting that détente would yield benign Soviet
behavior, sought to combat détente and used human rights as their weapon. “The Jacksonites
were aiming more at derailing detente than at promoting human rights, but a precedent was
nonetheless established.” (Feffer 2004) There was a massive effort by American Jewish
organizations to pass the Jackson-Vanick Amendment. Jackson announced his amendment to the
National Conference on Soviet Jewry, an umbrella organization comprising B’nai B’rith, the
American Jewish Committee, 32 other national Jewish organizations and more than 200 local
Jewish agencies (Franck and Weisband 1979, 189). This network of Jewish organizations
produced 259 co-sponsors when Rep. Vanik introduced the amendment in the House in 1973.
Rep. Vanik’s legislative aide, Mark Talisman, helped secure passage of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. He called every congressional office to secure co-sponsorship from members and
he negotiated directly with Jewish lobbying groups. Talisman “undertook a sixteen-hour-a-day
campaign to contact every one of 435 Congressional offices, cajoling key staffers to secure cosponsorship of the amendment by their principals. He called some offices as many as fifteen
times.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 236) The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was finally passed
and became part of the 1974 Trade Act.
Another legislative product of the SJM was the U.S. Helsinki Commission to the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE had been conceived by
the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s to legitimize the Soviet territorial gains from World
War II. The CSCE was organized through a series of meetings culminating in Helsinki, Finland,
with the Final Act. The Helsinki accords constituted
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a far-ranging set of agreements among 35 countries in Europe, North America,
and the Soviet bloc, represented the high-water mark of detente. Numerous
bargaining positions had to be accommodated at the negotiating table. …
[H]uman rights advocates wanted the Eastern bloc countries to adhere to a set of
principles guaranteeing individual rights of expression, assembly, and so on. The
final accords did include human rights provisions, though no one in the West
expected the governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to pay
anything but lip service to the human rights protocols. (Feffer 2004, 32)
Following the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki, Congress sent a delegation of 18
representatives, led by Speaker Carl Albert, to the Soviet Union in 1975 to discuss issues of
compliance. A member of that delegation was freshman Rep. Fenwick. She met with refuseniks,
Soviet Jews who had been denied exit visas to join families in Israel. The meetings were
arranged by an American Jewish organization, but the refuseniks took the initiative to visit the
congressional delegation (Korey 1993, 22). Fenwick was struck by the courage and the pathos of
the Soviet Jews who were being denied freedom to emigrate to Israel.
“We would meet them at night in hotels in Moscow and Leningrad,” she later
recalled, “and I would ask, ‘How do you dare to come see us here?’” in a setting
where no visitor went unnoticed by the Soviet secret police. “’Don’t you
understand?’” she recalls the universal reply. “’That’s our only hope. We’ve seen
you. Now they [the KGB] know you’ve seen us.’” (Albright and Friendly 1986,
291)
One visitor deeply touched Rep. Fenwick. Lilia Tenenboim Roitburd was a 39-year-old mother
from Odessa. She and her husband, Lev, had been applying for exit visas for 3 years. “Lev was
fired from his engineering job, denounced in the local newspaper as ‘an imperialist puppet,’ and
later arrested for allegedly striking a police officer.” (Korey 1993, 23) Lilia was visiting Fenwick
because Lev had disappeared a month earlier as he was traveling to Moscow to get help with the
exit visa.

“She was desperate,” Representative Fenwick remembered. “She brought out a
photograph that showed three people: a solemn-eyed little boy, a solidly built
man, and a good-looking woman. It had been taken four months earlier. It was her
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family, but she was unrecognizable; the strain had aged her so much. That woman
haunted me. I wanted to do something for Lilia, and the Commission bill was
what I did. Like all my legislation, it comes from some human problem.”
(Albright and Friendly 1986, 291-292)

Korey notes that Fenwick
was overwrought by the difference between Lilia’s image on a snapshot and the
“ravaged face” of the woman pleading her family’s case. “I still have nightmares
about it,” she would tell listeners upon returning to the United States. (Korey
1993, 23)
Fenwick told herself: “We’ve got to do something for Lilia. We’ve got to do something.” (Korey
1993, 23) When she returned to Washington she read the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords and
decided that the human rights provisions (Basket III) of the Final Act would help Soviet Jews get
to Israel. On September 9, 1975, she introduced a bill to create a commission that would press
countries to comply with the Helsinki Accords and monitor violations of the Final Act. On
November 17, 1975, Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) introduced her bill before the Senate. The
Commission was designed to include members from both houses of Congress and from the
executive branch to demonstrate national unity in favor of compliance with human rights.
President Gerald Ford, who had gone to Helsinki to sign the Final Act, signed the Fenwick-Case
Bill into law on June 3, 1976.
The SJM found its cohesion with the Helsinki Final Act. The humanitarian provisions of
the Final Act mandated the reunification of families, increased contact among people, and
improved communication flows. After Helsinki the member nations met in Belgrade in 1978, in
Madrid in 1983, and in Vienna in 1989. Yet, despite the Final Act, the Soviet Union increased its
crackdown on Soviet Jews and other dissidents in the late 1970s. Vogelgesang notes that the
Soviet leaders were likely surprised that the Final Act became a rallying point for internal
dissension. There was also growing unrest across Eastern Europe as human rights activists used
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the Final Act to protest their governments. The Soviet Union wanted to make sure that this unrest
did not affect it as well. The Soviet economy was crumbling, leading to increasing dissatisfaction
with the Soviet government. Finally, aging Soviet leaders were very conservative and sensitive
to criticism from dissidents and Jews. Thus, despite the creation of the U.S. Helsinki
Commission, the condition of Soviet Jews got worse instead of better, and the U.S. Congress was
forced to deal with refuseniks until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the Helsinki
Commission helped institutionalize human rights in American foreign policy (Galey 1985),
translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into American foreign policy (Galey
1998). The Helsinki Accords also changed global norms on human rights and helped speed up
the demise of Communism (Peterson 2009, Thomas 1997).
We can understand the efforts of Senator Jackson, Rep. Vanik, and Rep. Fenwick, by
applying the four elements of the model. The input came from the Soviet crackdown on
dissidents and refusal to grant exit visas to Soviet Jews to travel to Israel. The information came
from both political dissidents, who self-published books and magazines documenting horrible
prison conditions in the Soviet Union (Vogelgesang 1980), and the SJM, which passed
information from the Soviet Union to American Jewish groups that responded because they felt
guilty about America’s failure to respond adequately to the Jewish Holocaust in Nazi Germany
(Frey 2002). The information reached members of Congress through the Soviet dissidents and
the SJM, culminating in the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Senator Jackson had ties to American
Jewish organizations, and Rep. Vanik employed staff who had connections to Jewish
organizations. They were in the majority parties in Congress, facing a Republican administration
that sought to decrease the focus on human rights. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment represented
the path of least resistance for them, coupled with great assistance from American Jewish
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organizations. Rep. Fenwick received information directly from a refusenik during her visit in
the Soviet Union and she was deeply personally affected by the information. Even though she
was a freshman representative lacking institutional resources and a member of the minority
party, her bill to create the commission resonated with her colleagues, who were also interested
in human rights. Her colleague, Senator Case, gave her institutional weight by sponsoring her
amendment in the Senate. This legislation constituted her path of least resistance. The personal
impact is more apparent for Rep. Fenwick than for Rep. Vanik or Senator Jackson, but the
international provocations and information are obvious in both cases.

Cambodia
After the victorious Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, they marched
Cambodians, including the sick and the elderly, out of the cities to create collective farms. The
Khmer Rouge established concentration camps for the sole purpose of interrogating, torturing,
and killing Cambodians who were suspected of disobedience. Hundreds of thousands of
Cambodians died in the camps, and many more thousands died from untreated diseases while
working the collective farms. Fortunately, in the midst of mass death and destruction, a few
hundred Cambodians managed to escape. The Khmer Rouge had cut off all contact with the
outside world as they conducted this experiment in pure Communism, so the first information
about this genocide came from Cambodians who fled through refugee camps in Thailand. For
example, there is the story of Ly Linn, one of many told to New York Times correspondent Henry
Kamm and U.S. embassy officials at Cambodian refugee camps (Vogelgesang 1980). Linn was
born into the upper middle class in Phnom Penh. On April 17, 1975 Communist Khmer Rouge
soldiers broke into her home and forced her and her family to leave Phnom Penh with thousands
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of other Cambodians. Most of her relatives died on the month-long march to the small rural
villages in southeastern Cambodia near the Vietnamese border. Linn was made to work in
existing fields and carve new fields out of the jungle. Her only food was banana tree roots and
leaves. The Khmer Rouge soldiers learned her husband was a lieutenant in the army in General
Lon Nol’s government and killed him. Once her husband disappeared, Ly Linn decided to make
a run for freedom. She left with her two-year-old son and sister-in-law in the night and traveled
to Vietnam. They bribed village officials along the way with jewels hidden on their bodies and
worked in the villages until they arrived by separate routes in Saigon. She hid in a sugar-cane
field for three days and nights before leaving on a boat run by a Cambodian refugee who was
helping many others to escape to Thailand. While in the Thai refugee camp she applied for
emigration to the United States.
The events in Cambodia can be described as genocide (Hannum 1989). The Khmer
Rouge forcibly moved half of the population to rural areas to provide compulsory agricultural
production. They eliminated money, markets, wages, and salaries. They prohibited private
property, including a family's cooking utensils, clothing, and personal effects. They separated
children from parents and forced children to spy on parents. In addition, the Khmer Rouge
destroyed organized religion and prohibited religious practice. They stopped all education and
eliminated all government institutions. “The radical transformation of Cambodia envisaged by
the Khmer Rouge required the racial, social, ideological, and political purification of the
Cambodian nation, through the sociological and physical liquidation of a variety of groups
considered to be irremediably tainted by their association with the old social order or otherwise
unsuited to the intended new order. To achieve this goal, the Khmer Rouge government
instituted unremitting, absolute dictatorship over a populace ruled by terror.” (Hannum 1989, 85)
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With little information of the atrocities seeping out beyond Cambodia, the United States
and the international community responded very slowly. The information that did emerge from
refugees and American foreign service officers seemed unbelievable. Power (2002) writes about
Charles Twining, a foreign service officer who interviewed refugees arriving at the ThaiCambodia border and initially
did not even file a report because he found the refugees’ recollections literally
“inconceivable” and felt he would be laughed at back in Washington. But every
time he took the four-hour car journey to the border, he found it harder to deny
the reality of the atrocities. The Cambodians had heard the howls of their starving
infants. They had watched KR [Khmer Rouge] cadres use plastic bags to
suffocate Buddhist monks. They had seen their loved ones murdered by teenage
warriors who mechanically delivered the blow of a hoe to the back of the neck.
(Power 2002, 115)
The Khmer Rouge was killing groups of people, anyone who was deemed suspicious for any
reason.
One of the few American politicians who heard these stories was Representative Stephen
Solarz (D-NY), who became very engaged. He traveled in 1976 to Bangkok with a congressional
delegation and heard from Cambodian refugees about the conditions they had survived. “Solarz
was seized by what he was told about the Khmer Rouge.” (Winik 1993) He returned to
Washington and organized hearings on “Human Rights in Cambodia.” “For Solarz, the events in
Cambodia had ominous echoes of the Holocaust. ‘We have a moral obligation to consider every
conceivable possibility of doing something about the situation. I am not simply talking about
making statements so that we can wallow in our own sense of virtue. I am talking about doing
something which can bring a criminal regime to its senses and prevent a continuation of what has
happened.’” (Hearing on Human Rights in Cambodia, p. 39, cited in Winik 1993, 126) Solarz
successfully worked with Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) to change the refugee laws so that 15,000
Cambodians could enter the United States immediately as a group.
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In January 1979, compelled by security concerns, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, driving
the Khmer Rouge from power and installing the People’s Republic of Democratic Kampuchea
(PRK). This invasion sparked retaliation by the Chinese government, which invaded Vietnam in
February 1979. Thailand joined China to nurture a guerilla movement on Cambodia’s border
with Vietnam that benefited the Khmer Rouge. By 1980 three guerilla groups vied with the PRK
for supremacy in Cambodia.
There was constant war among the various factions until Vietnam succeeded in driving
out the guerilla groups in 1985 and setting up Cambodia as a satellite state for Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the PRK government behaved in much the same way as the Khmer Rouge had
between 1975 and 1979 (Winik 1993, 132). Because of the brutality exhibited by the PRK
government, the Khmer Rouge regained enough popularity and military strength to defeat it,
especially after the Khmer Rouge claimed to renounce Communism and Pol Pot announced his
retirement.
By 1985 the Reagan Administration was planning to fund another insurgent group, the
Non-Communist Resistance (NCR), as part of its effort to support anti-communist guerilla
movements around the world. Simultaneously, Rep. Solarz helped authorize $5 million in
economic aid to the NCR. This economic aid provided the spark that the NCR needed to counter
the superior manpower of the Khmer Rouge. This produced a military stalemate by 1988, when
the international and domestic political environment began to change. The Soviet Union
normalized relations with China and pressured Vietnam to leave Cambodia. An internationally
brokered peace agreement returned Prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state and led the
Cambodian factions to initiate discussions about sharing power.
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This changed international and political environment concerned Rep. Solarz. He feared
that once the PRK government left the Khmer Rouge would return to power and resume the
genocide. He decided that the United States had to get actively involved in brokering a peace
between the factions, and that meant going beyond economic aid to the NCR. He wanted to give
the NCR military (or “lethal”) aid, so that it would have a better bargaining chip against the
forces of the Khmer Rouge and the PRK. Solarz had backing for this effort from President
Reagan in 1988, when Reagan met with Sihanouk and pledged more economic aid for the NCR.
President George H.W. Bush met with Chinese leaders in February 1989 to discuss a peace
settlement in Cambodia. But it was Solarz who formulated the policy for Cambodia.
Solarz used his chair position on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee to first establish
during March 1989 hearings that the Bush Administration would support lethal aid to the NCR
and then started engaging in shuttle diplomacy to see if lethal aid would actually work as a
policy. “He met with virtually all the key actors relevant to the Cambodia settlement, testing his
ideas against the realities of the region. In addition to solidifying his thinking, the trip also had
the benefit of shoring up his credibility and authority at home on the issue.” (Winik 1993, 149)
Overall, Solarz learned that lethal aid was the right policy at that time, and he returned to
Washington to persuade the Bush Administration to adopt this policy.
Despite this intense diplomatic and political work, Solarz encountered resistance to lethal
aid from Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC), because the SFRC staff specialists were against lethal aid to any non-communist group
around the world. Solarz overcame this resistance by forming a political alliance with freshman
Senator Charles Robb (D-VA). Solarz convinced Robb to sponsor an amendment to the relevant
State Department Authorization bill that regularly passed through the SFRC. He formed an
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alliance with Robb by persuading Vice President Dan Quayle, a supporter of lethal aid to the
NCR, to contact Robb. This was an essential act of coalition-building on Solarz’s part: enlisting
the help of the Vice-President in the opposition party to call a freshman senator of your party.
Robb faced resistance in the SFRC from Senator Pell and Senator Alan Cranston, the chair of the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. During markup sessions on the Subcommittee,
Sen. Cranston organized his fellow Democrats to criticize the lethal aid amendment and postpone
a vote on it, essentially killing the amendment in the subcommittee. Sen. Robb was forced to go
to the Senate Floor and offer his amendment during the final debate on the bill, which was
scheduled for a vote by the full Senate five weeks later.
This delay between the subcommittee defeat and the floor vote gave both Solarz and
Robb the ability to line up a coalition of supporters that passed the amendment in the Senate.
(Solarz had passed the lethal aid amendment in the House, so the Senate remained the final
obstacle.) The Bush Administration had already come out in support of lethal aid to the NCR.
Robb and Solarz set out to line up the votes of moderate Republicans and Democrats. Solarz
took extraordinary steps in this effort. In addition to giving Robb the support of his staff, Solarz
“wrote a detailed, three-page, single-spaced letter urging senators to support a possible Robb
amendment. The letter was marked ‘Urgent,’ and was co-signed by HFAC Chairman Dante
Fascell, and Congressmen Bill Richardson, Robert Torricelli, and Charles Wilson. … Solarz
hand-carried more than 50 copies of his letter and strode onto the Senate floor after a vote on
another issue…One by one, Solarz stopped Senate Democrats, handed them his letter, and
pleaded for them to support Robb.” (Winik 1993, 187-188)
After Robb pressed his Senate colleagues heavily, the amendment passed 59-39. Robb
had put together a coalition that crossed party and ideological lines (Winik 1993, 192).
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Throughout this effort, Cambodian-Americans had been very active, attending the subcommittee
and committee hearings, and sending letters to senators on the SFRC. However, this grassroots
organizing effort had no impact on the SFRC. Instead it served to further motivate Robb by
giving him the sense that he had the moral high ground (Winik 1993, 177).
In addition to this emotional support, Robb forged a personal bond with Solarz and
senators to help build the coalition. The connection to Solarz was solidified when he testified
before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This relationship with Solarz
gave Robb intense motivation (Winik 1993, 167). Robb built his coalition with fellow senators
who had grown close to him as a Vietnam War veteran, such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ).
McCain had spent five and a half years in an American POW camp in Vietnam during the war.
McCain helped Robb enlist the support of fellow moderate Republicans and Democrats during
the final days before the vote (Winik 1993, 186).
Despite the victory in the Senate that paved the way for lethal aid to the NCR, the
international environment made lethal aid nearly a moot issue. Solarz realized that lethal aid was
not enough to provide a final resolution for Cambodia once Vietnam removed the PRK
government. He began to think of what the endgame for Cambodia might look like. He decided
to get the United Nations involved to administer elections in Cambodia and ensure a peaceful
transition to democracy that did not simultaneously raise the possibility of the Khmer Rouge
coming back into power. He developed a UN Interim Trusteeship Perm Five Plan in which the
permanent members of the UN Security Council would authorize the UN to take over the
sovereignty of Cambodia to ensure the transition to a peaceful democratic government.
Solarz had presented the idea of a UN Interim Trusteeship to both Sihanouk and the
prime minister of Singapore, with positive reviews, and he decided to focus on making it a
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reality. In the steps that he took to realize the UN plan, Solarz first enlisted the help of Australia,
which presented the plan as its own plan for Cambodia. Next, Solarz contacted the State
Department to see if the Bush Administration would back the plan, and received news that it
would. Solarz’s political stature was rising. Solarz presented the UN plan to the State
Department, which was reluctant to accept it, but, lacking an alternative policy, was forced to go
along. Next, the NCR and the UN Security Council both endorsed the plan.
The only obstacle for Solarz was the U.S. Senate. In both houses of Congress the critics
of the UN plan either had misconceptions about what was happening in Cambodia or had the
wrong information. They charged that aid to the NCR was also going to the Khmer Rouge and
that the Khmer Rouge would be brought back into power with the help of Congress. They argued
that the Chinese government was supporting the Khmer Rouge in its bid to take back power, and
that any UN Plan that included the Khmer Rouge in a governing body was, ipso, facto, a plan to
return the Khmer Rouge to power. No one in Congress wanted the Khmer Rouge to return to
power and recommence the genocide of the late 1970s, but by 1989 and 1990 few members of
Congress, except Rep. Solarz, Sen. Robb, Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), and Senator John Kerry
(D-MA) knew the facts on the ground.
In the end, international events overtook the Cambodia debate in Congress. Once Iraq
invaded Kuwait in August 1990, few, if any, members of Congress focused on Cambodia.
Moreover, by that time the UN negotiations were finalized. On August 29, 1990, the Perm Five
announced a plan that aligned perfectly with Solarz’s initial idea. This announcement removed
the issue from congressional debate when the four factions in Cambodia quickly agreed to the
plan. The final disagreement was over the level of covert lethal and overt economic aid that
Congress would authorize for the NCR and for humanitarian purposes, such as for the children of
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Cambodia. The Bush Administration struck a deal with the Senate critics to maintain the overt
aid, and eventually turn covert aid into overt aid, on a last-minute amendment to the State
Department authorization bill. The bill was passed and President Bush signed it into law.
Afterwards, Congress focused on the international crisis brewing in the Middle East. This
effectively ended America’s focus on Southeast Asia, which had been continuous from 1960 to
1990, as the Middle East dominated American foreign policy for the next 20 years.
We can see the four elements of the model present in Cambodia. The international
provocations were striking. Cambodia experienced genocide that rivaled the most extreme
conditions in Nazi Germany during the Jewish Holocaust. Information about these conditions
reached Rep. Solarz in 1975. He was so affected that he immediately organized hearings, despite
being a freshman in the House, and his interest in Cambodia remained until he left Congress in
1993. A hearing was the path of least resistance for Solarz during his early years in the House.
Once Solarz became Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee in 1981, a hearing was no
longer adequate as a response to the overwhelming information coming out of Cambodia. He
was in a position to write legislation that would easily pass the Subcommittee and then pass the
House. By the 1980s Solarz was a recognized authority, if not the expert, on Cambodia and a
slew of other international issues, so legislation by his subcommittee was almost guaranteed to
pass the House. The only challenge was the Senate. His strategy in the Senate was to find allies
who could influence other senators.
The personal background of Senator Robb made him a suitable ally for Solarz. Robb was
a celebrity because President Lyndon Johnson was his father-in-law, and Robb had become a
major player in Southern politics. Sen. Robb had used his celebrity status to get a seat on the
SFRC and he emphasized his foreign policy credentials more than his domestic policy concerns.

64

Senator Robb’s celebrity status was a valuable asset for Solarz because it enabled Solarz to turn
his strategic relationship with Robb into the coalition in the Senate that passed the lethal aid
amendment. As mentioned in the first chapter, coalition-building is an important skill for
political entrepreneurs, especially for those who take the path of least resistance. Few political
entrepreneurs have the desire or skill to do everything on their own, so having influential allies is
critical for passing legislation.

El Salvador
El Salvador has a history of political oppression, starting in 1932. Its politics, economy
and military are linked to preserve the power of the 14 families that control 60 percent of its farm
land. Its economy is concentrated in agriculture, but the land is unequally distributed. “Four
percent of the farms account for over 60 percent of the land area, while 70 percent of all farms
account for only 11 percent of land area. Two percent of the citizens own 60 percent of the land,
while most peasants have no land or such small holdings that they must work for the larger
landholders to supplement their incomes.” (Vogelgesang 1980, 167) This unequal distribution of
land and income leads to extreme poverty among the peasants. In the 1970s there were over 400
people per square mile, which was the highest population density in Latin America. Moreover, at
that time over 200,000 peasants were landless. This was the most severe imbalance of land and
labor in Latin America. (LeoGrande and Robbins 1980, 1085)
These economic inequalities caused periodic political turmoil in El Salvador, with the
most extreme occurring in 1932 with La Matanza (Anderson 1971), when the armed forces took
control of the government to suppress a massive peasant uprising. The 14 families that control
the country joined forces with the military to kill the organizers of peasant revolts, using death
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squads that went from village to village and killed all peasants who were suspected of being
sympathetic to the rebels. 30,000 Salvadorans were killed in La Matanza. (LeoGrande and
Robbins 1980, 1085) After 1932 the military was always suspicious of the peasants and the
peasants did not trust the army or ruling families. The government denied the peasants the right
to organize, and elections were rigged in both 1972 and 1977 (Vogelgesang 1980, 168-169).
The peasants started to fight back in the mid-1970s by organizing into the Popular
Revolutionary Bloc. They kidnapped and killed members of the fourteen families. The
government retaliated by creating right-wing paramilitary organizations that went into the
countryside to harass and kill peasant leaders. “According to some estimates, as many as half of
the approximately 40,000 victims of the current conflict in El Salvador were killed by death
squads, most of them rightist in their orientation.” (Livingstone 1984, 240) Death squads were
common in Latin America and they were effective. “Some reports describe custom-built vans
outfitted as mobile torture chambers that cruise the streets of San Salvador searching for victims.
Once abducted, victims are subjected to electric shocks and other torture in the van, and then
either released or their bodies dumped along the roadside.” (Livingstone 1984, 243) These
hostile conditions caused thousands of Salvadorans to leave.
Salvadoran refugees started an exodus to the United States to escape the civil war. They
entered illegally along the Mexican border, transported in many cases by religious groups (Brett
1994). The religious groups turned thousands of churches into sanctuaries for Salvadorans. In
addition, the religious groups tried to conceal the identities of the Salvadoran refugees. They
often defied U.S. immigration laws based on their sense of religious duty (Mims 1989, 60-61).
At the time, American immigration law identified Salvadorans as economic refugees, not
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political refugees, and thus Salvadorans were immediately deported back to El Salvador once
they were captured by immigration officials.
In addition to rejecting Salvadoran refugees, the Reagan administration began sending
financial aid to the Salvadoran government to combat communism. Reagan followed Jeanne
Kirkpatrick’s advice to distinguish totalitarian governments from authoritarian governments. For
Reagan, totalitarian and communist were identical, and he saw Latin America as the place where
the United States faced the greatest threat from the Soviet Union (Bright 1990). Therefore,
Reagan increased foreign aid to Latin American governments to help them defeat communist
insurgencies. El Salvador was one of the main targets of this aid (Fisher 1982, Weissman 1995).
In addition to aiding the government, the United States trained military officers from El Salvador
at the School of the Americas (SOA) (Fitch 1981).
This combination of foreign aid, military training, and immigration policy provided the
ingredients for political entrepreneurship by Representative John Joseph “Joe” Moakley (DMA). Rep. Moakley’s district included an area of Boston called Jamaica Plain. He was elected in
1972 and expressed no interest in foreign policy. He described himself as a “bread-and-butter”
congressman who devoted himself entirely to constituent services. That changed in the early
1980s.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many Salvadoran refugees began moving into Jamaica
Plain. They were transported by Catholic organizations and placed in Catholic churches. At the
same time, residents in the neighborhood began to become frustrated by American policy toward
El Salvador. Virginia Vogel Zanger had close friends living in El Salvador whom she had met
when she was an anti-war activist in 1971, protesting the Vietnam War. As the civil war
escalated in El Salvador, Zanger decided to start organizing her community in Jamaica Plain.
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Zanger had a meeting with other Jamaica Plain residents in her house. Most were neighbors,
some were friends. The organization Zanger co-founded was the Jamaica Plain Committee on
Central America (JPCOCA).
Once JPCOCA became active, the members noticed Salvadoran refugees living in the
neighborhood and learned they faced deportation if caught and then a grim fate at the hands of
the death squads. After consulting with some professional lobbying groups and Zanger’s brother,
who worked for a congressman, JPCOCA sent a letter to Rep. Moakley asking for a meeting
with him to discuss U.S. policy toward El Salvador. At the meeting, JPCOCA told Moakley
about Salvadoran refugees being sent back to certain death, and Moakley asked his aid, Jim
McGovern, to determine if this was happening. Once McGovern confirmed it, Moakley wrote an
amendment to the immigration law allowing Temporary Protected Status for all refugees from El
Salvador.
Rep. Moakley tells a somewhat different version of the story. He reports that he met with
constituents at post offices in Jamaica Plain and that refugees from El Salvador met with him to
explain their situation. After meeting with these refugees, Moakley contacted McGovern and set
out to change the immigration law. Moakley’s effort to create Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
for all refugees from El Salvador took nearly a decade to pass into law. (Moakley, John Joseph.
Interviewed by Robert Allison. John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-001. 2 April
2001)
Moakley was not the only member of Congress to take an interest in El Salvador.
Representative Robert F. Drinian (D-MA) was a Catholic priest who visited El Salvador in 1978.
Rep. Drinian had held a press conference in Washington in which he revealed reports about
murders, disappearances, or imprisonments of peasant men. (Vogelgesang 1980, 175)
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The Carter Administration had started sending foreign aid to El Salvador’s military when
the civil war begun. However, this aid was cut when a National Guard death squad raped and
murdered four American nuns and a laywoman on December 2, 1980. The Carter Administration
cut aid as a way to pressure El Salvador’s government to eliminate the death squads and improve
its human rights record. The Reagan Administration took office six weeks later and reinstated the
aid.
Rep. Moakley began pressuring the Reagan administration to cut foreign aid to El
Salvador’s military. When he learned from his constituents that refugees in his district were
being deported, he began to target changing the immigration law. He learned from his aide, Jim
McGovern, that 50,000 noncombatants were being killed in a country that had the same
population as Massachusetts. First he wrote to Reagan’s attorney general, Ed Meese, to change
the immigration law so that Salvadorans in the United States could remain under a limited
extended volunteer departure with green cards (Moakley 2001). When that did not work,
Moakley decided to write legislation to give Salvadorans Temporary Protected Status. Starting in
1983, Moakley introduced legislation to protect Salvadoran refugees using the “Extended
Voluntary Departure” provision that allowed a temporary stay of deportation and work
authorization.
Moakley faced resistance from two sources: the Reagan administration and the federal
courts. The Reagan Administration defined Salvadoran refugees as economic refugees, or illegal
immigrants, instead of as political refugees requiring sanctuary in the United States. The
Attorney General had the power to grant refugee status to the Salvadorans, but he refused. The
Reagan Administration believed that the Salvadoran problem was essentially an immigration
problem unrelated to the civil war. The United States had experienced increased illegal
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immigration in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and, the administration argued, allowing TPS for
Salvadorans would send Salvadorans a message that illegal immigration was acceptable. The
Salvadoran immigration problem was huge, according to the Reagan administration, with about
25,000 illegal migrants entering the United States each year (Vogelgesang 1980, 172). Hence,
the Reagan Administration feared a flood of new immigrants if TPS became law. The
administration argued that other countries provided asylum, including Mexico, and yet
Salvadorans went to the U.S. border instead. The administration ignored the harsh conditions for
Salvadoran refugees in Mexican camps.
On the other hand, the federal courts rejected asylum requests by Salvadoran plaintiffs.
When political refugees sought asylum in the United States, the courts would grant asylum only
to those refugees who faced specific persecution, and thus certain death, back in their home
countries. The Supreme Court held that allowing refugees to stay in the United States because of
a general fear of returning to their home counties would compel the U.S. to let the majority of a
country’s population relocate to the United States for an indefinite period of time, which would
be infeasible (Mims 1989).
Faced with these two obstacles to changing the immigration status for Salvadoran
refugees, Moakley was hesitant to get involved in the issue. He knew he would not receive any
electoral rewards from his constituents. “Of all the issues that I’ve been involved with… it was a
no-win issue, because…when I first got involved with it, I was getting calls from my
constituents, ‘Hey, what are you doing down there with them, if you want to bring people in this
country, what about the Irish and the Italian?’ That wasn’t a win.” (Moakely 2001) Moreover he
knew that other members of Congress could easily focus on this issue and achieve similar results.
He usually followed Representatives Gerry Studds (D-MA) and Tom Harkin (D-IA) on foreign
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policy issues. Thus, he had to know that they were not going to pursue this issue in order to
claim it as his own. Moakley asked his assistant, Jim McGovern, to find out where Studds and
Harkin stood on Extended Voluntary Departure for Salvadoran refugees. McGovern told him
that both Studds and Harkin considered the issue an internal matter for El Salvador and were not
active on the issue. At that point Moakley agreed to take it on. Moakley thought of his efforts on
behalf of Salvadoran refugees as one of the most important things he did in his career.
Karen Harraghy, a member of Rep. Moakley’s district staff from 1983 to 2001, notes that
the legislation Moakley crafted for the Salvadoran refugees initially covered only Salvadorans
and thus was too limited in scope to pass the House. To win congressional approval, Moakley
had to include protection for other refugee groups (Harraghy 2003). As Moakley included more
refugee groups in his legislation he was finally able to build a big enough coalition in the House
to pass it. However, passage of the bill provoked a veto threat from President Bush if the
Salvadorans were included. The critical moment for the legislation was in the conference
committee to reconcile the House and Senate versions. Moakley demonstrated to the
Republicans that he was willing to sacrifice the entire bill if the Salvadorans were not included.
Attorney General Edwin Meese contacted the conference chairman in 1988 and threatened to kill
the bill. Moakley told Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX) and Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY),
the chairs of the conference committees, that he would use his position as Chairman of the Rules
Committee to kill any bill that did not have TPS for Salvadoran refugees. After some negotiation
with President Bush they settled on 18 months for extended volunteer departure.
Thus was Moakley finally able to pass legislation that granted Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) to Salvadorans in the Immigration Act of 1990 (PL. 101-649). TPS grants
temporary legal residency and work authorization to immigrants fleeing civil wars, natural
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disasters or other conditions in their home country for a set period of time. In El Salvador’s case,
TPS has been extended several times since 1990. The TPS designation has been used by other
countries experiencing civil unrest and is administered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS). (See http://www.uscis.gov.)
As the bill was nearing final passage, events in El Salvador took a turn for the worse. On
November 16, 1989, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter were murdered by El
Salvador’s military at the University of Central America in San Salvador. The crime was the
culmination of El Salvador’s antagonism toward Jesuit priests, and specifically their advocacy of
liberation theology. Catholic priests had been using their sermons to focus on the plight of the
poor in El Salvador, and these sermons were instrumental in sparking peasant rebellions. When
the six Jesuit priests were murdered, Congress took action by authorizing an investigation
(Weissman 1995, 140). House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) organized a special House
committee to investigate the murders and he asked Rep. Moakley to lead the committee.
So Tom Foley called me. I was down in Florida, giving a speech…. He said, “Joe,
I don’t like the way that investigation is going down there… I want you to handle
it. .. I want you to be chairman of the committee and task force.” I said, “Mr.
Speaker, … if you’d put a request on the bulletin board, you’d have 434 members,
but you wouldn’t have me on it.” He said, “I know, that’s why I’m calling. I
wanted somebody who didn’t have … baggage; all their other foreign affairs
meanderings.” So we went in there and [it] didn’t cost a penny; I just worked out
of my Rules Committee … The embassy … didn’t want us to get near anything.
And it was very, very awakening…frightening at times. … a couple of times I
thought I was going to get killed…. But it turned out all right, and we were able to
put the Moakley Report into … the case against them. (Moakley 2001)
Moakley was an ideal selection to lead the committee in part because he was chairman of the
House Rules Committee, and in part because he was very tough (Weissman 1995, 141).
Moakley enlisted Leonel Gomez, a Salvadoran who became his man on the ground,
investigator, and interpreter. Gomez had grown up among the elite in El Salvador because his
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family owned coffee plantations. When the political turmoil started in the 1970s, Gomez started
organizing peasant unions and he became chief adviser to the president of the Salvadoran land
reform agency. Unfortunately his boss was assassinated and Gomez fled to the United States. He
started to testify at congressional hearings. Gomez returned to El Salvador in 1989 to help
Moakley because he knew the local scene (Weissman 1995, 141-142). Gomez was a critical link
because of his numerous contacts in El Salvador (Whitfield 1994, 165). With this team, the
Moakley committee was effective (Weissman 1995, 142). Sean Ryan, a member of Moakley’s
congressional staff from 1992 through 2000, notes that Moakley became passionate about his
involvement in this committee because he thought the Bush Administration was stonewalling the
investigation. “He got the feeling that our government was protecting a government that was
really filled with bullies and people that were performing terrible human rights violations as a
result of our government’s assistance to them.” (Ryan, Sean T. Interviewed by Paul Caruso. John
Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-004. 18 April 2003.)
The work required knowing the details of the Jesuit murders as thoroughly as possible.
The team worked with the American Embassy in El Salvador, read court documents, talked with
Salvadoran investigators, judges, and the attorney general. They contacted the military and
government officials. They interviewed human rights groups and witnesses, including the
accused murderers, in hopes of implicating any leaders who had authorized the killings. A
critical turning point in the investigation came when the team learned that an American military
officer had heard first-hand accounts from an El Salvadoran soldier who was present at the
killings. The military officer had written down this information and brought it to his superiors.
Rep. Moakley set out to get this incriminating document, only to encounter resistance from both
the State Department and the Defense Department. Moakley then threatened to issue a Rules
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Committee subpoena and he was finally allowed to at least talk to the officer. Moakley
persuaded the officer to make a copy of the document for him. The Moakley committee learned
that the Salvadorean Armed Forces Chief of Staff had ordered that the soldiers kill the Jesuit
priest, Father Ignacio Ellacuria, and leave no witnesses.
This information convinced Congress in November 1990 to make military assistance to
El Salvador “conditional on its ‘thorough and effective’ investigation and prosecution of the
Jesuit case, as well as both the government’s and FMLN’s respect for human rights and pursuit
of peace. Half of the requested aid would be initially withheld, but it could be restored or cut off
depending on both sides’ performance.” (Weissman 1995, 146) Senator Christopher Dodd (DCT) had conceived of this approach, but Moakley was instrumental in putting it into motion in
the House. Moakley used both is chairmanship of the Rules Committee and an alliance with Rep.
John Murtha (D-PA), who had visited El Salvador and been on the Moakley Committee.
“Murtha’s cooperation grew out of both the investigation and his personal relationship with
Moakley. Murtha also had considerable clout as chairman of the important Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee.” (Weissman 1995, 147)
When the Moakley Committee finished its work for Congress, Moakley became even
more invested in El Salvador. Moakley learned that the military officers involved in the killings
had been trained at the SOA. He focused, unsuccessfully, on closing the school, but he did help
change it. Stephen LaRose, a member of Moakley’s congressional staff from 1993 to 2001, notes
that Moakley was horrified that the U.S. military had trained the killers. So Moakley sponsored a
bill to close the school. The bill failed but it started a dialogue with the Pentagon that ultimately
changed the leadership and culture at the school (LaRose, Stephen M. Interviewed by Beth Anne
Bower and Zenelky Ortiz. John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-002. 7 April 2003)

74

The murders of the Jesuit priests coincided with a massive offensive by the FMLN,
demonstrating that the civil war would require a diplomatic solution instead of a military one.
This caused the Bush administration to advocate openly a political settlement (Munck 1993, 80).
With the help of the United States and the United Nations, El Salvador accepted UN Peace
Accords in 1992 and held democratic elections the following year. Moakley went to El Salvador
to observe the elections in 1994.
Moakley visited El Salvador a few more times in the 1990s, including in 1999 to
commemorate the 10th anniversary of the killings of the Jesuit priests. He went because he had
bonded with the El Salvadoran people. “[I]t was like a love affair of some sort. I mean, they
embraced him. He had done so much for them to create peace in their country that he was like a
god down there. He felt the same way about them, I think. He felt the warmth coming back, and
he wanted to continue to help.” (LaRose 2003) Moakley focused on helping El Salvador reduce
its violence, rebuild political institutions, build a functional judiciary, and build a functional
police force. He also bonded with the Jesuit priests at the University of Central America.
We can see the four elements of the model in Rep. Moakely’s interaction with El
Salvador. First, the international provocations included the killings of the nuns in 1980 and the
priests in 1989. The international provocations also included paramilitary organizations killing
thousands of Salvadoran peasants. Second, the information about these killings reached Rep.
Moakley through several sources, including congressional hearings, meetings with refugees
living in his district, meetings with civic groups, including JPCOCA, that were based in his
district, and information produced by his assistant, Jim McGovern. Third, there is ample
evidence of deep personal impact for Moakley, as recounted by his staff and members of
JPCOCA. Moakley’s intensity and focus on Salvadoran issues was sparked by hearing the
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testimony of Salvadoran refugees. Zanger, who co-founded JPCOCA, said the members of
JPCOCA “were just amazed not only by the tenacity of Jim [McGovern] and Congressman
Moakley, but to watch Moakley really change and take on this issue and become so passionate
about this issue.… His decision to pick it up,…what I got from Jim…was that as they brought
Salvadorans in to testify at these hearings, he became so moved by their stories that he really
changed as a person.” (Zanger 2003)
Finally, Moakley took the path of least resistance. Initially his level of involvement was
restricted to sponsoring legislation for TPS, but as he acquired more resources as chair of the
Rules Committee his involvement increased, but only when he realized that the Reagan and Bush
administrations were blocking Congressional investigations into El Salvador. Moakley’s
legislative activities on behalf of El Salvador started in 1983. It took seven years to get the
legislation passed, and by that time he was leading the committee to investigate the murders of
the Jesuit priests. Once Moakley finished his work on the Commission, his deep personal
affection for the Salvadoran people sustained his political interaction with them. Moakley had an
endowed university chair named after him, as well as a scholarship, at the University of Central
America (LaRose 2003). Moakley once “met with the chief of police down in El Salvador, and
he invited them up to Boston to meet with Commissioner [Paul] Evans here in Boston and teach
him about community policing in Boston. The Salvadoran police officer brought up several of
his lieutenants in the Salvadoran police force, and they met with Boston police and learned about
community policing.” (LaRose 2003) Moakley essentially did case work for El Salvador, such as
after Hurricane Mitch hit the country in October of 1998. He helped to rebuild churches and
restore electricity. “Moakley got the U.S. government—the Embassy—to run electricity
wires….And within a couple of months, they had electricity.” (LaRose 2003)
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It is difficult to explain Moakley’s activities on behalf of El Salvador from the
perspective of constituent rewards. Politically, El Salvador was a no-win issue for him (Moakley
2001). His constituents were mainly Irish and Italian, and they repeatedly asked him to focus on
immigration issues concerning their ethnic groups. He was an unlikely lawmaker to become
involved in foreign policy issues such as El Salvador because he maintained an intense focus on
the needs of his constituents, devoting all of his time to case work. The presence of Salvadoran
refugees in his district and the request of a small minority of his constituents to do something to
help the refugees sparked his initial involvement. The support given to him by JPCOCA and
other interest groups, such as Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), helped
sustain his involvement during the 1980s.
A better explanation for why he got involved requires understanding the confluence of
rational calculations and affective motivations. El Salvador presented a policy window. Up until
1983 Rep. Moakley had followed the leadership of Rep. Studds on foreign policy issues.
However, once he learned that Studds was not moving on Salvadoran refugees, Moakley decided
to fill the gap by sponsoring legislation. Once the legislation became law, his affective
motivations took over when he started serving on the committee. He continued traveling to El
Salvador as it ended its civil war in 1992, held elections in 1994, suffered the ravages of
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, and commemorated the 10th anniversary of the killings in 1999. He
died while in office on May 28, 2001. Moakley entered Congress in 1973, but El Salvador
occupied nearly two-thirds of his time in Congress. Through his involvement he earned deep
affection from the Salvadorans (LaRose 2003). His Roman Catholic background helped him
bond with the Jesuit priests and gave him strong emotional reasons to return to El Salvador.
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In addition to revealing the explanatory value of the model, Rep. Moakley demonstrates
that it is robust. It is easy to apply the model to someone like Rep. Solarz, who was interested in
many different foreign policy issues and was one of the most traveled members of Congress. It is
challenging to apply the model to someone like Rep. Moakley who initially had no interest in
foreign policy issues. The fact that Rep. Moakley essentially became the Congressman from El
Salvador demonstrates the power of deep personal impact to motivate a member of Congress
over many years.

South Africa
South Africa had created a racist state based on an ideology of racial superiority (in its
case, white supremacy). The very nature of its economic and political system, Apartheid, was
oppressive for its African majority. However, the United States and most other countries ignored
this oppression until the 1970s when African-American activists started to focus American and
international attention on South Africa. (There had been efforts by black activists prior to the
1970s. The Council of African Affairs (CAA) tried without success to get the U.S. government
to condemn South Africa between 1937 and 1955.) (Aziabu 1997). Congress began to pay
attention because of the efforts of Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI, 1954-1980). Diggs entered the
House in 1955 and worked with Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY) to develop his foreign
policy expertise. Based on this expertise, Diggs became Chair of the House Subcommittee on
Africa in 1969.
In 1971 Diggs started the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC intended to
unify, articulate, and disseminate the pro-Africa voices within Congress. The caucus held Africafocused hearings, sponsored resolutions, held press conferences, and wrote dissent letters to the
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State Department protesting American policy toward South Africa. The CBC also informed and
nurtured ties with black officials to organize a disciplined anti-apartheid strategy. (Aziabu 1997,
125-126) The CBC became active in foreign policy issues mainly because Diggs persuaded
black House members that foreign policy success would earn them the credibility they needed to
advance in domestic politics (Tillery 2006). Diggs and most of the members of the CBC were in
safe districts, so they did not need financial capital to win re-election. However, unlike most of
the other members of the CBC, Diggs was very ideologically committed to ending South African
Apartheid. Diggs used his seniority on the Foreign Affairs Committee to build up support for
sanctions on South Africa. Diggs focused on building grassroots support in majority-minority
districts from 1973 to 1975. He sponsored more bills sanctioning South Africa from 1973 to
1975 than any other time in his career. Diggs organized the Black Forum on Foreign Policy and
toured Democratic-leaning districts with black populations to raise black America’s
consciousness about Africa. The result was that black voters began demanding action and CBC
members reincorporated sanctions bills into their legislative portfolios (Tillery 2006, 99).
Although Diggs was forced to resign from the House in 1980 during a scandal, his efforts
were not in vain. Randall Robinson served as a legislative assistant for Diggs from 1975 to 1977,
before starting and becoming the executive director of TransAfrica, a permanent and
professional grassroots foreign policy organization modeled on the American-Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). TransAfrica was designed to transcend ideological divisions within
the black community while simultaneously managing organizational linkages among black
activist constituencies. TransAfrica was designed to transcend ideological divisions within the
black community while simultaneously managing organizational linkages among black activist
constituencies. TransAfrica was credible as a coalition-builder and powerful enough to get the
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attention of Washington (Aziabu 1997, 193). Robinson brought zeal and expertise to
TransAfrica. He had traveled extensively in Africa, had solid knowledge of Southern Africa as a
foreign policy issue, and had general knowledge about third world politics (Aziabu 1997, 194195).
Once Diggs left the House, more representatives – all members of the House Africa
Subcommittee – became leaders on South African sanctions. Rep. Solarz became Chair until the
same position opened up on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. Once Solarz moved to Asia
and Pacific, Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI) became Chair of the House Africa
Subcommittee. Starting in 1980, Solarz and Wolpe began collaborating with Representative
William Gray III (D-PA) on sanctions legislation. They persuaded the House to adopt bans on
new investment and loans, and on sales of gold Krugerrand coins (Weissman 1995, 170). In
addition, Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA) submitted an amendment in the final
legislation that imposed a total economic embargo on South Africa.
In the Senate, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) took the lead. Kennedy began to focus on
the apartheid system in South Africa during a 1984 luncheon with South African Bishop
Desmond Tutu, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize that year. Tutu told him ‘‘the world will
not pay attention until someone like you comes to South Africa and brings the cameras and the
spotlights with you’’ (Clymer 1999:363 cited in Carter, et al 2004). Kennedy told South African
Foreign Minister Pik Botha to make progress on forced removals of blacks, South African
citizenship for all, and black voting rights. Starting in 1985, Kennedy introduced sanctions
legislation with Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) that included elements similar to the House bill
(Carter, et al 2004). As part of his effort to pass the legislation, Kennedy testified at hearings
before the Banking and the Foreign Relations Committees, and he gave numerous speeches
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calling for an end to apartheid. He spoke in early 1985 to the Combined Chambers of Commerce
in Johannesburg. He published an article in Ebony to argue for sanctions. “I came away from my
trip with a deep-seated feeling that the U.S. should not be passive in its opposition to apartheid in
South Africa and that U.S. policies should in no way be neutral. On the contrary, we should be
much more vigorous and much more visible - politically, economically, and morally - in the
effort to end apartheid.” (Kennedy 1985a cited in Carter, et al 2004)
Back in the House, Solarz, Wolpe, and Gray assembled the coalition of members who
would eventually pass sanctions legislation. They consulted with the CBC, TransAfrica, and the
Washington Office on Africa. They had to go to every member of the House to negotiate specific
proposals and build a veto-proof coalition (Weissman 1995, 171).They were assisted by
increased numbers of black representatives in the House, who were in positions on many
committees to influence sanctions legislation (Aziabu 1997, 198).
Furthermore, the actions of political entrepreneurs in Congress were critically supported
by the efforts of TransAfrica to build grassroots support. TransAfrica developed influence
despite its small staff. The leadership studied potential partners closely to build a viable
coalition. TransAfrica connected with major black political caucuses and institutions nationally
and locally to advocate divestment. Finally, TransAfrica coodinated investigations and public
hearings with the CBC, using celebrities to testify and shape public opinion (Aziabu 1997, 200201).
TransAfrica used all these resources to persuade Congress to act after the South Africa
government started its violent campaign against black South Africans. Starting in September
1984, there was a burgeoning black revolt across South Africa’s townships. On television
Americans saw police officers beating black youths. Antiapartheid protests provoked the
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government to arrest key leaders and kill people. By late 1985 that average daily death toll was
four people (Jentleson 1990, 157).
Rep. Wolpe said that these images were instrumental in creating the environment that
made sanctions legislation possible. “People were back in the civil rights movement with these
pictures. It humanized the struggle, made it real and concrete.” (Weissman 1995, 168) Jentleson
notes that South African apartheid had become a domestic civil rights issue in Congress. “Prime
Minister Pieter Botha was Governor George Wallace; Bishop Desmond Tutu was the Reverend
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and the Anti-Apartheid Act was the Civil Rights Act. ” (Jentleson
1990, 158) Jentleson also notes that Republicans voted for the sanctions legislation to appeal
more to black voters.
In November 1984, TransAfrica began its campaign against apartheid at the South
African embassy in Washington, D.C. Robinson was arrested with a group of civil rights leaders
and a few elected officials while picketing the embassy. These arrests continued over months and
provoked divestment moves by academic institutions and states (Aziabu 1997, 216). This Free
South Africa Movement (FSAM) was also critical for putting pressure on Congress. As Rep.
Dellums describes the changed environment: “It was very interesting to see colleagues from both
sides of the aisle and of all races, who had previously paid little attention to our efforts, scramble
to get arrested in front of the South African embassy and introduce sanctions bills when the
[effects of the] movement hit home in their districts.” (Tillery 2006, 100) The FSAM attracted
several thousand activists, including members of Congress and representatives of many different
human rights groups (Weissman 1995, 169).
This dramatic campaign paid political dividends in the House. Members from left to right
lined up to endorse sanctions. Conservative Southern white Democrats were forced to support
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sanctions in order to retain the support of their black constituents. There were also conservative
Republicans, some former civil rights demonstrators, who wrote to the South African
ambassador threatening to support sanctions as a way to align the Republican Party with racial
justice and human rights. This coalition helped the House pass a sanctions bill in June 1985. The
Senate passed a similar bill in July. At that point, President Reagan signed an executive order
that put in place many of the provisions of both bills, thinking this would placate the House and
Senate. However, events in South Africa compelled Congress to take further action. South Africa
intensified its crackdown on political dissidents. The pro-sanctions forces united to pass the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) over President Reagan’s veto, mainly with help
from Senator Richard Lugar (R- IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lugar
had been mayor of Indianapolis during school desegregation efforts and had helped avoid rioting
in 1968 after Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated (Weissman 1995, 173-174). Lugar helped
craft the legislation to sustain the veto-proof majority in the Senate and in the House.
The impact of the CAAA on South Africa was swift. In 1989 President F. W. De Klerk
started taking the actions that allowed President George H. W. Bush to lift sanctions in 1991.
Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress, was released from a 27-year
imprisonment. The state of emergency was lifted and political parties were allowed (Weissman
1995, 165).
The four elements of the model are evident in the case of South Africa. The international
provocations from apartheid were well known within the American black community because
information about the racial injustices under apartheid was widely shared within the black
community (Aziabu 1997). The only obstacle the black community faced was communicating
with a unified voice to Congress and the executive branch to place economic sanctions on South
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Africa. This unified voice was missing until the creation of the CBC and TransAfrica. The CBC
spread information about apartheid to black members of Congress and white members of
Congress who represented majority-minority districts. TransAfrica also spread information about
apartheid to a plethora of organizations within civil society. Members of Congress who traveled
to South Africa, including Rep. Solarz, Rep. Wolpe, and Senator Kennedy, had personal
encounters with apartheid that deeply affected them and convinced them to sponsor sanctions
legislation in the House and Senate. The Carter Administration was responsive to congressional
concerns about apartheid, but the Reagan administration pursued a policy of “constructive
engagement” that Congress thought was a failure. The uprisings within South Africa from the
late 1970s to the early 1980s provided the inputs for members of Congress to collaborate with
TransAfrica until both the black community and Congress found their unified voice. In a sense,
South Africa was a simmering pot that was finally brought to a boil with the crackdown by the
South African government and the FSAM in Washington, D.C.
In the South Africa case, unlike the others, many lawmakers played the role of political
entrepreneur. The torch of leadership was passed from one political entrepreneur to another,
burning brighter each time. Rep. Diggs lit the torch with the CBC and passed it to Randal
Robinson and TransAfrica. TransAfrica passed the torch to Rep. Wolpe and Rep. Solarz, who
helped build the veto-proof majority in the House. Senator Kennedy became a political
entrepreneur to end apartheid after he visited South Africa. Senator Lugar used his position as
Chairman of the SFRC to give the Senate a unified voice on South Africa, and he was personally
affected because of his history of dealing with desegregation and racial tension in Indianapolis.
All of these political entrepreneurs lined up to help Congress speak with overwhelming clarity
once South Africa demonstrated the extent that it would go to preserve apartheid through
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bloodshed. There never was a path of least resistance for any of these political entrepreneurs.
They all knew that sanctions legislation, while morally correct, would be very difficult to pass.
Thus, they combined their efforts to pass the CAAA over President Reagan’s veto.

Uganda
In 1971 Idi Amin came to power in Uganda by overthrowing President Milton Obote.
Over the next eight years, he killed over 100,000 people (U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee
on Africa, 1978: 5 cited in Nurnberger 1982). Many victims received international press
attention, including two Americans. In 1977, Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) introduced Senate
Resolution 175, condemning Uganda after the murder of Ugandan Anglican Archbishop Janai
Luwuum. Other media, including a "60 Minutes" broadcast and a film on Idi Amin, kept
Americans aware of events. Amin was portrayed as a tyrant. In response to this attention,
Ugandan exiles and prominent Americans began a campaign against him, testifying in Congress
and before civic organizations. Ugandan exiles formed the Committee on Uganda in 1973, and
by 1977 the committee was lobbying Congress.
Congress focused attention on American coffee imports from Uganda, which provided
Uganda with much of its foreign capital. In addition, Congress focused on American companies
that supplied Amin's jets, a telecommunications satellite system, and pilot training. Coffee had
become the sole remaining foundation for Uganda’s economy, as all other sectors of the
economy collapsed under Amin. He controlled the coffee industry in Uganda, and this control
gave him his money. Freshman Rep. Donald Pease (D-OH) was the first member of Congress to
see this connection because his legislative assistant, William Goold, researched the subject for
his senior thesis at Oberlin College. Rep. Michael Harrington (D-MA) had revealed Uganda's
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reliance on coffee in 1974 (Congressional Record, October 10, 1974: E-35539, cited in
Nurnberger 1982), but Pease made the connection to American coffee companies. The United
States imported only four percent of its coffee from Uganda in 1971, and that increased to seven
percent in 1977 (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 139; U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on
Foreign Economic Policy, 1978: 52-53, cited in Nurnberger 1982).
Rep. Pease decided that an American-led boycott of Ugandan coffee would deprive Amin
of his funds without hurting Americans.
The problem was that the Carter administration did not support the boycott. The Carter
administration had already taken extensive diplomatic action against Amin. It had, for instance,
closed its embassy in Kampala and discontinued all assistance. It had withdrawn all Peace Corps
and AID personnel. Representatives to the World Bank and the African Development Fund were
instructed to vote against loans to Uganda. The administration had excluded Uganda from U.S.
programs designed to promote trade and investment. The Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) had both ceased activity in Uganda after 1973.
The administration did not grant general trade preferences to Uganda, and it reviewed all
applications for export licenses to Uganda, denying them if exports contributed to human rights
violations. William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, noted that
the administration had worked to prevent activities that contributed to human rights violations
and worked with concerned governments to pressure Uganda to improve its human rights
situation (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1978: 126-27, cited in Nurnberger 1982). However, this was as
far as the Carter administration wanted to go. It did not want to overthrow Amin because this
would set a dangerous precedent of overthrowing foreign governments. The administration also
did not want to punish Amin. The final risk was the continuing presence of American citizens in
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Uganda, including missionaries, students, dependents of Ugandans, pilots, and contract
technicians. The Carter administration did not want to provoke retaliatory actions against these
people.
The problem with economic sanctions, according to the Carter administration, was that
they would violate free trade principles and would likely be ineffective. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles required extraordinary circumstances to cease trade. The
Carter administration argued that the human rights violations did not constitute extraordinary
circumstances. Finally, even though African countries were embarrassed by Uganda’s actions,
they saw the situation as an internal African problem and did not want the U.S. to intervene. The
Carter administration argued that the risks were too high if it got involved, but would be lower if
American companies took the lead in any boycott.
In the face of the Carter administration’s resistance to trade sanctions, Pease released the
names of the thirty-three American companies that purchased Ugandan coffee in 1975 and 1976
in the hopes of pressuring those companies to voluntarily boycott Uganda. The American coffee
industry resisted Rep. Pease’s pressure. Representatives of the industry argued that this was a
foreign policy decision that was best handled by the United States government and not by the
private sector. Moreover, the American companies did not purchase coffee from Uganda
directly, but instead went through brokers. The problem was also that an American ban would
simply pressure Uganda to sell coffee to other markets. However, the American coffee
companies admitted that they did not like Amin’s government and wanted to change it. They
were concerned about both the domestic repercussions of not boycotting Uganda, and the
possible repercussions in Uganda if they did boycott. They wanted Congress to take the lead.
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This created an impasse that Congress had to work through. Private companies wanted
the United States to set official policy in order to avoid retaliation for their business decisions
and the United States wanted the private sector to take the lead to avoid retaliation from Uganda
and other trade partners. To resolve this impasse, Congress began to apply pressure on American
businesses that were doing business with Uganda or helping it in some way. Members of
Congress, including Rep. Jim Mattox (D-TX), targeted a company in Texas that trained pilots for
Amin’s private jets. They also targeted a company in Ohio that sold a telecommunications
satellite system to Uganda, and an airline company in New York that had sold a Gulfstream II jet
to Uganda.
Pease submitted legislation, including: H.R. 9252, to amend the Export Administration
Act of 1969 to prohibit American exports to Uganda; H.R. 9253 to amend the International
Coffee Agreement Act of 1968 to prohibit the importation of Ugandan coffee into the United
States; and H.R. 9254 to prohibit the importation of Ugandan goods into the United States
(Nurnberger 1982). When Pease introduced his legislation, thirty-five Representatives cosponsored the bills and Rep. Don Bonker (D-WA) joined the boycott movement. In the Senate,
Mark Hatfield (R-OR) became interested after talking with Ugandan Anglican bishop Festo
Kivengere. Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-CT) became involved upon the urging of the former
ambassador to Uganda, then the president of Sacred Heart University in Bridgeport, CT. Weicker
introduced the Pease bills in the Senate. Senator Frank Church (D-ID), Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, became involved because of a
staff memo and called for hearings. In both houses the congressional staff had access to
information from the Ugandan community in the United States, which enabled Congressional
knowledge to surpass the knowledge of the executive branch.
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Reps. Bonker and Pease introduced House Concurrent Resolution 426, which called on
the Carter administration to close the Ugandan embassy in Washington, restrict the movement of
Ugandan diplomats to the United Nations, prohibit imports and exports of all Ugandan products,
prohibit Ugandan citizens from being trained in the U.S., prohibit Ugandan aircraft from landing
in the U.S., and prohibit Ugandan equipment with military applications from being maintained in
the United States (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 302-4, cited in Nurnberger 1982). The House
Committee on International Relations held hearings on this resolution. Committee chairman
Clement Zablocki (D-WI), with the State Department’s support, argued that the resolution be
weakened. Rep. Pease also faced a political battle within his own Africa Subcommittee. Rep.
Diggs thought a congressional investigation of Uganda would divert attention from South Africa
and joined Zablocki in supporting a non-binding resolution. Bonker gave in and substituted
House Concurrent Resolution 612, urging the president to support and implement measures to
discourage United States support of Uganda (U.S. Congress, House, 1978: 305-6, cited in
Nurnberger 1982)
This weaker, non-binding resolution was the congressional signal that the coffee industry
needed to implement a boycott of Ugandan coffee. Immediately the Folger Coffee Company
interpreted the resolution as an expression of government policy and suspended all purchases of
Ugandan coffee. The rest of the industry quickly followed (New York Times, 1978; Cleveland
Press, 1978, cited in Nurnberger 1982). The non-binding, “sense of Congress” resolution helped
resolve the impasse between the government and the coffee industry because it let the companies
initiate a boycott without violating their belief that foreign policy should be conducted by
governments, not corporations. The House adopted the resolution, then the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held hearings. Senator Church introduced an amendment to the
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International Monetary Fund Supplementary Financing Facility Bill imposing a trade embargo
against Uganda. The Senate passed the embargo amendment, then went into conference with the
House to reconcile the different versions. The amendment was approved on October 10, 1978.
After this legislation passed Congress, Amin sent soldiers to the Tanzanian border and
initiated a civil war within Uganda. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania retaliated against Amin
by using a combined force of Ugandan exiles, dissidents, deserting Ugandan troops, and the
Tanzanian army to drive out Amin in April 1979. President Carter informed Congress that the
human rights situation in Uganda had improved and Congress removed all restrictions on trade
and assistance. The actions by Congress likely had no direct impact on Uganda, but they
signaled to Nyerere that the United States would support his military action against Amin.
Nyerere assumed the embargo would lead to American assistance and admitted disappointment
that the United States did not help pay for the invasion force (Nurnberger 1982).
The four elements of the model are present in the Uganda case. The international
provocations by Idi Amin were well known and publicized around the world. American media
organizations and Ugandan refugees provided information to members of Congress, who then
submitted non-binding resolutions expressing the “sense of Congress” and binding resolutions
restricting trade with Uganda. Specific members of Congress, including Reps. Pease and Bonker,
and Sens. Hatfield and Weicker, were deeply personally affected by conversations they had with
people from Uganda. Finally, they took the path of least resistance. Rep. Pease tried at first to get
the Carter administration to impose a coffee embargo. When that did not work he tried to
convince American coffee companies to voluntarily implement an embargo, and he submitted
legislation. When neither of those worked he submitted a binding resolution that was weakened
in committee. The non-binding resolution was the easiest legislative mechanism to get through
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the committee system, but it proved to be enough to convince the coffee industry to start the
embargo. Congressional signaling became a critical tool as it influenced both industry behavior
and Tanzania’s behavior.
Uganda also demonstrates that non-binding resolutions can have more impact than
binding legislation on the behavior of domestic constituents and foreign governments. This is
surprising because we usually assume that binding legislation has a bigger impact. However,
Uganda shows that congressional signaling to domestic and foreign actors is an important
component of American foreign policy and international relations. Congressional signaling can
take many forms in addition to non-binding resolutions.

Comparing the five cases according to the model
Now that the model has been applied to five countries, it is useful to analyze each
element of the model so that we can draw some additional lessons about the roles of political
entrepreneurs in these cases.

1. International provocations: Each of the cases presents obvious human rights abuses.
(a) The Soviet Union cracked down on political dissidents, imprisoning them and
torturing them. The Soviet Union also prevented Jews from going to Israel to unite with
families. (b) Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge killed about 2 million people through torture,
execution and forced labor. (c) El Salvador sent paramilitary units, or death squads, into
villages to kill peasants suspected of supporting rebels. (d) South Africa maintained a state
that practiced racial discrimination. (e) Uganda’s Idi Amin killed over 100,000 people,
including an American journalist and a teacher.
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2. Information: For each of the cases there are intermediaries who tell members of Congress
about the rights abuses (the international provocations).
(a) Soviet dissidents and American Jews in the SJM told members of Congress about
the plight of political prisoners in the Soviet Union and refuseniks who were trying to leave.
(b) Cambodians fleeing the killing fields of the Khmer Rouge met with Rep. Solarz and told
him horrible stories of mass death. (c) Salvadorans fleeing death squads told members of
JPCOCA about certain death after being deported back to El Salvador and JPCOCA brought
this information to Rep. Moakley. (d) Members of Congress traveled to South Africa and
witnessed the immoral conditions under apartheid, or TransAfrica and the CBC
communicated this information to them. (e) Dr. Thomas Melady, the last American
ambassador to Uganda, spoke to members of Congress, and Ugandan exiles presented their
case to Congress through the Committee on Uganda.

3. Deep personal impact: For each of these cases there was at least one member of Congress
who was deeply affected by information about human rights abuses.
(a) Senator Jackson and Rep. Vanik learned about the plight of refuseniks. Rep.
Fenwick met with a refusenik in Russia and was so deeply affected that she had nightmares.
(b) Rep. Solarz met Cambodian refugees and was reminded of the Jewish Holocaust. (c) Rep.
Moakley learned about the death squads roaming El Salvador and he decided to take action.
He investigated the killing of Jesuit priests in El Salvador and he formed a deep bond with
Salvadorans and the Jesuit priests. (d) Rep. Diggs and Randal Robinson equated South
African apartheid with Jim Crow in the American South before the Civil Rights Movement.
Rep. Wolpe and Solarz traveled to South Africa and decided that apartheid was immoral.
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Senator Kennedy traveled to South Africa and reached the same conclusion. Senator Lugar
remembered his experience dealing with desegregation in Indianapolis and decided to
support sanctions legislation. (e) Senator’s Case, Church and Weicker introduced resolutions
after having conversations with people who lived or worked in Uganda.

4. Path of least resistance: For each of these cases the member of Congress got involved only
to the extent that his/her institutional support and support from colleagues made legislation a
viable option, and only after realizing that the executive branch would likely resist his/her
efforts.
(a) Senator Jackson and Rep. Vanik amended the 1974 trade act to make trade with
the Soviet Union contingent on refuseniks being allowed to leave for Israel. Rep. Fenwick
submitted legislation to create a commission that would monitor compliance with the
Helsinki Final Act. It was supported by her colleague in the Senate, Senator Clifford Case
(R-NJ), and other House members who were both interested in human rights and interested in
placing pressure on Henry Kissinger’s State Department. (b) Rep. Solarz organized a hearing
on human rights in Cambodia as a freshman in the House, but he did not pass a non-lethal aid
amendment until he was Chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee in 1985. He submitted
his UN Interim Trusteeship plan to the international community and the executive branch,
where there was a policy window, before submitting it to the House and the Senate, with the
Senate being the most resistant obstacle to his plan. His plan passed the Senate only after the
UN and the Cambodian factions announced their support for the plan and the Bush
administration brokered a deal with key senators.
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(c) Rep. Moakley submitted legislation granting TPS to Salvadoran refugees, but he
did not play hardball until he was Chairman of the Rules Committee. He used his Chair
position to investigate the murders of Jesuit priests in El Salvador, to provide funds to build
Salvadoran Society, and to place pressure on the warring factions to broker a peace
agreement. (d) Rep. Diggs used his Chair position on the House Africa Subcommittee to start
the CBC. When Reps. Solarz and Wolpe occupied the same Chair positions, they started
shaping sanctions legislation for South Africa. Senator Lugar used his Chair position on the
SFRC to shape legislation that could pass Congress with a veto-proof majority. (e) Rep.
Pease tried unsuccessfully to get the Carter administration to implement an economic boycott
against Uganda. Then he tried, again unsuccessfully, to get the coffee industry to voluntarily
boycott Ugandan coffee. His effort succeeded only when he passed a non-binding “sense of
Congress” resolution through committee.

Understanding the role of political entrepreneurs
The model helps us understand the specific role that political entrepreneurs and interest
groups had in each of the four cases, and in other cases not discussed here. Every case discussed
here required political entrepreneurs to change American foreign policy. However, the presence
and organization of grassroots interest groups differed across the cases.
In the case of Cambodia the Cambodian-Americans were poorly organized and had no
electoral strength. It took Rep. Solarz, an effective political entrepreneur, to argue effectively to
both Congress and the executive branch to change American foreign policy. In the case of El
Salvador, Salvadoran refugees were not organized, but American citizens were very organized.
Yet Rep. Moakley had no interest in foreign policy issues. Citizen groups, including JPCOCA,
brought the plight of Salvadoran refugees to the attention of Moakley and his staff and thus
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sparked Moakley’s interest. For South Africa there was a strong grassroots component, with
TransAfrica combining with many effective political entrepreneurs in Congress. It took the
united efforts of the House Africa Subcommittee, the CBC, political entrepreneurs Solarz,
Wolpe, Gray, Dellums, and Kennedy, and finally TransAfrica, to craft sanctions legislation and
pass it over President Reagan's veto a mere two years after TransAfrica began FSAM. As the
South African government increased its crackdown TransAfrica stepped up its campaign. For
the Soviet Union, there was a strong grassroots component, with the Soviet Jewry Movement and
American Jews putting pressure on members of Congress to help free the refuseniks. Sens.
Jackson and Case, and Reps. Vanik and Fenwick, both harnessed this grassroots pressure to pass
legislation. For Uganda, there was a strong grassroots component with Ugandan exiles
organizing and placing pressure on Congress to end trade relations with Uganda. Rep. Pease
successfully passed a resolution that facilitated an economic boycott. Senator’s Case, Church and
Weicker passed binding legislation that restricted trade.
Moreover, we can see in each case that the political entrepreneurs had secure seats that
gave them the liberty to pursue foreign policy issues. In the chart below, the Margin of Victory
on the Y-axis indicates the percentage points separating the winner in the election from the
closest competitor. With the exception of Rep. Lester Wolff, all of the winners sustained large
margins during their congressional careers. In Wolff’s case, he had razor-thin margins in the
first, second, and fifth elections of his career. He received a boost from the Democratic waves in
1974, 1976, and 1978. He was defeated by a Reaganite Republican, John LeBoutillier, in 1980
after LeBoutillier ran an advertising campaign showing Wolff spending more time in other
countries as chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee than in his district. Wolff’s defeat is
sometimes cited as an example of what happens when members of Congress care more about
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foreign policy than their districts, but the electoral margins show that Wolff’s seat was never
really safe without the help of national political forces.3
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As I argued in the first chapter, the main difference between a citizen, a legislator, and a
president is the time frame. A president has the constitutional authority to act quickly on foreign
policy issues. The path of least resistance for a member of Congress or a citizen who wants to
change American foreign policy is to ask the president to change policy. When the president is in
the same party as the member of Congress, the change in policy may come quickly after a letter
or meeting from the member of Congress. However, when the president is from the opposition
party and becomes unresponsive to the entreaties of members of Congress and citizen groups,
members of Congress have a motive to change policy through their own efforts. The motive is
3
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dependent on the means: as members of Congress acquire more institutional resources, they do
more. A member of Congress who is in the minority party in the House or Senate and lacks
tenure on a committee (or celebrity status) may try to use media resources to shape the debate
and change American foreign policy (Kedrowski 1992). In each of these cases, it was the
combination of both congressional resources and executive opposition that sparked political
entrepreneurship.
Based on these cases, a plausible argument can be made that there are three elements that
need to exist to facilitate a change in American foreign policy toward a specific country. First,
there must be one or more political entrepreneurs, either in Congress or in civil society. They
take advantage of institutional resources and a policy window to create policy toward a specific
country or region. Second, compelling international events create a window of opportunity for
action. Third, there must be a conduit for information from the target country to Congress,
possibly provided by citizens groups and ethnic interest groups. The first two elements are
essential. The last element speeds up the process. What citizens groups do is shorten the time
frame for activity. Instead of waiting decades to take action, Congress may move within months
or a few years. When all three elements are combined, Congress can act quickly and override a
presidential veto.
The model presented here can probably be applied to other cases of human rights abuses.
Possible cases include Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, where military coups led to
death squads and disappearances, causing refugees to flee to the U.S. Scholars may examine
African countries where human rights abuses provoked members of Congress to target bilateral
trade relations and economic development assistance. There is the alleged Armenian genocide in
which the Ottoman Turks killed 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1923. Their
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descendents moved to the United States and placed pressure on Congress to recognize the
genocide (Cannon 2009). There are also the cases of Cuba (Zook 2004), Haiti (Gomis 2000),
Lithuania (Hartman 1996), and Poland (Podbielski 1997). These, and other cases, may further
demonstrate the explanatory power of the model.
The model also demonstrates the connection between international relations,
transnational politics, and domestic politics. In the cases of the Soviet Union and Uganda there
were organized transnational movements that spread the information to the United States
Congress. In the cases of Cambodia, South Africa and El Salvador the transnational movements
either were not organized enough (Cambodian and Salvadoran refugees) or they did not exist
(South Africa). However, they still had voices in the United States because of American interest
groups (JPCOCA for Salvadoran refugees, TransAfrica for South Africa) or champions in
Congress (Solarz for Cambodia).
The second element of the model, information, simplifies this complexity for the sake of
clarity, but it is important to recognize that these cases demonstrate complex interdependence
and the power of transnational networks to connect domestic politics and international relations
through United States foreign policy. The limitation of these examples is that the transnational
movements dissipated once Congress responded and the international provocation ended. There
is no longer a Soviet Jewry Movement because the Soviet Union no longer exists. There is no
longer a movement of Ugandan refugees because Idi Amin fled Uganda. In the next chapter, we
will examine what happens when the transnational movement, the Taiwan Independence
Movement, persists even after Congress acted and most of their demands for change on Taiwan
were met as Taiwan liberalized during the 1980s and democratized during the 1990s.
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Chapter 3
Taiwan Independence Movement and the Congressional “Gang of Four”
Taiwan has a unique position in international relations. It is, in practice, an independent
country with its own political system, history and economy. However, legally it is not recognized
as independent by the United States and most other countries in the world because it is
considered to be part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is within this complex situation
that we can apply the model developed in the previous chapter.
After the United States shifted its official relationship from the Republic of China (ROC)
to the PRC in 1979, Taiwan’s government began a systematic crackdown on political dissidents,
committed human rights abuses against political opponents, and even killed TaiwaneseAmerican citizens who had fled the political oppression on Taiwan. Information about these
human rights abuses was brought to the United States Congress by the Taiwan Independence
Movement (TIM), which traces its origins to February 28, 1947, when the military forces of the
ROC systematically killed thousands of political dissidents who posed a threat to the ROC
(Wang 1999). In 1982 TIM created the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a
grassroots organization that built relationships with four members of Congress: Rep. Stephen
Solarz (D-NY), Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA), Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. Claiborne Pell (DRI) (Lin 2006, Chen 2007). These members of Congress made public statements, held
subcommittee hearings, gave press conferences, and passed non-binding resolutions and
legislation that communicated to Taiwan’s government the need to end human rights abuses and
create a viable democracy. They did this because the Reagan administration refused to condemn
the government crackdown, even though it condemned government crackdowns in other
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countries. Taiwan’s government responded both to these actions by Congress and the changing
political dynamics on Taiwan. In 1987 Taiwan liberalized; in the 1990s it democratized.
This chapter will not prove a direct causal link between the actions of Congress and
Taiwan’s transition to democracy, but Taiwan’s government seemed to respond to Congress.
This chapter focuses on the role of transnational politics in the information component of the
model as it applies to Taiwan. The cases of the Soviet Union and Uganda demonstrated the
power of transnational networks in providing information to Congress that ends up in nonbinding resolutions and binding legislation. Taiwan demonstrates the persistence of transnational
networks after Taiwan ended its human rights abuses and democratized. Previous work has
demonstrated TIM’s impact on Congress, through FAPA, from the 1990s to the present (Chen
2007). This chapter focuses on the 1980s. There was often a direct exchange of information
about human rights abuses in Taiwan with members of Congress during the 1980s through
FAPA.

Taiwan’s Unique International Position
Any discussion of Taiwan must recognize the complex relationship between the United
States, the PRC, and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. American foreign policy toward
China and Taiwan is complex because China’s culture, people, and vast resources have posed
significant challenges for the West in general, including European colonial powers, and for the
United States in particular. The United States has used its China policy to articulate its national
identity and its international relationships, from the Open Door Notes that the Secretary of State
sent to the European Powers in 1899 to argue for open trade in China, to the recognition of the
ROC in 1911, to the decision to not recognize the PRC in 1950, to recognition of the PRC in
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1979 and eventual support for the PRC to enter the World Trade Organization (Holdaway 2002).
The United States has used its China policy to advocate democracy around the world and
demonstrate that it is a loyal ally to friendly countries.
China had been carved up by European powers during the 18th and 19th centuries, with
different treaties articulating the commercial rights of each European power. Then China entered
an anti-colonial, revolutionary period as it came under the military and political dominion of Sun
Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Nationalist government (Kuomintang or KMT). The U.S.
recognized this government and allied with it during World War II. The U.S. was about to
recognize the PRC after the Chinese Communist Party forced the KMT to move to Formosa
(Holdaway 2002), but the PRC’s intervention in the Korean War on behalf of North Korea
forced the U.S. to maintain its official alliance with the KMT government on Formosa. The U.S.
had to engage in a delicate balancing act between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on Mainland
China. On the one hand, the United States Congress passed the Formosa resolution in 1955 that
authorized President Dwight Eisenhower to defend Taiwan and its smaller islands from attacks
by the PRC (Briggs 1994). On the other, the U.S. did not want to commit itself to Taiwan’s
defense such that it got dragged into a war between the ROC and the PRC if Taiwan or one of its
smaller islands were attacked. This created a political and military stalemate, a situation that held
until the Nixon administration renewed relations with the PRC in 1972 and the Carter
administration officially recognized the PRC in 1979.
Between 1949 and 1979, relations between the United States and the ROC were shaped
primarily by the “China Lobby”, a group of American business leaders, politicians, and
missionaries who had been actively involved in Chinese business, politics, and culture (Koen
1974, Chao 1990). The China Lobby helped turn the ROC into an American ally despite
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extensive evidence of corruption within the Nationalist Party and ineptitude in the government
(Ericson 2004). When the Nixon administration sought a new relationship with the PRC, the
China Lobby cast a shadow over negotiations, forcing Nixon and Kissinger to conduct all
diplomacy in secret in the lead-up to the 1972 Shanghai Communique (Oksenberg 1986) and the
Carter administration to do the same prior to official recognition of the PRC (Holdaway 2002,
Sutter 1980). The China Lobby joined forces with the official lobby for the ROC to maintain
U.S.-ROC relations from 1949 to 1979. Later the Taiwan independence movement effectively
displaced both the China Lobby and the official representatives of the ROC on Capitol Hill.

The 228 Incident
The majority of the population on Taiwan is descended from Chinese who migrated there
in previous centuries. Mainland-born Chinese who settled there at the end of WWII, along with
their Taiwan-born offspring, constitute a sizeable minority. For 50 years after Japan defeated
China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) Formosa was ruled by the Japanese Empire.
The Japanese turned out to be enlightened leaders, building roads, hospitals, and schools for the
native population on Formosa. The natives learned Japanese and witnessed their island turn into
an industrial power. After the Allied powers defeated Japan in World War II, Formosa was left in
limbo for a couple years as the Chinese government struggled for survival against Mao Zedong’s
Communist rebellion. Unlike the progressive Japanese, who developed Formosa, the Nationalist
government on China, led by General Chiang Kia-shek, decided to treat Formosa like a prize
from the spoils of war. Chinese troops pillaged Formosa from the moment of their arrival on the
island (Kerr 1965). The natives switched from hailing the conquering Chinese heroes to fearing
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them and rebelling against them. Chinese corruption on Formosa was rampant, and the natives
seethed with anger until, finally, a single spark became the catalyst for a conflagration of terror.
On February 27, 1947, a woman on the island of Formosa started selling cigarettes
without a license. She was promptly arrested by police working for the Nationalist Government
controlling Formosa. Her arrest symbolized to the island natives all the corruption in the Chinese
government and its oppression of the people on Formosa. The natives rebelled, catching the
Chinese government off guard at first. The Chinese government on Formosa tried to negotiate,
but the governor of the island communicated the troubles to the Nationalist government on the
mainland and the government sent troops for a crackdown. The next day, February 28 (the 228
incident), the crackdown began, and it was horrific. In scenes reminiscent of the worst days of
the Nazi regime in Germany and the purges in Stalin’s Russia, the Nationalist troops murdered or
arrested ten thousand natives on Formosa, especially student protesters. The carnage became
Formosa’s holocaust (Kerr 1965; Lai et al 1991). The massacre was followed by martial law and
an era of “White Terror.” The crisis caused many Taiwanese students, especially upper-class
Taiwanese, to travel abroad and oppose the KMT (Mendel 1970; Wu 2003).

Spreading Information Through the Taiwan Independence Movement
Thus was born the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) which consisted of advocates
who began to call themselves “Formosans,” to distinguish themselves from Chinese born on
mainland China, after the Dutch name for Taiwan (Kerr 1974, Ma and Cartier 2003). After the
228 incident, TIM spread to Japan, Sweden, Canada, and the United States. TIM pursued three
goals after the initial 228 incident: (1) an end to martial law and the “White Terror”, which
included improving human rights on Taiwan; (2) democratization, including legal opposition
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parties; and (3) independence for Taiwan based on self-determination of the Taiwanese people
(Wang 1999; Bush 2005; Tang 2005). Emotion-laden factors, such as national self-image, are an
essential part of every national movement (Femenia 2000). Their need for international
recognition gave independence activists the energy to spread the message of Taiwan’s
independence. Their self-image is still tied to an independent Taiwan. They will continue to
advocate independence until Taiwan becomes legally independent. Their emotional connection
to advocating Taiwan’s independence also provides the mechanism for collective organization,
which we know through the concept of bonding social capital.
The Nationalist government lost the civil war with the Chinese Communists and was
forced to move to Formosa, which became Taiwan. Native Taiwanese thought Formosa was
betrayed by the government that was supposed to be its benefactor, and, just as its identity was
erased, its freedoms were erased as well. The Nationalist government was oppressive, but it tried
to maintain the pretense of democracy so that it could sustain its alliance with the United States
and retain a veneer of legitimacy with the native people on Taiwan. Michael Fonte, the Senior
Policy Analyst at the FAPA from 1986 to 2002, said “I lived in Taiwan from 67 to 70 so I
experienced this all myself -- under tight martial law, a lot of human rights abuses, you were not
allowed to speak out in any way…. The native Taiwanese who came here became professional
people - scientists, doctors, engineers, etc. -- very well educated, hard-working people, but very
dedicated to seeing a change in their home country …and so they carried an awful lot of that
passion into their organizing.” (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)
The 20 years of TIM activity in the United States from the early 1960s to 1980 can be
seen as a learning process as the same people created different organizations to advocate
Taiwan’s independence, and discovered the most viable method, creating political capital in
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Congress, only after previous attempts at advocacy failed. The Taiwan independence activists
learned to use the appropriate terminology, target the appropriate politicians, and moderate their
goals sufficiently to find supporters in Congress. TIM efforts in the United States were
disorganized until the 1980s when the activists created the Formosan Association for Public
Affairs (FAPA).
In the 1950s and 1960s, Formosans traveled via student visas to Japan, Canada, and the
United States, among other countries, to promote a free and independent Formosa. The KMT
oppressed Formosans abroad by canceling their visas if they engaged in anti-KMT activity and
harassing their relatives on Taiwan (Peng 1972). Nevertheless, Formosans started many
American organizations to raise awareness about their plight: Taiwanese Association of America
(TAA), Free Formosans for Formosa (FFF), United Formosans for Independence (UFI), United
Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI), and World United Formosans for
Independence (WUFI) (Lin 2006). “I think the key to my mind lies in the community of
Taiwanese Americans who came here. Many of them, especially the FAPA core people, came
here in the ‘60s as students, or maybe early ‘70s, around that time.” (Michael Fonte, interview
with author, October 22, 2008)
The key organizer was Trong Chai. Chai is from Jiayi, Taiwan, a location of the worst
forms of KMT oppression after the 228 incident, and had been active in the Taiwanese-American
social organization TAA. In 1970 he organized WUFI, a successor organization to FFF which
was started in 1955 in Philadelphia and became UFI until merging with other groups to form
UFAI in the 1960s. In April 1970, Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Taiwan’s president Chiang Kaishek, visited the United States. Peter Huang, a member of WUFI, attempted to assassinate him.
After the failed attempt, Trong Chai asked Peng Ming-min to join WUFI. Dr. Peng had been a
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professor of political science and law in Taiwan and been forced into exile after distributing a
document calling for democratically elected government. He eventually established roots in the
United States through the University of Michigan (Smith 1970), and in September 1971 he
agreed to move to New Jersey to establish Formosan Studies, Inc., under the auspices of WUFI.
In January 1972, Dr. Peng was elected chairperson of WUFI, but the Chiang assassination
incident compelled many members to withdraw from WUFI. Dr. Peng was an ineffective
administrator, functioning more as a “thinking-type intellectual”, as WUFI fell apart (Shu 2005).
“Worse yet, he was haughtily lofty, obsessively confident, and he lacked political savvy. Unable
to handle the situations, after only half of a year on the chairpersonship, Ming-min resigned.”
(Shu 2005)
TIM reached its high point in terms of visibility with the attempted assassination of
Chiang Ching-kuo, but the connection of TIM activists, especially WUFI members, with violent
tactics caused Taiwanese around the world to disassociate themselves from the independence
movement. Thus, there was little activity as the major international events of the 1970s
transpired.

The Chung-li Incident and Kaohsiung Incident
In the late 1970s, two incidents united Taiwan independence activists on Taiwan and
abroad, and galvanized them to take political and sometimes violent action. The Chung-li
Incident in 1977 was the first political protest on the streets of Taiwan since the 1940s, and it
was aimed at preventing election fraud by the KMT. This incident provoked activists to start
organizing again. On Dec. 10, 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident occurred, with the government
inciting violence against peaceful demonstrators at a United Nations Human Rights Day
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celebration. The government arrested and imprisoned many opposition leaders. The Chung-li
Incident and the Kaohsiung Incident gave activists a sense of urgency about the dire situation on
Taiwan. These two events fomented organized political opposition and intense activism by
Taiwanese exiles in Europe and North America (Gregor and Chang 1983).
The oppressive actions of the KMT occurred in five main areas following the Kaohsiung
Incident. The first area was the arrest, imprisonment, and torture of people that the government
linked, fairly or unfairly, to the peace demonstration. It arrested politicians, human rights
activists, lawyers, ministers, journalists, and other citizens. The government imprisoned many
people on Green Island and tortured them in various ways, including sleep deprivation, inflicting
bodily injury, denying them access to food, water and toilets, and denying them access to the
outside world. The second was the impediment of democratic processes, including preventing
non-KMT candidates from campaigning for public office. The third was the denial of press
freedoms, such as the right to publish materials concerning human rights, the need for
democracy, or documentation of the human rights abuses committed by the KMT. The fourth
area was the denial of religious freedoms, particularly involving the rights of the Presbyterian
Church and its leaders. The fifth area was persistence of martial law, which started in 1949 as an
anti-communist measure, and involved the imprisonment or assassination of politicians, human
rights activists, lawyers, ministers, journalists, and other citizens the KMT deemed a threat,
whether they lived in Taiwan or in the United States.

Spreading information
Information about these human rights abuses went out to the world through Amnesty
International, the State Department’s annual report on human rights, international magazines and
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newspapers, and publications of organizations associated with the Taiwan independence or
democracy movements. The Formosan Association for Human Rights (FAHR), founded in 1976,
published literature on the KMT’s human rights abuses. The Society for the Protection of East
Asians’ Human Rights (SPEAHR) published SPEAHRhead between 1979 and 1984 to document
the plight of prisoners, both those held in connection with the Kaohsiung Incident and those
imprisoned for longer periods of time. The International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan
began publishing the Taiwan Communique in December 1980; FAPA took over the publication
in 1988. The Taiwan Communique became a valuable source of information for politicians,
policy makers, human rights activists and researchers concerned about the developments on
Taiwan. It still publishes to this day. Most of the material is culled from other publications as
well as the Congressional Record so that readers have access to the speeches and resolutions by
members of Congress on behalf of Taiwan.
Members of Congress, including but not limited to Rep. Solarz, Rep. Leach, Sen. Pell and
Sen. Kennedy, directed their staff to gather information on Taiwanese government rights abuses
by arranging for activists, scholars and government officials to speak at hearings.
Representatives of FAPA were witnesses at many hearings. In addition, Taiwan independence
activists spoke at these hearings. After the Kaohsiung Incident, congressional activity -hearings, press conferences, press releases, speeches, binding resolutions, non-binding
resolutions, legislation, casework -- focused on events, both in Taiwan and in the United States.
The events received press coverage both in Taiwan and the international press, often sparking
hearings in Congress that resulted in legislation. The congressional activities signaled the KMT
about the intentions of the United States government and thus often led to changes in the KMT’s
behavior.
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Deep Personal Impact: Staff and Members of Congress
As we examine the motives of members of Congress and their staff as they interacted
with Taiwan democracy activists, we find evidence of deep personal impact.
Rep. Stephen Solarz: Rep. Solarz explains why he not only met with refugees, but also
turned his office into a refugee camp for oppressed people from all over the world. It owed
largely to his Jewish background.
My view of history has been shaped profoundly by the destruction of European
Jewry in the Holocaust and the failure of the United States and other countries to
come to their assistance when it could have made a difference. I believed as a
Congressman that wherever there were people in distress, I had a responsibility to
do whatever I could to relieve their suffering. That is why, whether it involved
protecting the right of people to practice their religion, to freely emigrate, or to
express themselves without fear of persecution, I kept my office door open to
Timorese, Bahai, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Pakistanis,
South Africans, Bangladeshis, and anyone else in harm’s way, seeking help from
the U.S. government. (Excerpt from unpublished memoir)
Solarz’s deep interest in oppressed people made him the ideal champion for Taiwan. Solarz’s
introduction to the Taiwan democracy movement started with Trong Chai. Solarz had already
traveled to Taiwan, and by 1981 he was the chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee. His
chief of Staff, Edward Friedman, had also spent time on Taiwan during the 1960s. Thus, Solarz
was the natural contact point for Taiwan democracy activists.
Shortly after I became chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia in 1981, I was
approached for help by a Taiwanese American, Trong Chai, who was a professor
at Medgar Evers College, which is part of the City University of New York. More
importantly, he was a skilled political organizer and president of the Formosan
Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)… FAPA‘s members were Taiwanese
Americans who were committed to the creation of real democracy and the
eventual establishment of an independent Taiwan. (Excerpt from unpublished
memoir)
A key problem between Chai and Solarz was impact of U.S.-Beijing normalization.
Solarz knew U.S. policy on Taiwan could not change, given the rapprochement with the People’s
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Republic of China in 1972 and the official recognition of the PRC in 1979. But Chai did not
recognize this limitation.
There was always a little tension in my relations with Chai and FAPA. While I
strongly supported their desire for an end to martial law and the establishment of a
real democracy on Taiwan, I was not prepared to unequivocally endorse their goal
of formal independence. I believed that if the U.S. had come out in favor of an
independent Taiwan it would have resulted in a rupture in our relations with
China…I tried to square the circle by securing the adoption of a Congressional
resolution stating that the future of Taiwan should be determined peacefully and
in a way that was acceptable to the Taiwanese people. (Excerpt from unpublished
memoir)
Once Solarz became Chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, following Lester Wolff’s
defeat in the 1980 election, he asked Edward Friedman to lead his staff. Friedman explains
Solarz’s motivation as deriving from his commitment to human rights, which had started in the
1970s. Friedman says, “Solarz had a tremendous and ongoing and global commitment on these
kinds of issues. You can see it already when he is on the African Subcommittee chairing it on the
issue of South Africa. No one has to put pressure on him to care about these kinds of issues.”
(Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010) Once Solarz got involved in
Taiwan issues he became very impressed with the Taiwanese-Americans, most of whom were
wealthy and educated doctors, scientists, businessmen, professors, engineers, and so on.
That group of people really was very impressive. These are people who had left
Taiwan early and their grouping had unbelievably high percentage of doctors.
That’s why they had some money that they could give to causes. So it was a very
impressive group of professional people. If you met them it’s very hard not to be
impressed. (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)
Richard Bush, who succeeded Edward Friedman as Majority Staff Consultant, explains Solarz’s
nuanced approach to Taiwan issues during the 1980s, which included balancing China-U.S.
relations with Taiwan-U.S. relations and, simultaneously, developing a fundraising base.
Solarz … understood … that U.S.-China relations was important to the United
States; understood that promoting an explicit independence agenda would be
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inconsistent with that, so he reached an understanding with the leaders of FAPA
early on that he would support democracy and human rights in Taiwan, which if
…successful would create the ability of people on Taiwan to make their own
choice, and then it was up to them… that allowed him, he felt, to simultaneously
support … U.S.-China relations. … Solarz was interested in developing as many
fundraising bases as possible, and he saw this as an attractive one. (Richard Bush,
interview with author, August 4, 2009)
Bush also explains that Solarz’s activity was far above the average for most representatives
because he had so much energy.
Solarz…did more than the average congressman. He did have a general and deep
interest in promoting democracy and human rights everywhere - something he
really believed in. He did not really focus on Taiwan until he became chairman of
the subcommittee and until he was approached by Taiwanese. They got more out
of him in terms of hearings and other things than they would have gotten out of
somebody else. It was an interactive process. … I think he used his chairmanship
aggressively to keep the issue alive. (Richard Bush, interview with author, August
4, 2009)

Edward Friedman: Friedman, Solarz’s long-time friend, in 1980 was a professor of
Chinese politics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Friedman had completed his Ph.D. in
Political Science in 1968 at Harvard after spending three years on Taiwan going through the
archives of the Nationalist government. As a graduate student he had lived in dorms run by the
military, had encounters with the secret police, and visited Green Island. In 1981 he agreed to
work with Rep. Solarz until Solarz was sufficiently knowledgeable about Asian issues, especially
China. Friedman explains that the most important factor for Solarz in interacting with the KMT
and FAPA was the intersection of interests in areas that corresponded with the national interest.
“American interests and FAPA’s interests overlapped in particular places. Overlap is very
different from coincided. The key to FAPA’s interest is independence. We don’t support that.
But they also, for their own reasons, have an interest in supporting human rights and democracy
in Taiwan. That overlaps with us. The KMT … want to have good standing in the United States
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so they have the ability to get weapons from the United States and so on. That creates a basis for
a conversation with them to promote our interests having to do with human rights and
democracy.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)

Rep. James Leach: Rep. Leach’s personal involvement derives mainly from his
background and his staff’s backgrounds. “I had become active on Taiwan democracy issues in
the 1970s, starting in January 1977, partly because I have a background in the State Department.
I had a wonderful staff member [Cindy Sprunger] who was … raised in Taiwan. Her father was a
missionary there -- a Mennonite. So we developed our own contacts from the island backwards.
… This would have been an interest that sprung from my office and me personally.” (Rep.
Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008) Cindy Sprunger and her family had lived on Taiwan
as Christian missionaries. Her concern for Taiwan motivated him to become more active.
Leach notes that his motivation for interacting with the Taiwan democracy movement
also derived in part from this sincere desire to promote democracy on the island, and in part from
his personal impression of Taiwanese-American immigrant groups.
I remember talking to that group in Illinois of Taiwanese activists. … they were
all doctors and engineers and extremely successful, extremely intelligent people.
But when they talked about American politics you had a sense of a little bit of
naivete. And then they became very much a part of the American system. … so
this was an integration of groupings of new Americans into American politics in a
very profound way, and particularly on the democracy side. I found it wonderfully
uplifting. (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008)
Based on these affective impressions, Leach became active on issues pertaining to Taiwan in the
late 1970s. He had submitted an amendment to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act advocating
democracy on Taiwan.
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Finally, Leach was interested in the intellectual puzzle that Taiwan presented. Taiwan is a
country that has de facto independence without legal independence. During the 1980s and before
it was technically a democracy but not really a democracy because the representatives had
permanent tenure. Taiwan had developed economically but had a horrible human rights record. It
was important to the United States but officially part of the People’s Republic of China.

Senator Ted Kennedy: Senator Kennedy was one of the few celebrity senators in the
United States Senate during the activities of the Gang of Four. Given Kennedy’s national stature
and his human rights advocacy, it was natural for Taiwan democracy activists to seek his support
when he ran for president. Kennedy’s motivation for supporting Taiwan came from his previous
history of advocacy for oppressed people around the world. Nancy Soderberg, the Foreign Policy
Advisor to Kennedy from 1985 to 1988, describes Kennedy as being “very involved in
democracy movements around the world.” This made Kennedy an obvious target for any group
of people who wanted to promote democracy and human rights in their countries.
As the Cold War ended, democracy movements around the world took on a new
significance and had a new freedom to be active. …those who had a strong human
rights agenda such as Kennedy were an open door to those who were pushing for
democracy and human rights around the world. So, Kennedy worked with
Solidarity in Poland, ANC in Africa, obviously Ireland, the Philippines, the South
Koreans, and the Taiwanese….It was really a lifelong commitment to standing up
for the little guy and pushing democracy and human rights. (Nancy Soderberg,
interview with author, February 10, 2010)
Soderberg also mentions that Kennedy helped Taiwan because he thought he could be a force for
improvement on the island. “It was a movement that he thought he could help develop into a
democratic Taiwan… He really had a true feeling that if his weight and voice could help make
progress in a certain area, he was willing to do it.” (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author,
February 10, 2010)
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Senator Claiborne Pell: Senator Pell was involved in the Gang of Four for personal
reasons, having served in the military during World War II and trained at Columbia University to
take over the governance of Taiwan once the United States defeated Japan. Pell never served in
the capacity for which he trained because Taiwan instead reverted to Nationalist Chinese control.
However, because of this war-time experience and friendships among the Taiwan democracy
activists, Pell had a strong personal connection to Taiwan. His most important connection to
Taiwan was through his friend Mark Chen, one of the key founders of FAPA. Thomas Hughes
was his chief of staff during this time period, and recounts how the friendship between Pell and
Chen motivated Pell to work on Taiwan issues.
[It was] a special relationship between two significant but dramatically different
personalities who during this period came together by sheer happenstance, bonded
and really became true friends…working together [they] accomplished a great
deal to help Taiwan on the road to democracy, human rights, and selfdetermination. [Pell] was then in his third of what turned out to be six terms …
He was both by his family tradition and his own personal interest somebody who
had a lifetime interest and involvement in foreign policy. And he had a very very
unique and unusual interest in, and affection for, Taiwan … The other personality
was Chin Dong Chin, better known … as Mark Chen. [He became] an advocate
for democracy and an end to martial law in his native land. Pell … never forgot
the lessons learned at Columbia and always cherished the affection that he had
gained even from a distance for the people of Taiwan. (Hughes 2009)
Hughes said Pell’s interest in Taiwan stemmed also from a fondness for small countries.
Throughout his entire legislative life, Claiborne Pell had a passion for what you
might call “small states”. In fact he had a passion for small states that he thought
were being picked on by their bigger neighbors. (Hughes 2009)
Once Senator Pell became friends with Mark Chen, the friendship bothered the KMT. As a
result, the KMT became very active in its lobbying effort with Pell’s office. When staff from
Pell’s office met with the ambassador from Taiwan, they were told that Mark Chen worked with
WUFI, the infamous terrorist organization.
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Pell never could quite figure out what WUFI was. It really didn’t impress him
very much. But many of these accusations, I was present for many of them. They
were done in sort of whispered innuendo. “Oh senator, I wish I could tell you all
the details, because you’d be horrified. But just suffice to say that these are very
dangerous people.” Well at this point, Pell had come to know Mark Chen really
quite well and liked him enormously. He was impressed by the fact that Mark was
very understated, that he was calm, and that he had a very restrained manner. He
felt he could trust him and that he could rely on Mark’s version of events.
So you can imagine Pell’s reaction the first time a CCNA representative… in the
same whispered sort of way, told Pell that Mark Chen -- and he had this on the top
authority from Taipei -- Mark Chen as a leader of WUFI, was a terrorist. Pell
typically did not react, he was a very calm figure, but later he made it very clear
to me that he was offended by this. He knew Mark Chen. These accusations
were nothing more than a libel against his friend, and it just made him all the
more determined to work harder on the issues that they shared. (Hughes 2009)
This friendship motivated Pell to help Mark Chen go back to Taiwan after Taiwan liberalized.
This was not an easy cause. In fact, one of my favorite recollections is when Fred
Chen, the legendary Fred Chen, was then the CCNA representative here. And he
came to see Pell as he did regularly, bearing some kind of very, very good news.
So he came in and Pell expected it was something he really cared about. It wasn’t.
So Pell listened politely and he said very nicely, “that’s very nice, thank you very
much, now tell me, what about Mar..” and he just got the first syllable of Mark’s
name, when Chen went, “Stop talking about Mark Chen, I can’t do anything with
Mark Chen, please don’t talk to me anymore about Mark Chen.” Of course that
didn’t stop it. And indeed in 1987 they relented, Mark Chen was allowed back
into Taiwan. (Hughes 2009) (See also “Mark Chen: from Exile to Lawmaker”,
Taiwan Communique October 1992)
We get a sense of the intensity of this friendship from Hughes’ description of the last meeting
between Chen and Pell after Pell had left the Senate.
In 2004 in Newport, RI, Senator Pell was very, very seriously afflicted by
Parkinson’s disease. He was in a wheelchair, slumped over, quite alert, but unable
to talk primarily. And Mark Chen, the then Foreign Minister of Taiwan, came to
Newport to present him an award and to give an address. In presenting the award,
Mark got incredibly emotionally touched by seeing his old friend and by seeing
his old friend so incapacitated, and … he simply stopped and started to sob. One
of the most moving things I’ve ever seen in my life. …he went over and embraced
his long-time friend. That was the last time they ever saw each other. (Hughes
2009)
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The tight emotional bond between Pell and Chen was a key element in Pell’s motivation in
advocating democracy and human rights on Taiwan.
Pell’s relationship with Chen reflects the strategic interaction between the Taiwan
democracy activists and the Gang of Four. Pell met mainly with Mark Chen. Trong Chai, the
first president of FAPA, related mainly with Rep. Solarz. Peng Ming-Min, the third president of
FAPA after Mark Chen, visited mainly with Rep. Leach. This pattern of relationships was
tailored to the positions and the personal relationships each activist had with each politician.
Friedman describes the interaction he had with the Taiwan activists. “I just know him [Mark
Chen] to be very good. He’s a very nice person. I think he’s a delight to talk to. I think he had a
much better feel than the other two [Trong Chai and Peng Ming-Min] for the politics and
political life in the United States. You could take him more seriously. … I thought that he had a
very good understanding of the difference between his cause and our cause so that you could
have a much more honest conversation with him. We had no interest in promoting an agenda of
independence.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)

Cindy Sprunger: Cindy Sprunger stands out among the congressional staff within the
Gang of Four. She sparked Rep. Leach’s personal interest in Taiwan, and she provided the
emotional energy to sustain the activities of the other staff on Taiwan issues. She has a
background as a human rights activist before the Taiwan democracy activists started interacting
with members of Congress. She knew of, and interacted with, key people in the Taiwan
independence movement before she worked in Congress. She was a natural contact for the more
sophisticated Taiwan democracy activists in the 1980s. Sprunger was active in these movements
during the 1970s, then she went to the University of Michigan for graduate school. She returned
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to Congress in early 1980 and started working on issues involving FAPA. From 1981 to 1985
Sprunger worked with the Subcommittee on Human Rights while Fulton Armstrong, in Rep.
Leach’s office, was working on Taiwan. After Rep. Leach became the ranking member on the
Asian subcommittee, Sprunger moved to that subcommittee as the Minority Staff Consultant.
Sprunger notes that the human rights angle was a critical issue for dealing with Taiwan in
the 1970s and 1980s. Sprunger describes the human rights issues that involved Taiwan in terms
of getting political dissidents out of prison and improving harsh prison conditions.
It was getting people out of prison, it was getting the head of the Presbyterian
Church out of prison, it was getting other people out of prison, making sure there
was no pressure being brought on Taiwanese-Americans for their activities in
support of human rights. We took a staff delegation to Taiwan in 86 for elections
to see how the election process was going, to see how the DPP was being
handled, just to kind of monitor this evolution on Taiwan. (Cindy Sprunger,
interview with author, July 25, 2009)
Sprunger says her involvement in Taiwan springs from moral motivations as well as her personal
background. She appreciates the fact that immigrants and exiles can flee to the U.S. and put
pressure on U.S. policy to agitate for democracy and human rights in their home countries.
Friedman explains that, while Solarz had the most energy on foreign policy issues in general, it
was Cindy Sprunger who showed the greatest drive on Taiwan issues in particular.

Fulton Armstrong: Fulton Armstrong lived on Taiwan and became an advocate for
democracy and human rights during this critical period of time as Taiwan was liberating
politically. From 1980 to 1984 he was the Foreign Affairs Aide to Rep. Leach. Armstrong
describes himself as a “long, long student of Taiwan.” He says Cindy Sprunger set up the
“Taiwan camp in the House of Representatives in Jim Leach’s office” before he arrived.
I started in Congressman Leach’s office after four years in Taiwan, including
some close association with government entities. I worked at the broadcasting
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corporation for China and watched Taiwan from both the street and from inside
the Kuomintang propaganda apparatus….We saw normalization as inevitable,
overdue, and very much in the U.S. national interest. We didn’t resist that. If we
are upset about anything we are upset with the KMT’s inability to prepare for
normalization, to engage with the world community, including the U.S. a number
of times in previous decades on how to solve the national identity or legal status
issue. (Armstrong 2009)
Armstrong said the Kaohsiung Incident and the murders of Lin’s mother and daughter
demonstrated that the KMT was doing to crackdown during this period of transition.
The Kaohsiung incident and the Lin family massacres - those were huge powerful
signals that they were not going to move, or if they were going to move, they
were going to move on their own terms. (Armstrong 2009)
Armstrong says the recalcitrance of the KMT became the biggest motivation for the Gang of
Four because the members of Congress and their staff were trying to fix the relationship between
the United States and Taiwan.
We thought we were filling an important void in giving this relationship
something more than the technical stuff in the Taiwan Relations Act. In other
words, I think that what we were doing was encouraging… a new strategy, not
just for our relationship with Taiwan and people of Taiwan, but for Taiwan itself.
And that is: What [do] you do now with your national identity issue and your
internal stability and democratization issue? … we said … Taiwan's governance,
its survival and its national identity, all would be served with one magic formula,
and that is human rights and democracy. … it was the insurance policy that
Taiwan needed. (Armstrong 2009)
The motivations for members of Congress and their staff derived from both moral convictions
and personal relationships with Taiwan activists. The affective relationships existed both in the
congressional offices, between members and their staff, and in their interactions with ethnic
interest groups. Members of Congress and their staff expressed affective motivations in the ways
they reacted to the human rights abuses on Taiwan and in the United States.
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Safe seats for the Gang of Four
As the four charts demonstrate below, all of the members of the Gang of Four had safe
seats. The “Margin of Victory” on the Y-Axis represents the points separating the winner from
the second-place vote-getter. In 1976, for example, there were four points separating Rep. Leach
from his Democratic opponent. In 1962 there were thirty-seven points separating Sen. Pell from
his Republican opponent. In 1974 there were fifty-nine points separating Rep. Solarz from his

Rep. Stephen Solarz

1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Election Year

Election Year

Rep. JimLeach

04

20

00

20

96

92

19

19

ElectionYear

-50

84

1980 1986 1992

19

1962 1968 1974

0

80

0

50

19

20

100

76

40

150

19

60

Margin of Victory

Margin of Victory

Sen. ClaibornePell

19

1962 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006

80
60
40
20
0

88

80
60
40
20
0

Margin of Victory

Margin of Victory

Sen. Ted Kennedy

Election Year

Republican opponent. In 1962 there were fourteen points separating Sen. Kennedy from his
Republican oppenent. Kennedy stayed in his seat until his death in 2009. Solarz suffered a
district change after the 1990 Census and lost the 1992 primary. Pell retired in 1996. Leach lost
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his seat in the Democratic wave of 2006. All of them sustained large victory margins over many
election cycles.4 Rep. Leach ran unopposed in 1990. His closest races were in 1996 and 2002
when he defeated his opponents by seven points. Rep. Solarz had victory margins above fifty
points for all of his races except 1984, when thirty-three points separated him from his
Republican opponent. Sen. Pell’s closest race was in 1962 when eight points separated him from
his Republican opponent. Sen. Kennedy’s closest race after 1962 was 1994 with seventeen points
(Statistics of the Congressional Election).
This political security gave them the freedom to become foreign policy entrepreneurs. As
we recall from the first chapter, Carter and Scott (2010) categorize foreign policy entrepreneurs
as policy specialists, process specialists, policy strategists, and process strategists. Both Solarz
and Leach were policy specialists. As leaders on the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, they were
deeply concerned about American policy toward Asian countries after the Vietnam War and the
recognition of the PRC. Both Kennedy and Pell were process specialists and process strategists.
They wanted Taiwan to approach its democratic transition in the proper way without interference
from the United States or the PRC, and find a way for Taiwan, the PRC, and the United States to
relate peacefully over the long term. As policy specialists, Solarz and Leach responded first to
specific events on Taiwan. As process specialists and process strategists, Kennedy and Pell
focused more on martial law and democratic freedoms. They expressed this focus in their Senate
resolutions.
The Gang of Four expressed their policy interests through the events on Taiwan during
the 1980s. There are four events after the Kaohsiung Incident that provided the catalyst for
members of Congress to act on their affective motivations. In 1981 Wen-cheng Chen, a

4
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Taiwanese-American professor at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA, was killed in
Taiwan. In 1985 Henry Liu, a Taiwanese-American journalist was killed in the United States. In
1991 Huang Hua, an advocate of independence, was sentenced to a long prison term. In 1992
members of Congress learned about the KMT blacklisting of Taiwanese-Americans, preventing
them from entering Taiwan after social or political activities in the United States.

The Impact of Wen-cheng Chen’s Death
Wen-cheng Chen was killed on July 2, 1981, by the Taiwanese Garrison Command
(TGC) after spies for the KMT alerted the KMT to Chen’s various political activities in the
United States (Taiwan Communique July 1981, December 1981, October 1982, February 1988,
February 1989). When Chen went to Taiwan to visit his family, he was interrogated and killed.
On the morning of July 3, his body was found by local jogger under a fire escape on the campus
of the National Taiwan University in Taipei.
He had 13 broken ribs, a broken spine and numerous internal injuries. Chen's
family had last seen him 22 hours before when he was taken away by the Taiwan
Garrison Command, the national security police, for questioning about his
political activities in the United States. According to the official Taiwanese
account, Chen was interrogated for 13 hours about letters, speeches and phone
calls he had written or delivered in the United States. (Peterson 1981)
The KMT claimed it was an accident. This sparked a series of hearings by the Asian and Pacific
Affairs Subcommittee that revealed a network of spies for the KMT spread across American
college campuses. These spies reported to the KMT and the KMT applied pressure on
Taiwanese-American college students by threatening their relatives on Taiwan. Through these
hearings, the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee learned that immigrants who had fled
other countries for similar reasons of oppression were being similarly spied on and targeted for
killings or repercussions for relatives in the home country. Based on these findings, the
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committee passed legislation banning U.S. arms sales to any country that killed immigrants in
the United States.
The first reporting on Prof. Chen’s death was done by the Pittsburgh Press and the
Pittsburgh Post Gazette. Rep. Leach learned about the death and, on July 9, entered a statement
in the Congressional Record requesting a speedy conclusion to the investigation. On July 10
Leach made a statement about Taiwanese agents spying on American college campuses. “Given
the admitted surveillance by Taiwanese authorities of Professor Chen in the Pittsburgh area and
the chilling message his death leaves with everyone of Taiwanese descent living in America, I
am convinced of the necessity of highlighting the intelligence activities of the Taiwan
Government as well as those of certain other foreign governments and to demand at the highest
government levels that these surveillance activities cease.” (Taiwan Communique, December
1981) Following Leach’s statement, many other national newspapers and magazines picked up
the story.5
Hearings before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee began on July 30, 1981.
Rep. Donald Pease (D-OH) entered a statement in the Congressional Record, as Chairman of the
Human Rights Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, applauding the
hearings. The Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee discovered that there was an extensive
spy network. This information was widely reported in the press.6
Fulton Armstrong described the investigation into Chen’s death.
5

Articles appeared in the International Herald Tribune (‘US legislator claims professor’s death is related to spying
by Taiwan students.’, July 15, 1981), the Honolulu Advertiser (‘Another Chen case ?’, July 20, 1981), the New York
Times (‘Death of Taiwan professor causes uproar on a Pittsburgh campus.’ July 21, 1981), the Wichita EagleBeacon (‘What happened to Dr. Chen ?’, July 22, 1981) and the Washington Post (‘After police interrogation, a
death.’, July 28, 1981). (Taiwan Communique, December 1981)
6
Articles appeared in the Chicago Tribune (“Spying on foreign students”, July 30, 1981), the Los Angeles Times
(‘Taiwan harassment of students in U.S. reported.’ July 31, 1981), the Chicago Sun-Times (‘Taiwan spies on U.S.
students, House panel told.’, July 31, 1981), Newsweek (‘Professor Chen goes home.’ August 3, 1981), the Christian
Science Monitor (“Professor’s death linked to alleged Taiwanese spying.’, August 6, 1981), and TIME Magazine
(‘Spies among us; outrage at a professor’s death.’, August 10, 1981). (Taiwan Communique, December 1981).
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If you’ve ever driven to Pittsburgh, you have to go through this funny little truck
stop called Breezewood. We met the Howard Johnsons in Breezewood… we
interviewed his [Chen’s] friends, we met also with [the] president of the
University, we read the full autopsy reports. We were actually the official U.S.
government custodians of the autopsy report and photographs and files in
congressman Leach’s office. We did all this not because we wanted to pick up
dirt and make a political case. We actually wanted to make everybody appreciate
the true shock value and have everybody appreciate the implications of what was
going on here in the United States of America.
We got to look at a model resident of the United States of America, a model
immigrant, who was a respected academic embarking on a solid career, a young
father, a good husband, well-liked by everybody, being harassed, interrogated,
tortured, and killed, purely for his political views…. political views that had been
reported through channels by people at the University in Pittsburgh that we found
to be a quintessential apparatus, a foreign apparatus repressing its people,
suppressing democracy, and killing people … we thought it was a very powerful
signal. It was a warning not just to the Taiwanese on the island. It was a warning
to Taiwanese in the United States: We’re watching you, we’re not just going to
blacklist you, we’re going to punish you…. We looked at how the KMT ran
campus spy networks. (Armstrong 2009)
The congressional hearings were designed to send signals both to the KMT and supporters of the
KMT on Taiwan who had believed in the good behavior of their government.
Rep. Leach presented a statement at the first hearing, on July 30, 1981, in which he
described the intelligence network that Taiwan had created. He noted that files had been kept on
Taiwanese students and faculty in the United States since the 1960s.
For more than fifteen years, students have been receiving parents’ secret letters,
hand-carried here by close friends, informing them of family harassment. A
respected civil engineer working in the Provincial Government was told how
"unfortunate" it was that his son associated with "Taiwan Independence elements"
at Harvard and, coincidentally, was not promoted once during the last fifteen
years of his career. A younger sister, accepted to study at a prominent American
university, was denied an exit visa because her brother signed an open letter
critical of the arrest of veteran Taiwanese leader Yu Teng-fa. A history teacher
was denied a position in a national university because of his sister's "indiscreet
political activities" at the University of California. Taiwanese in the U. S. are
harassed too, particularly those who have commenced careers here.
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They are told directly by Taiwanese Government representatives of potential or
actual punitive actions that can be taken against them. It is common to hear of a
Taiwanese receiving a note saying, "your visa application to return to the
Republic of China has been denied" or "your passport renewal cannot be
processed at this time (i.e., you must return home)." Another common message is:
"Your application for property sale or transfer has been rejected spending [sic]
clarification of a case currently being investigated by the Taiwan Garrison
Command." When someone tries to clear up the problem through a Taiwan office
in this country, he is either given a confession form (as well as an offer to become
an informant") or a run-around. (“Taiwan Agents in America and the Death of
Prof. Wen-Chen Chen”, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific
Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, July 30, 1981)
Rep. Leach said he learned that many countries hunted down and killed their emigrants who
became American citizens. The human rights abuses practiced in authoritarian countries were
routinely practiced in the United States.
Do not underestimate the coercive dimension of the reach of foreign societies in
the United States. … It took some courage of the pro-democracy people to
become active… I mean the word “courage”. …for years… if you were a
Taiwanese student in the United States, you would have reports on you made up.
Every campus of every size would have someone reporting on everybody else.
you were expected never to criticize the government…if you criticized the
government, there could be ramifications for your younger brother ever getting a
scholarship. There could be ramifications for your father’s employment. This was
a very serious phenomenon. And very coercive. … I don’t want to suggest this
just of Taiwan. It was true in the Philippines, it was true in Yugoslavia Yugoslavian-Americans, Filipino-Americans might be killed. (Rep. Jim Leach,
interview with author, July 25, 2008)
The congressional hearings sparked many journalistic investigations and concurrent
congressional investigations into the KMT’s American spy network. The trail, followed by
college newspapers and national newspapers, revealed that campus spying by the KMT was an
old problem going back to the 1970s.7
7

News stories had appeared about campus spying at MIT in the Christian Science Monitor (“Spy charges surface at
MIT”, March 30, 1976). The University of Chicago newspaper, The Chicago Maroon, had reported on spying
(“Spying charge found nationwide.” May 21, 1976). The University of Washington Daily had reported on campus
spying (“Students charge Taiwan government spies”, December 7, 1977). The Washington Post reported on foreign
intelligence activities (“Foreign Spy activities found rampant in the U.S.”, August 9, 1979). (Taiwan Communique
January, 1983, August 1983). For more evidence on campus spying by the KMT and other foreign governments, as
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The KMT’s spy network created a climate of fear for any Taiwanese students at
American college campuses. In addition to MIT, the University of Washington, the University of
Minnesota, the University of Illinois, and the University of Hawaii, the KMT had spies at
Columbia, Cornell, Iowa State University, Princeton, State University of New York, University
of Californian at Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Florida, and University of
Wisconsin at Madison (Glennon 1984).
Based on the information gathered at these hearings, the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee
passed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of Individuals. -- No letters of offer
may be issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export licenses
may be issued under this Act with respect to any country determined by the
President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or
harassment directed against individuals in the United States. The President shall
report any such determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate. (22 U.S.C.A. § 2756 cited in Glennon 1984)
The problem with this amendment, Glennon notes, is that it places the burden on Congress to act
on the information the president provides instead of letting the president act on the information
independent of Congress. Moreover, it affects only states that depend exclusively on the U.S. for
arms sales, thus limiting the impact of the amendment. The Reagan administration produced the
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, to commemorate the 10-year anniversary of
the 1972 Shanghai Communique. This time, the United States promised to gradually reduce, and
ultimately end, arms exports to Taiwan. These actions, from the president and the Congress,
placed pressure on the KMT to dismantle its spy network in order to continue receiving
defensive weapons from the United States.

well as relevant laws, see Glennon 1984 and Activities of “Friendly” Foreign Intelligence Services in the United
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The Assassination of Henry Liu
The murder of Henry Liu was ordered at the highest levels of Taiwan’s government. The
KMT paid a gang in San Francisco, CA, to assassinate Liu in front of his home. While the death
of Prof. Wen-cheng Chen was likely unintentional on the part of the KMT (Chen died after
receiving multiple injuries as a result of his nearly 13 hours of interrogation), the murder of
Henry Liu was intentional, took place on American soil, and thus posed a direct challenge to the
Arms Export Control Act amendment.
Henry Liu was a Taiwanese-American journalist who was killed by KMT-sponsored
agents on Oct. 15, 1984 (Taiwan Communique November 1984). Liu had published a book that
was unflattering to Chiang Kai-shek. Initially the KMT was uncooperative in the investigation,
but became cooperative as the FBI discovered that the assassins had connections with the Taiwan
intelligence community and were following the orders of Chiang Hsiao-wu, the de facto head of
Taiwan’s intelligence organizations and Chiang Ching-kuo’s son. The revelations that the KMT
ordered members of a Taiwan underworld gang to murder an American citizen outraged
members of Congress, sparking hearings and resolutions. The KMT investigated, and then tried,
convicted, and sentenced the key people involved with the murder, but denied any connection to
Chiang Hsiao-wu and the KMT. The widow of Henry Liu, Helena Liu, was not satisfied with the
KMT’s explanation, so she sued the KMT for a wrongful death in United States district court in
San Francisco, CA. The district court followed the Taiwan court’s rulings under the “Act of
State” doctrine, but the federal appeals court sided with Mrs. Liu, arguing under the principle
respondiat superior that the KMT government could be held liable for Henry Liu’s death.
Finally, the KMT appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and settled with Mrs. Liu when it realized
that the Supreme Court would likely side with Mrs. Liu.
States: A Case Study. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, June 1978
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Henry Liu’s killing received a great deal of press attention, starting with the Washington
Post, which reported that Liu was shot in front of his home in Daly City, south of San Francisco.
Following the assassination, the KMT began a campaign against organized crime. On November
12 the KMT arrested Chen Chi-li, the leader of the “Bamboo Union Gang”, Taiwan’s largest
underworld gang with 10,000 members, including government officials, business leaders, and
movie stars. The KMT arrested three officials of the Military Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry
of Defense, including Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, who had ordered the assassination (New
York Times January 19, 1985; Taiwan Communiqué February 1985).
Based on these events, Rep. Solarz called for hearings (“Coast Murder Spurs Inquiry in
Congress on Taiwan Activities”, January 19, 1985, New York Times) to investigate whether the
murder of Henry Liu violated the amendment to the Arms Export Control Act. In addition to
Solarz, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Rep. Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA) asked President Reagan
to request extradition. ''How can Chinese-Americans feel safe when the President remains silent
over this terrorism?'' Mineta told the New York Times. The Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee started its hearings on February 7 and received testimony from Helena Liu, Rep.
Mineta, William Brown, deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
and Michael Glennon. Helena Liu expressed her belief that high government officials in the
KMT ordered the murder for three reasons: “1) to punish him for writing about the ruling Chiang
family; 2) to prevent him from writing books and articles in the future about the Chiang family,
and their political and family history; and 3) to scare other journalists and writers who might also
be interested as Henry was in writing about this family and its history.” (The Murder of Henry
Liu, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985)
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During the hearings, Rep. Solarz made the point that aliens living in the United States
must be protected from their home governments.
I cannot exaggerate the sense of outrage which the reported involvement of
officials of the Taiwan government in the murder of an American citizen on
American soil provokes in me. … Part of my outrage stems from the knowledge
that this is not the first time that Taiwan has abused the freedoms of individuals in
the United States. In the past, there have been numerous credible charges of
surveillance, intimidation, and harassment in the United States by agents of
Taiwan’s intelligence services, particularly with respect to Taiwanese students in
our country.” (The Murder of Henry Liu, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April
1985)
Rep. Mineta spoke as the most senior member of the House of Representatives of Asian
ancestry. He recounted the racism and denial of justice that Asian-Americans suffered in the
United States. He argued that the Reagan administration’s failure to condemn the Henry Liu
murder was another injustice against people of Asian-American.
I am concerned about acts of violence against other Americans of Asian ancestry.
… I am forced to believe that if Henry Liu was white, then this case would be
handled differently by our government and other groups. On June 19, 1982, a
young American of Chinese ancestry was enjoying a last night out before his
wedding, when two autoworkers in the bar with him blamed him for the troubles
in the auto business. Such scapegoating is not at all rare, but in this case the two
men followed Mr. Chin for half an hour, later beating him to death with baseball
bats. For this crime, the Michigan courts sentenced the two men to $3,000 fines
and probation. Neither spent one night in jail. As you can imagine, protests
mounted, and it took 8 months of hard work to convince the Department of
Justice to indict these two men on Federal civil rights charges. When the two men
were finally prosecuted on Federal charges, one was convicted of violating Mr.
Chin's civil rights.
The same sort of situation appears to be developing here. How many of these
cases have to be endured before the rights of Americans of Asian ancestry are
fully respected and protected by our government? Americans of Asian ancestry
are sick and tired of the failure of the Federal Government to vigorously enforce
the civil liberties they possess as citizens of the United States. I urge this
subcommittee to send a signal that the time has come to put an end to the
hypocrisy that condemns terrorism against U. S. citizens abroad, but turns a blind
eye to it here at home… We cannot allow Taiwan to be a safe haven for those
who murder U.S. citizens. (The Murder of Henry Liu, Hearings before the
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Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
February 7, 1985)
On April 2, 1985 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a Concurrent Resolution
advocating democracy on Taiwan, with Jesse Helms (R-NC) as the only senator voting against it
(Taiwan Communiqué April 1985). On April 16, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
approved the Senate resolution as House Concurrent Resolution 49, which called for an
extradition agreement and cooperation between American and Taiwan authorities. This
Concurrent Resolution passed the House as Concurrent Resolution no. 110 by a vote of 387 to 2
(Taiwan Communiqué June 1985). On July 31 the U.S. Senate passed an amendment to the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986. The amendment called for democracy
on Taiwan. On August 1 the House passed the Act (Taiwan Communiqué August 1985). On
August 17 President Reagan signed the bill into law (Taiwan Communiqué October 1985).
As the investigation continued, more revelations came out about the KMT targeting
people for harassment. Chen Chi-li admitted to planning the killing with three top-officials of the
Military Intelligence Bureau (San Francisco Examiner, February 24, 1985, cited in Taiwan
Communiqué April 1985) On March 14, Representatives Mineta, Solarz and Leach requested
Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives, to initiate a congressional investigation into the activities of foreign
agents in the U.S. who harass and intimidate American citizens.
During a hearing in Taipei District Court on March 20, 1985, Chen Chi-li revealed that
Vice-Admiral Wang Hsi-ling had told him to “teach Henry Liu a lesson” because Liu had written
“bad things about our country and about President Chiang Ching-kuo.” Chen had received the
order from Wang on August 14, 1984. For a month he received training at the Intelligence
Bureau’s training school at Yanmingshan (“Grass Mountain” near Taipei). The Bureau gave him
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materials, including Liu’s home address and daily schedule. In the U.S., an associate of Chen’s
revealed that Chen had met with Chiang Hsiao-wu on three occasions. Chen recorded the
conversation during one of these meetings. On a recording made October 17, 1984, Chen Chi-li
had said:
Four years ago, government agencies of all levels came to see me, because I was
originally the leader of the biggest gang in Taiwan. Moreover, I had great “hidden
potential” all over Taiwan. Therefore the government wanted me to come back to
the gang and reorganize the Bamboo Union Gang. The government wanted me to
develop the Gang.... The main purpose was to deal with the non-KMT politicians
and Taiwan Independence Movement members. (Taiwan Communiqué April
1985)
On April 9, 1985 Chen Chi-li and Wu Tun were both sentenced to life imprisonment. On April
12, 1985, Vice-Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, Major-General Hu Yi-ming, and Colonel Chen Hu-men
were tried for the murder of Henry Liu. On April 19, Wang Hsi-ling was sentenced to life in
prison and his codefendants received sentences of two-and-a-half-years in prison (Taiwan
Communiqué April 1985).
Media reports indicated that Chen Chi-li had been part of the KMT’s systematic
crackdown on domestic and foreign dissidents following the Kaohsiung Incident. The KMT had
asked Chen to reorganize the Bamboo Union Gang as an unofficial arm of the national security
apparatus. Kaohsiung “convinced the government that it needed to enforce martial law without
dirtying its hands.. In the ensuing years, according to Bamboo Gang members, the underworld
syndicate grew from 1,000 members to 40,000, forming a pervasive intelligence network that
spied on opposition leaders and dissidents in Taiwan and gathered sensitive information on
China.” (Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1985, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985)
Underworld gangs were used in Taiwan during the 1970s to collect information on dissidents and
disrupt election campaigns of opposition politicians (Newsweek, “The Gangs of Asia”, April 1,
1985, cited in Taiwan Communiqué April 1985)
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Following the actions by Congress and the Taiwan government in 1985, the Henry Liu
murder case was mainly resolved through the American federal courts. Tung Kueisen, the third
killer in the case, was arrested in Brazil in September 1985 and brought to the U.S. for trial. On
March 16, 1988, he was convicted for his role in the Henry Liu murder and sentenced on May
11, 1988, to “27 years to life” in prison (Taiwan Communiqué May 1988). Despite prison terms
for the killers and the officials at the Military Intelligence Bureau, Mrs. Liu sued the government
of Taiwan for $200 million in California district court in September 1987 to link the murder with
Chiang Hsiao-wu and the KMT. The district court cited the “Act of State” doctrine to deny
summary judgment to Mrs. Liu. U.S. District Court judge Eugene Lynch said he was bound to
accept the finding of the KMT’s courts that the intelligence director, Admiral Wang Hsi-ling,
had acted on his own and not in his official capacity. The “Act of State” doctrine is the judicial
system’s reasoning that the executive branch is given the primary role in foreign affairs and that
the American courts will refrain from overruling foreign court decisions or trying foreign
governments for their actions (Alford 1989). The district court’s decision was reversed on
December 29, 1989, by the U.S. Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco. The court ruled that the
KMT could be held directly responsible. The appellate panel argued that Wang acted within “the
scope of his employment.” (Taiwan Communiqué April 1990) The appellate court used the legal
doctrine of respondiat superior (Scheven 1991), recognizing that the “Act of State” did not apply
in cases of human rights violations. On May 14, 1990, the KMT appealed the appellate court’s
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court (Taiwan Communiqué August 1990). The KMT settled with
Mrs. Liu on October 25, 1990, paying her $1.45 million (Taiwan Communiqué December 1990).
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Applying the Model
In the cases of Wen-cheng Chen and Henry Liu, we can see the elements of the model.
First there were obvious international provocations: the KMT was linked to the deaths of two
American citizens. Second, members of Congress received information about both the deaths and
the links to the KMT through American media organizations and congressional hearings. In both
cases the hearings revealed the existence of a spy network. In the case of Prof. Chen, the network
consisted of students paid by the KMT to spy on students suspected of dissident activities. In the
case of Henry Liu, the network consisted of a criminal gang paid by the KMT to disrupt dissident
activities in Taiwan and in the United States. Third, members of Congress were deeply
personally affected. Rep. Mineta spoke about his sense that Asian-Americans were being killed
without bringing the killers to justice. Fourth, members of Congress took the path of least
resistance. They knew the Reagan administration was unresponsive to these events, so they held
hearings and passed non-binding concurrent congressional resolutions to signal to the KMT how
they wished these cases to be resolved. If the Reagan Administration had been more vocal about
the KMT’s activities and active in resolving these criminal cases, members of Congress would
likely not have held hearings or passed resolutions. Rep. Leach’s office would likely not have
been the official U.S. government custodians of the autopsy report, photographs, and files in
Prof. Chen’s case.

Congressional reactions to political oppression on Taiwan and Taiwan’s response
Congress responded to the deaths of Taiwanese-American citizens as a function of its
investigative role. Congress is not obligated to respond to political oppression in other countries.
Yet, in the case of Taiwan it did exactly that. Members of Congress responded to arbitrary
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arrests, bad prison conditions, curtailment of press freedoms, persecution of the Presbyterian
Church, and martial law. For example, the Taiwan Garrison Command arrested Mrs. Lee Yaping on September 17, 1985 while she was visiting Taiwan, for publishing the International
Daily News, a Chinese-language newspaper in Los Angeles. The State Department immediately
published a statement, saying, “Arresting a United States newspaper publisher for her
professional activities in the United States must be seen as an act of intimidation and harassment
directed against individuals in the United States. We are asking the Taiwan authorities to review
the case immediately and to release Ms. Lee without further delay.” (Taiwan Communique
October 1985) On September 19, Rep. Solarz, issued a statement, saying that the arrest of Lee
Ya-ping was like the murder of Henry Liu, and “a frightening example of the long arm of
Taiwan’s martial law tearing at the fabric of American democracy. The authorities of Taiwan are
not content to destroy basic liberties on the island of Taiwan, but insist on violating the right to
free speech of people in the United States as well. The Kuomintang needs to be reminded that the
State of California is not a province of Taiwan.” (Taiwan Communique October 1985)
The imprisonment of Presbyterian ministers and confiscation of church property became
a catalyst for congressional hearings. The KMT made repeated attempts to limit the influence of
the Presbyterian Church. Information about religious persecution in Taiwan reached the House
of Representatives through a hearing on “Religious Persecution as a Violation of Human
Rights”, September 23, 1982, before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations, chaired by Rep. Don Bonker (D-WA). The subcommittee received testimony
from Reverend Dr. Arie Brouwer, General Secretary of the Reformed Church in America, Dr.
Shoki Coe, former director of Theological Education with the World Council of Churches in
Geneva, and Mr. Tong Hwan Moon, pastor of the Capital Union Presbyterian Church. Their

133

testimony revealed that over the course of the 1980s, the KMT tried many ways to limit the
influence of the Presbyterian Church, including preventing the church from being represented at
international meetings and trying to infiltrate the church to control its governance. The KMT
focused on the Presbyterian Church for persecution because it is the oldest Protestant Church in
Taiwan, with over 170,000 members at that time, and was often the first organization to
condemn bad prison conditions, violations or press freedoms, and other forms of political
oppression.
Congress responded swiftly to any incidents on Taiwan intended to prevent opponents of
the KMT from advocating democracy, especially their arrest under martial law. For example, on
May 20, the Gang of Four – Rep. Solarz, Rep. Leach, Sen. Kennedy, Sen. Pell – held a press
conference to urge Taiwan to end 33 years of martial law (“Congressmen Ask Reagan to Press
for End to Martial Law in Taiwan,” New York Times, May 25, 1982). The Gang of Four
repeated these press conferences every May 20 until 1987 (Taiwan Communiqué June 1983,
August 1984, May 1986, May 1987, September 1987). That same day, May 20, 1982, the Asian
and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee held a hearing on “Martial Law on Taiwan and United States
Foreign Policy Interests.” The subcommittee passed Resolution 591, calling for the end of
martial law in Taiwan.
On February 28, 1983, the United States Senate passed a resolution that called for
Taiwan’s future to “be settled peacefully, free of coercion and in a manner acceptable to the
people on Taiwan.” The same resolution was introduced in the House by Representatives Solarz
and Leach the next day. To recognize 35 years of martial law on May 20, 1984, Sen. Pell urged
Taiwan to lift martial law. On May 31 the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held a
hearing and passed House Concurrent Resolution 344 “Expressing the sense of Congress
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concerning the need to achieve full democracy in Taiwan”. On November 18, Solarz and Leach
introduced House Concurrent Resolution 233 expressing concern about the lack of political
freedom and freedom of expression in Taiwan (Taiwan Communiqué January 1986). On March
25, 1986, Senators Kennedy and Pell introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 121 calling on
the Taiwan authorities to allow the formation of genuine opposition parties, end censorship and
guarantee freedom of speech, expression and assembly, and move towards full representative
government (Taiwan Communiqué May 1986). In June, 1987, the House of Representatives
passed an amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill calling for sustained progress
“towards a fully democratic system of government on Taiwan.” In October 1987, the Senate
approved a similar amendment urging democratization on Taiwan.
These efforts by members of Congress to pressure the KMT to liberalize began to
produce results. After Congress passed resolutions in 1983 urging Taiwan to lift martial law and
create a viable democracy, the KMT began to make some changes. They demoted General Wang
Sheng, the internal security czar, after he was scolded by members of Congress for brutal police
methods. The KMT allowed four non-KMT politicians to visit the U.S. and tour college
campuses. The KMT also granted exit visas to the wives of two men imprisoned for the
Kaohsiung incident (Eduardo Lachia, Asian Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1983, cited in
Taiwan Communiqué June 1984).
On July 14, 1987, Taiwan ended martial law (Taiwan Communiqué September 1987).
One explanation for Taiwan’s responsiveness to Congressional actions is that the original Gang
of Four was building a following, including former Vice-President Walter Mondale, Senator
Gary Hart (D-CO), Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-AK), Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), Sen. John
Glenn (D-OH), Sen. David Durenberger (R-MN), and Rep. Pease. These and other members of
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Congress kept the pressure on Taiwan by repeatedly submitting congressional resolutions. This
demonstrates two things. First, it shows the power of a coalition that is assembled by political
entrepreneurs. Second, it shows the power of non-binding resolutions, subcommittee hearings,
and press conferences to repeatedly send a signal for a country to change its domestic behavior.

Switching from a focus on political oppression to a focus on democracy
Congress continued signaling to Taiwan the need to create a viable democracy. Congress
and FAPA became partners in this process. FAPA took the lead by lighting a “torch for
democracy” on October 31, 1987, at the Statue of Liberty in New York. Runners carried the
torch to the steps of the U.S. Capitol on November 3rd, where members of Congress, opposition
leaders from Taiwan, and hundreds of Taiwanese-Americans witnesses greeted FAPA Executive
Director Trong Chai carrying the torch. In addition to the Gang of Four, speakers included Sen.
Lautenberg and Rep. Pease, who called for general parliamentary elections in Taiwan. After this
rally, the torch traveled to other American cities until November 14th, when Chang Chun-hung,
an opposition politician who had recently been released from prison, tried to bring the torch into
Taiwan, only to have the police confiscate it. Despite this setback, the “run for democracy”
campaign continued until November 22 as mass rallies were held at 12 locations in Taiwan
(Taiwan Communiqué December 1987)
Despite political liberalization, the KMT still cracked down on political opponents. On
May 20, 1988, 4,000 Taiwanese farmers demonstrated against the agricultural policies of the
KMT. The government sent riot troops to disperse the crowds, injuring and arresting more than
100 people. On June 10 a coalition of 14 Taiwanese-American organizations held a rally in front
of the Capitol to protest the excessive use of force by the Taiwan police and call for a fully
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democratic system. They were joined by the Gang of Four and Rep. Matthew Martinez (D-CA).
Kennedy made a speech noting that “[a]lthough martial law is a thing of the past, other laws,
such as the ‘National Security law’ and the ‘Assembly and Street March Law’, restrict freedom
of assembly and association and of peaceful political expression. Individuals continue to be
arrested for peaceful expression of their political views and Taiwanese citizens continue to be
barred from returning to Taiwan because of their political beliefs. Restrictions on the press and
curtailed access to the media by the opposition continue. The right to forms labor unions and to
strike remain restricted.” In addition, two opposition members of Taiwan’s parliament,
Legislator Chu Kao-cheng and National Assembly-member Hung Chi-chang, were at the rally. It
failed to have an immediate impact on the KMT regime. On June 16 the Taipei district
prosecutor’s office indicted 93 people for violating the Assembly and Demonstration Law, and
“committing the crimes of obstruction of official duty, and obstruction of freedom” (Taiwan
Communiqué August 1988).
Another international provocation occurred on December 21, 1989, when Mr. Huang
Hua, a member of the democratic opposition in Taiwan, was indicted for advocating Taiwan
independence (Taiwan Communiqué January 1990). On December 8, 1990, Huang was
sentenced to 10 years in prison (Taiwan Communiqué January 1991). In response, Senators Ted
Kennedy, Claiborne Pell, Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), John Kerry (D-MA), and Paul Wellstone
(D-MN) sent a letter on January 14, 1991, to President Lee Teng-hui:
Huang’s imprisonment is a serious set-back to the progress your country has made
towards democracy in recent years. His detention clearly violates international
human rights standards and contravenes the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights and Taiwan’s own constitution, both of which guarantee the right to
freedom of speech. There is widespread public opposition in Taiwan to Huang’s
imprisonment. … We urge you to commute Huang Hua's sentence and grant his
immediate and unconditional release. (Taiwan Communiqué April 1991)
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Huang’s arrest and sentence was part of a renewed KMT attempt to crack down on advocates of
independence (“The KMT clamps down on Independence”, Taiwan Communiqué January 1991).
A final international provocation was KMT’s blacklist of any Taiwanese who
engaged in political dissent against the regime, both in Taiwan and abroad. For those
people who dissented in Taiwan, the government denied them exit visas; for those who
dissented abroad, the government denied them entry visas. Eight hundred to one thousand
people were on the blacklist by 1991 (“Blacklisting of overseas Taiwanese continues”,
Taiwan Communiqué June 1991). Between 1987 and 1992, many overseas dissidents
were immediately deported once they entered Taiwan.
FAPA encouraged its members to communicate with their congressional
representatives about this blacklist. FAPA also coordinated with the Gang of Four to help
a press conference on May 20, 1992. FAPA argued that the blacklist denied TaiwaneseAmericans legal equality and the human right to enter and leave Taiwan as they pleased,
in that they could not freely leave or return to their homeland. Coen Blaauw, a FAPA
employee, wrote a letter to President George H.W. Bush on May 7, 1991, stating the
number of Taiwanese citizens in the United States who were on the blacklist, noting that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared that everyone has the right to travel
in and out of the country. In response, Bush organized a briefing for ninety
representatives of Taiwanese-Americans on March 5, 1992, which was the first such
meeting (Chen 2007).
In Congress, Rep. Solarz introduced House Concurrent Resolution 248, stating the need
to end the blacklist (“Solarz’s Asian Affairs Committee condemns blacklist”, Taiwan
Communiqué December 1991). The Senate responded in kind when Senators Pell, Kennedy, and
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Lieberman submitted Senate Concurrent Resolution 99, stating that the Taiwan authorities
should permit Taiwan-born residents of the United States to return to their homeland
(“Resolution on Taiwan Blacklisting in Senate”, Taiwan Communiqué April 1992). The Senate
passed the bill on March 10, 1992. The House passed it on May 14. The KMT responded by
phasing out the blacklist system. On May 15, 1992, the Legislative Yuan amendment Article 100
of the Republic of China’s criminal law so that political dissidence was no longer considered
sedition (“Overseas Blacklist Disappears ... more or less”, Taiwan Communiqué June 1992;
Chen 2007). This blacklist campaign had been going for ten years, since FAPA was first
created, but initially FAPA did not have the resources to engage members of Congress. By 1991
FAPA had the resources (Chen 2007).

Applying the Model
In each area of political oppression – the Kaohsiung Incident, imprisoning political
opponents, censoring the press, persecuting the Presbyterian Church, arresting people under
martial law, sentencing people to long prison terms, torturing people in prison – the oppression
was reported by a variety of political institutions and organizations. Amnesty International
produced reports on Taiwan, as did the United States Department of State. Information about
political oppression also came to Congress through congressional hearings, as well as through
congressional staff. The members of Congress who learned about political oppression were
deeply personally affected. The Reagan Administration was silent, so members of Congress,
including but not limited to the Gang of Four, used other means to communicate with the KMT.
These methods included concurrent resolutions, press conferences, subcommittee hearings,
amendments to biannual appropriations bills, rallies on the step of the Capitol, speeches in
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Congress, and letters to both the executive branch and Taiwan’s government. These activities
constituted the path of least resistance for members of Congress.
The Taiwan independence activists communicated all of these events to members of
Congress and their staff, if news of these events had not already reached them by other means.
We again see bonding social capital as the members of Congress and their staff were deeply
affected by these events and formed strong relationships with the independence activists. The
activists helped to frame the events in terms of promoting democracy on Taiwan because the
events were clearly attacks on democratic processes.

Path of least resistance: Small effort, big impact
The Gang of Four became active primarily because Solarz chaired the Asian and Pacific
Subcommittee and the Reagan administration was silent. Solarz told Lin that if he had not been
chair of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, he would not have been as active. “I would feel my
ability to have an impact would be much less.” (Lin 2006) Fulton Armstrong expressed the
frustration Rep. Leach’s office had with a president from his own political party. Once the U.S.
recognized the PRC instead of the ROC, the ROC stopped being a bastion of democracy from
the Republican perspective. From the Democratic perspective, Taiwan’s human rights abuses
were no longer important. Thus, Leach’s office decided to take the lead because it encountered
resistance from the executive branch. “We tried to get meetings with the Assistant Secretary and
even with the Deputy Assistant Secretary level of the State Department to talk with us, the lead
people, and try to talk about what is this relationship, and what could we do to help. If you can’t
do it government to government, we can do it because we’re Congress, and we had trouble doing
this on occasion.” (Armstrong, 2009)
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In the context of this political resistance to acting on behalf of Taiwan after the TRA, the
Gang of Four used hearings and press conferences to send congressional signals to Taiwan’s
government. Rep. Leach said that Congressional activities, notably hearings and press
conferences have a symbolic power in foreign affairs that members use to advocate changes
abroad. The American media tend to ignore announcements the reference foreign countries, but
the media in those countries pay close attention.
The United States Congress is very symbolic to many countries in the world, and
no place depended more on good relations with Congress than Taiwan. … The
Gang of Four symbolized Congress being an advocate of principles which were at
direct variance with the KMT model - this was the great significance of it. … at
this time, the activism of just a few members of Congress made a very significant
impact on a timetable of movement of Taiwan toward greater democracy. (Rep.
Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008)
Rep. Solarz explained that simply by holding hearings, Congress could send important signals to
countries that would influence their behavior. “Many of the things we did in Washington that
attracted scant attention in the U.S. media were often big news overseas. They were brought to
the attention of people abroad through the VOA, the BBC, and the ‘jungle telegraph’ operated by
exiles and Diaspora communities in the U.S. which closely followed events in Washington. For
those suffering from oppression in foreign lands these manifestations of American concern were
a source of tremendous encouragement.” (Rep. Solarz, Excerpt from unpublished memoir)
From this perspective, even non-binding, concurrent resolutions that expressed the “sense
of Congress” became valuable signaling devices for Congress to articulate its desires about a
country’s internal behavior. As the previous chapter demonstrated in the case of Uganda, nonbinding “sense of Congress” resolutions send important signals to American corporations that do
business with foreign countries and to their leaders and organized opposition. The signals
communicate how Congress wishes a crisis to be resolved if the target regime wished to continue
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good relationships with the United States. Congress is incapable of writing binding resolutions
that have legal force on another country’s behavior because acts of Congress are legally binding
only on the United States. Yet, members of Congress do want to influence behavior in other
countries. Passing concurrent resolutions through the House and Senate sends a message abroad,
and Taiwan demonstrates that the intended audiences do change their behavior.
Another explanation for Taiwan’s responsiveness to non-binding resolutions is the
patron-client relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. In a patron-client relationship, a single
powerful country provides security and economic assistance to a country that it thinks is
strategically important. The United States has these relationships with Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan (Bobrow and Chan 1986), Iran (Ghassemi 1988), Israel (Helman 2002), and Zaire
(Pachter 1987). Within patron-client relationships, the patron exercises greater influence over the
client than with other countries, and vice-versa. Therefore, individuals and organizations from
patron and client states will likely have a greater impact on each other than individuals and
organizations from states that are not part of that relationship. Solarz learned that his efforts were
heeded by the KMT.
I’ve been told by Lee Teng-hui and [Chien-Jen] C.J. Ch’en [the unofficial
ambassador to the United States from 2000 to 2004] and other senior KMT
figures that, while they were very unhappy with what I was doing to focus
attention on the absence of democracy and suppression of human rights in Taiwan
at the time I did it, in retrospect they feel like I did them a favor by encouraging
them to recognize the need of change if they were going to maintain healthy
relationship with the U.S. One of the main themes of my speech to Tang-wai was
the security of Taiwan which very much hinged on the support of the United
States, and the support of the U.S. would be much more assured if Taiwan was a
democracy than remaining a dictatorship. (Solarz quoted in Lin 2006)
The patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan helped the Gang of Four to have an
impact on Taiwan’s democratic transition.
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An easy way a member of Congress could help an oppressed group in a foreign country
was by making a strong statement. When Soderberg went to Taiwan as part of Kennedy’s staff,
the Taiwan democracy activists would arrange meetings with opposition groups and then work to
get a strong statement from Kennedy.
What statements from Washington do…is give…credibility. It makes it a lot
harder for the government to lock up the political prisoners. It gives a voice to
those who are trying to change… it makes it harder …for the government to
ignore it. …Kennedy … worked very closely with his foundation for Robert
Kennedy, which would give an annual human rights prize to various activists. So
in China we were getting political prisoners out, and in South Korea we were
getting political prisoners out. … the minute he would give the Robert Kennedy
Award to a political activist, that person got some moral authority. The
government’s not likely to execute them, they’re not likely to keep them in jail
forever, so they become a political force in their own right. (Nancy Soderberg,
interview with author, February 10, 2010)
Kennedy made many statements and speeches on behalf of the Taiwan democracy activists.
Armstrong said the hearings and legislation that went through the Asian and Pacific
Subcommittee were essentially signals sent by Congress, especially its Gang of Four, to the
KMT, pushing the message that it had to change.
We kept trying to … ask the ruling party and the opposition: What do you want to
be? What do you want Taiwan to be? What is your party all about? And then we
would say: How could Taiwan survive non-recognition… if this is what you want
to be? Is this really your game? And the answer was always “no”, and we like to
think, it might be vain, but we like to think that us asking that, and having them
answer the question themselves on both sides of the divide in Taiwan, was a
useful thing for us to do and led to the changes that … came later on. (Armstrong
2009)
Richard Bush emphasizes that the collective impact of the Gang of Four mattered more than any
individual actions from a particular senator or representative.
What was important in bringing about the change that they all wanted - and they
did all want it - was the fact that it was a significant albeit small group of
prominent members. Their activities got reported in the Taiwan Press much more
than they got reported in the U.S. Press. I don’t think theirs was the major impact
on Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision. I think the major reasons were in Taiwan itself.
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But what they did together and separately was not trivial. (Richard Bush,
interview with author, August 4, 2009)
The transition from dictatorship to democracy on Taiwan was a dynamic that took place mainly
on Taiwan, but the Gang of Four had input to this dynamic. Through joint press conferences, the
Committee for Democracy on Taiwan, subcommittee hearings, speeches, and public statements,
the Gang of Four and other members of Congress who followed their lead were able to send a
clear message to the KMT about the way Congress wanted Taiwan to handle its democratic
transition. This effort paid off.

Conclusion: The Global Congress
Armstrong’s description of the Gang of Four’s activities reveals two important things
about congressional action in the 1970s and 1980s. First, congressional actions, including press
conferences, hearings, resolutions, and legislation, were motivated by events both at home and
abroad. The events were newsworthy mainly to the people from the home country. Second, the
intended audience was the ruling party and the opposition groups in foreign countries.
Congressional hearings were held to send signals to other countries. Those signals were received
by the intended audiences, and the audiences frequently reacted in a way that members of
Congress intended. These two facts suggest that the formation of American foreign policy was a
global affair. In this sense, Congress was becoming an internationally representative body.
Leach says the House of Representatives suddenly began to represent the entire world,
with subcommittees devoting more attention to immigrant groups and exiles.
This became a new trend and a new element in American politics, and also a
reflection of another trend. In American constitutional history, if you go back to
the founders, one judgmental call that fit then that doesn’t fit now is the
assumption…that the executive would have dominance in foreign affairs, because
among other things it would have a near monopoly on knowledge. As time has
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gone on, you have the smallening of the world in this globalization sense, the
communications of the world that have shifted. And you have constituents who
have concerns. And they cannot reach the executive branch. They can [reach]
their Congress. And so Congress is beginning to play a more active leadership
role in foreign affairs in ways very different than they ever existed before. Of
which, this issue, of Democracy in Taiwan, is an example. (Rep. Leach, interview
with author, July 25, 2008)
Soderberg also echoes Leach’s observation that Congress is better positioned to address these
global human rights and democracy movements than the executive branch.
Congress tends to be a little ahead of the Administration on many of these issues.
Because you’re a member of Congress, you have a little bit more flexibility,
you’re one of 535 people as opposed to the Administration making official U.S.
policy. (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author, February 10, 2010)
This openness of Congress provides many access points to any transnational movement. The
movement must be both passionate enough about its missions to personally affect members of
Congress and their staff. The movement must be sophisticated enough in its execution to build a
coalition of members of Congress. TIM has both of these qualities.
The problem TIM faced was that it did not have these qualities before the 1980s. It was
passionate, but it directed its passion at the American public, not at members of Congress and
their staff. It lacked sophistication in its execution. It recruited inept independence activists and
tried to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo. However, suddenly in 1980 the same activists learned
how to build long-lasting relationships in Congress that are based both on affective ties and
rational electoral calculations. Moreover, before the 1980s Congress was not filled with people
who were naturally sensitive to issues concerning Taiwan. Affective politics would not have
worked in the 1960s and early 70s. The next chapter discusses how TIM learned to be effective
through FAPA in the 1980s and to the present day.
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Chapter 4
The Formosan Association for Public Affairs: Organization, Strategies, Successes, and
Failures
The previous chapters demonstrated that Taiwan stands out in American foreign policy
because of its human rights abuses on Taiwan and American soil, and because of the dedication
of political entrepreneurs in Congress to Taiwan over the 1980s. These same political
entrepreneurs – Senator Ted Kennedy and Representative Stephen Solarz for example – also
dedicated their efforts in foreign policy toward other countries, including South Africa, but
within Congress only Taiwan consistently maintains political support, second only to the
political support the Israel has maintained over three decades. This consistent support, despite
improvements in Taiwan since 1987, is based on the efforts of the Formosan Association of
Public Affairs (FAPA). In the same way that the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) develops a membership base of people devoted to Israel that in turn cultivates political
loyalties in Congress, FAPA develops a wealthy, passionate and sophisticated membership base,
spread throughout the United States, that cultivates political loyalties in Congress.
This is what makes Taiwan different. There is no Cambodia Caucus, South Africa
Caucus, El Salvador Caucus, Russian Caucus, or Ugandan Caucus in the House or Senate. In
many cases the members of Congress and staff members who became advocates of those
countries over the four decades since 1970 have left the House and Senate. The ethnic lobbies
still exist. For instance, a dedicated group of Armenian-Americans, especially in California, still
annually submit a resolution to a House Subcommittee to recognize the Armenian genocide, but
there is no Armenian Caucus in the House or Senate, and this resolution almost never makes it
out of committee. Many scholars have studied AIPAC’s influence to determine what accounts
for its political support in Congress, but the same focus has not been placed on Taiwan except in
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two studies (Lin 2006, Chen 2007). This chapter builds on the research done by Lin and Chen by
first showing how FAPA built its political support in Congress. Next, this chapter demonstrates
how FAPA sustains its political support in Congress, but with fewer resources than AIPIC and
fewer resources even than TECRO, the official lobby associated with Taiwan’s government. This
political support does not always produce the results FAPA wants in terms of resolutions,
legislation, and ultimately de jure independence for Taiwan, but the successes are based on
consistent strategies, just as the failures are based on consistent mistakes. It is these strategies
and mistakes that this chapter will discuss.

Shifting strategy: From independence to democracy
Why has FAPA, as a representative of the Taiwan independence movement, been able to
accomplish so much substantive congressional activity, as revealed in Chapter Three, while still
being ostensibly for independence? The answer is that the independence movement shifted
strategy by presenting itself to Congress as the Taiwan democracy movement.
The international and domestic changes during the 1970s provided a window of
opportunity for activists, but those activists - specifically Trong Chai and Peng Ming-Min - had
to recover from the stigma of violence associated with the TIM since the failed assassination of
Chiang Ching-kuo. This recovery, or renunciation of violence, required two distinct steps. The
first step was to identify more closely with the larger Taiwan democracy movement instead of
the smaller Taiwan independence movement. This had to be done while still retaining the loyalty
of the Taiwan independence activists who had been agitating for Taiwan’s de jure independence
since the 228 Incident. The second step was making the strategic transition from organizing just
the Taiwan Diaspora to making political connections in the House and Senate.
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Rep. Leach explained how, from the perspective of the Gang of Four, the independence
activists began to identify with the democracy movement:
The word independence doesn't exactly fit this circumstance at that time. … It
would never fit me for example. I was never an advocate for independence. … In
world affairs, there are two concepts that are generally synonymous: One being
the word independence, the other being self-determination. But Taiwan was the
one place in the planet that these two concepts were juxtaposed. If Taiwan ever
declared independence it would lose its self-determination. If it refused to walk
down the independence route, it would have a lot of self-determination.
This became a movement that was not an independence movement that the Gang
of Four was interested in. It was a pro-democracy movement … so the group that
I became quite active in, and basically established … was pro-democracy where
we pressed for the movement of Taiwan in a more democratic direction. … And
this movement was one aimed at getting people who were dissenting out of jail,
and those who were jailed at the time were those who were seeking democracy.
(Rep. Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008)
Friedman said the Gang of Four was an alliance between liberal Democrats and progressive
Republicans. “There is a natural relationship between the liberal Republicans, the moderate
Republicans, and the more human-rights-oriented Democrats - which is how you’re going to get
your Gang of Four - on the side of this kind of foreign policy.” (Edward Friedman, interview
with author, February 5, 2010) Leach said one of the challenges the Gang of Four faced was
translating the desires for independence, shared widely among Taiwan activists at that time, into
more moderate policy that could be endorsed by the entire Congress.
Now in the United States in this particular era, the majority of Taiwanese activists
were pro-independence. But that did not mean that that was the direction of those
that were active in this Gang of Four, although I think if you had surveyed most
members of Congress, they might say, “well, independence makes sense”. I don’t
think most knew the repercussions that would follow, which would have been
gigantic. … with each passing year they become more gigantic. (Rep. Leach,
interview with author, July 25, 2008)
This tension between de jure independence and de facto independence was an ongoing struggle
in Congress during the 1980s. It was also reflected in Taiwanese-Americans at the same time.
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Among Taiwanese-Americans and the larger Taiwan Diaspora that left Taiwan following
the 228 Incident, there is significant disagreement about the virtues of de jure independence
versus the de facto independence that Taiwan has enjoyed since the end of World War II. During
the 10-year period from 1977 to 1987, advocates for democracy on Taiwan could find much
more common ground amongst themselves than could advocates of Taiwan independence. The
Taiwan democracy movement also found common ground with human rights and democracy
activists in the United States and around the world because the need for democracy on Taiwan
was obvious and because it connected with the larger human rights concerns that were prominent
in the 1970s.
In order to acquire political viability in the American political system, Taiwan
independence activists understood that advocating independence for Taiwan would violate the
“One China” policy that had been established in the Shanghai Communique. Key activists
advocated democracy for Taiwan when they communicated with the offices of Rep. Stephen
Solarz, Rep. Jim Leach, Sen. Edward Kennedy and Sen. Claiborne Pell. The staff members from
these offices said they would have avoided meetings with Taiwan independence activists. For
example, Cindy Sprunger explained that the only possible way the Taiwan democracy movement
could make an impact on U.S. policy toward Taiwan was by leaving “independence” out of its
language so that the US could maintain critical ambiguity, or what Henry Kissinger called
“constructive ambiguity” after the US signed the Shanghai Communique. Maintaining this
ambiguity was a necessity for any group of Taiwanese-Americans that wanted to get a hearing in
Congress. Pei-te Lien, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa
Barbara, said the independence activists were able to successfully morph into democracy
activists when they approached Congress in the late 1970s because they understood by that time
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that they had to take a step-by-step approach toward independence for Taiwan, and the first step
was promoting democracy on Taiwan. She said there are at least three stages in this process.
“There was a … liberalization stage… in order to push for independence you cannot just directly
jump from authoritarian to this state that you want. There has to be something in between.
Liberalization first and democratization.” (Pei-te Lien, interview with author, March 13, 2009)
(See also Lien 2006).
The real issue for independence activists was thus not “what do we want?” but “how do
we get what we want?” Analyzing the movement to independence as a three-step process, with
liberalization coming first, helped the activists get access to appropriate members of Congress
and their staffs. As these activists began to target Congress, they had to figure out how to
connect with the American political system in a meaningful way. They learned that they had to
share interests in the same outcomes with members of Congress and their staff in order to
communicate. To sustain their shared interests, they had to tell a compelling and gripping human
rights story that would capture the interests of members of Congress and their staff.
Robert Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, said the reason the
independence activists were able to become democracy activists is because they made a strategic
political calculation, knowing that independence would not be supported by the U.S. Congress,
but knowing that they could establish an “identity of interests” to build a coalition to promote
democracy on Taiwan. “My sense is that FAPA as a political organization concealed their true
intentions in order have more influence on Capitol Hill. I have always understood them to be an
independence group. They may say otherwise, but that’s what politicians do: in order to be
influential they need to shape their reputation and their policies to maximize influence. … They
were genuinely interest in democracy as well, but once democracy was achieved they did not end
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their lobbying. They continued to lobby.” (Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14,
2009)
By the time FAPA started to lobby members of Congress, democracy promotion through
advocacy of human rights had become a common agenda. Robert Sutter said the primary concern
in Congress during the 1980s was helping Taiwan to make a transition from authoritarian rule to
democracy. “Most people who want Taiwan independence also want democracy for Taiwan…
The people in Congress wanted democracy for Taiwan, too. … I am sure there were hard-liners
who wouldn’t want to do this type of cooperation on democracy, but they were pretty marginal I
think in my judgment in the 1980s, and certainly in FAPA. FAPA’s approach was selfdetermination. Rights for the people of Taiwan was their focus.” (Robert Sutter, interview with
author, October 7, 2009)
This strategic change begs the question: How were independence activists able to become
politically savvy enough to start to build connections on Capitol Hill in the first place? After all,
the key players remained. Trong Chai started WUFI, and he also served as the first president of
FAPA. Peng Ming-Min served as president of WUFI in 1972 before resigning, then he returned
as president of FAPA following Trong Chai. Yet, WUFI never developed political connections,
whereas FAPA started building on political relationships that had already been established. What
changed in that 10-year period, from 1972 to 1982? This question is especially relevant in Peng
Ming-min’s case because he was older than Trong Chai and Mark Chen, and was brought on as
president at both organizations because of his international prestige as an advocate of Taiwan
independence. Yet, where in 1972 he proved inept as an organizer, in 1982 he became very adept
at building FAPA’s Congressional presence and non-profit operations around the country.
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Rep. Leach offers one explanation for the Taiwanese activists’ success in the 1980s
following their failures in the 1970s. He argues that it took about 30 years, from the organization
of the first Taiwan groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s to the organization of FAPA in the
1980s, for Taiwan activists to learn how the American system works and take advantage of it
appropriately. Leach refers to this process as the “maturization of citizenship” whereby new
immigrants have to learn processes and “the limits of what can be said and how it should be said.
And how to lead and how not to lead.” (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with author, July 25, 2008)
Another possible explanation for the activists’ rapid learning curve is that they were an
informal extension of the official China Lobby, specifically the efforts of the government of
Taiwan to build support in Congress for the ROC. In this sense, Congress had already been
softened up by three decades of interaction with the Taiwanese government, and the democracy
activists simply piggybacked on that earlier foundation.
Rep. Leach said the most important consideration for understanding the Taiwan
democracy activists is that they were an updated version of the old “China Lobby” from the
1950s and 60s.
The Taiwan Lobby was one of the first major extraordinary lobbies from a foreign
policy dimension in the modern-day 20th century. It became the model for
virtually all of the others. And it was powerful in a cultural sense and in a
financial sense. This is not a cheap lobby. What Taiwan did in American politics
absolutely preceded any other country. It is the model. It strengthens your tale, it
doesn’t weaken it, and it makes it stunning. The influence of Madame Chiang
Kai-shek and the Taiwanese lobby in the 50s was dramatic. And everything
proceeded [from] that. … I really want to emphasize to you how early and strong
the Taiwanese Lobby was. … And what’s interesting in this regard is that Taiwan
had already set an unprecedented model, and this was a subset of that model at
variance with the direction that had historically been in place. … part of your
story is a break from the past, of Taiwanese lobbying of the US being all KMT, to
an advocacy, not of the island, but of a group within the island, and precepts
within the island. This is a phenomenal story. (Rep. Jim Leach, interview with
author, July 25, 2008)
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From Rep. Leach’s perspective, especially from the Gang of Four, the groundwork had already
been laid by the old “China Lobby” for the Taiwan democracy activists to start making political
connections on Capitol Hill.
Ross offers another perspective that helps explain why the democracy activists were able
to replace the official Taiwan Lobby. The China Lobby had become too oppressive, too willing
to violate human rights, for members of Congress. The Taiwan democracy activists gave
members of Congress a better story.
Taiwan has a nice story. You cannot help but like that story. And across the strait
is a country with a story that is very hard to sell. Ideological support and
sympathy for a little country dealing with big old nasty China. It’s a good story.
(Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14, 2009)
Leach was one of the few members of Congress who was very receptive to this story. As a
former member of the foreign service and as a liberal Republican who was the ranking member
of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, he had already made statements supporting human rights
on Taiwan. Moreover, he refused out-of-state campaign contributions, and this gave him moral
standing when acting on behalf of democracy in Taiwan. Leach specifically wanted to make
Taiwan’s government more legitimate for its own people, and democracy was the best way to do
that. The democracy activists gave him the tools to accomplish this goal.
The strategic re-branding that independence activists undertook was very successful in a
very short time because it occurred precisely when Congress faced a policy window on U.S.
China policy. For 30 years U.S. China policy had been set by the president and the China Lobby
in Congress. Recall that Congress passed a resolution asking President Carter to be informed of
any changes in U.S. China policy. This was part of an effort to promote increasing transparency
in the executive branch and greater collaboration between the two branches. When the Carter
administration suddenly announced a new China policy without consulting Congress, members
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became angry. The announcement symbolized not just a new policy toward China, but a return to
the secrecy and deception used by the Nixon administration to get around Congress. Sutter
argues that the timing was critical because the shifting alignments of Cold War politics gave
members of Congress a foreboding sense that Taiwan would be sacrificed to the needs of détente
with the PRC.
Congress had … sort of a backlash against the [Carter] administration’s policies
toward Taiwan … There was a broad, bipartisan concern that Taiwan hadn’t been
treated fairly … So there was a lot of support for Taiwan… (Robert Sutter,
interview with author, October 7, 2009)
This sparked moral outrage and pushed many members of Congress to seek resources to
seize control of U.S. China policy from the Carter administration. “Sen. Ted Kennedy,
who was quite critical in the handling of normalization, …went out of his way to promote
the Taiwan Relations Act.” (Robert Ross, interview with author, October 14, 2009). (See
Gwertzman 1979). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was the legislative product of that
effort. The political opening for democracy activist can be seen as the political product of
that effort. The TRA did everything for Taiwan except create a separate immigration
quota, and that issue provided the political window the activists needed.

Window Opens on U.S. China Policy: Taiwan democracy movement enters Congress
When the United States officially recognized the PRC in 1979, the withdrawal of support
from the ROC was devastating to the KMT government. The KMT suddenly faced an
environment in which it was no longer guaranteed help from the United States. The only thing
the United States promised was aid in Taiwan’s defense in the case of a PRC attack. However, a
PRC attack seem likely only if Taiwan declared independence, and the KMT had no intention of
doing that. What the KMT did do was release its claims to authority over Mainland China. It
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recognized that the US would no longer provide it with military assistance to retake the
Mainland from the Communist government. Consequently, the KMT had to come to terms with
the reality of its representative system of government. Nearly all the representatives had been
elected from the Mainland, and they were dying. In addition, non-KMT representatives were
being elected. Thus, the KMT faced pressure to make its government more representative of the
population born on Taiwan, and it gave into this pressure during the 1980s.
The Taiwanese-American exiles faced a window of opportunity. While they understood
that America’s rapprochement with the PRC meant that it would not recognize Taiwan’s
independence, they also understood that the shift from security issues to economic and human
rights issues, facilitated by the rapprochement, gave them the ability to focus on changing
Taiwan’s undemocratic government and improving its human rights record.
All that was required was finding sympathetic members of Congress who would
champion these causes.
During the 1979 debate on the Taiwan Relations Act, Lester Wolff, Chair of the Asian
and Pacific Subcommittee, traveled to Taiwan in the first Congressional visit since
normalization, and returned with a vow to help the government and people of Taiwan. (Lee
1987). Rep. Leach demonstrated his commitment to Taiwan by putting an amendment into the
TRA that called for greater democracy on Taiwan. The passage of the TRA was a key
development in Congress because it compelled House members and their staff to articulate a
clearer relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Fulton Armstrong, who worked on
Rep. Leach’s staff, notes how important the TRA was in focusing the attention of Rep. Leach on
Taiwan issues. “We felt that the Taiwan Relations Act was a brilliant piece of legislation, but it
was sterile. It didn’t have feeling. It didn’t really say what we were going to be, how our
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relationship was going to be. It was quite technical, and I know that certainly in the Leach office,
we felt that the relationship needed more feeling.” (Armstrong 2009)
During the debate in the House on the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwanese advocates of
democracy on Taiwan began communicating frequently with House members to educate them
about human rights abuses by the KMT, arrests of peaceful demonstrators, and other antidemocratic practices. This education convinced many representatives that the United States
government could no longer continue supporting an authoritarian Taiwan against the PRC if
Taiwan maintained its anti-democratic practices, especially considering their widespread
concerns about democracy and human rights around the world since the end of the Vietnam War.
Taiwanese-American activists used the common concern for human rights and Taiwan to
establish a rapport with members of Congress known to be engaged by such issues. For example,
Kenjohn Wang was a successful businessman in Taiwan and Brazil before immigrating to the
United States. He participated in many community charity events, especially in the TaiwaneseAmerican community. Local politicians always approached him for help. The passage of the
TRA, coupled with the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979, prompted Wang to combine
forces with Trong Chai, Peng Ming-Min and Mark Chen to organize a letter-writing campaign to
send 8,000 letters to Senator Edward Kennedy to show their concern over Taiwan’s arrest of the
opposition activists on Taiwan. Kennedy responded in March 1980 by issuing a proclamation
regarding Taiwanese civil rights, “vehemently reprimanding the KMT for its violation of human
rights, freedom and democracy.” (Shu 2005) Trong Chai, Kenjohn Wang and other enthusiastic
fellow Taiwanese-Americans showed appreciation for Kennedy’s help by holding a fundraiser
banquet with one thousand participants for Kennedy to help him win the Democratic presidential
candidate nomination.
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The impact of the fundraiser on Senator Kennedy was profound. Wang said: “In addition
to showing the consolidated power of the Taiwanese Americans, what hit Kennedy between the
eyes were the achievements the Taiwanese have attained in all walks of life in America. He
lavished praises on the Taiwanese repeatedly: the Taiwanese immigrants are the most
outstanding among the minorities in America” (Kenjohn Wang 1999, 270, cited in Shu 2005,
441). Kennedy’s praise for the Taiwanese immigrants convinced Wang, Trong, and Peng to
lobby Kennedy and Solarz to give Taiwan a separate 20,000 quota from China. The US
Immigration Act of 1965 had set the quota for the ROC at 20,000 annually. After 1979 the quota
applied to both Taiwan and the PRC. This outraged the Taiwanese-American community, which
wanted a separate quota (Lin 2006, 142). This effort proved successful at the end of 1981.
Based on their success in changing the quota, Wang helped Trong, Peng, and Mark Chen
start FAPA in Los Angeles in February 1982. He contributed to FAPA’s funding and bought the
first office buildings (Lin, 2006, 145, footnote 62). They moved FAPA’s headquarters from New
York to Washington, D.C., and started providing critical information to the Gang of Four and
other politicians on Capital Hill. Mark Chen formed a close friendship with Senator Claiborne
Pell (D-RI), while Trong Chai became very active in Rep. Solarz’s office and Peng Ming-min
worked closely with Rep. Leach’s office.
Fonte said a key element in FAPA’s interaction with the Gang of Four was the presence
of Taiwanese-American citizens in their districts or states.
Solarz is from New York. There are a lot of Taiwanese-Americans in the greater
New York area. … And Kennedy, in the Boston area a lot of Taiwanese
Americans. Boston has its clutch of great schools, so a lot of Taiwanese went
there. Same with Connecticut. Rhode Island had Brown and other schools. In
Iowa there was a son of a famous dissident who was killed in the 228 incident.
This man was a well-known scholar. He was the first Taiwanese to get a Ph.D. I
think at Columbia. [He] was in Taiwan during the famous incident in 1947. He
led, or was one of the leaders in the group that tried to get together and provide a
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comprehensive list of their concerns to the government. And what the government
did of course was wait to get more soldiers and then picked all those people up
and killed them all. So both his sons were very active, and one son is in Iowa. His
name is Prof. TK Lin. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)
Just as important is the time period. Many members of Congress, Fonte maintains, felt guilty
about American support for authoritarian regimes after the Vietnam War ended, and this drove
their support for Taiwan.
I think that by the time you got to the 80s, people like Leach [felt guilty] … about
US foreign policy…It’s not like Jim Leach felt personally responsible for the
murder of X, Y, or Z person, but our policy had been such to support that, so in
that sense of guilt, yes. The Vietnam war had heightened the general public
interest in the oppressive nature of U.S. Foreign policy, and this softened the
congressional members who were active in foreign policy arenas to be more
sensitive to guilt-type associations vs. African issues or European issues – just
like Jewish lobby was able to capitalize on the guilt feelings associated with the
Holocaust. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)
Edward Friedman makes a similar point about the period of time following Vietnam.
As a result of the American defeat in Vietnam, there grew a concern… that the
U.S. should not be supporting authoritarian regimes and should care about human
rights. … Then you have the issues of the Shah of Iran leading on to Khomeni in
Iran, and Somoza in Nicaragua leading on to Sandinistas in Nicaragua, all
happening at the end the 1970s. And at the same time you get going in Eastern
Europe Charter 77 and the beginning of Solidarity. And a context gets set in
which there grows within liberal democrats a concern that part of American
foreign policy should be supporting democratization. That, not to do so leads you
to be involved with the Diems of Vietnam and the Shahs in Iran and the Somozas
in Nicaragua, and the consequences are not good for the United States. (Edward
Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)
FAPA took advantage of this general environment to build up its political support in Congress.
The Gang of Four were the most active, but many other members of Congress contributed for the
same reason.
Richard Bush notes that the relationship between FAPA and Congress had strategic
advantages, including rational electoral considerations. He describes the relationship between
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FAPA and the Gang of Four as a marriage of convenience that served its purpose until Taiwan
liberalized politically.
Solarz was interested in developing as many fundraising bases as possible, and he
saw this as an attractive one. … The reason they were able to break through is the
nature of campaign fundraising under the rules at that time made it impossible for
a member of congress or anyone running for office relying on a small number of
large contributions. That was prohibited by law. So you needed to create
fundraising bases made up of a large number of small contributors. There are
thousands of these little fundraising bases around the country defined by group
interest or policy interest, ideological interest. The Taiwanese-Americans just
happened to be one of them.
Solarz over time was able to create, was able to tap into, various Asian-American
groups, none of which provided a lot of money in the big scheme of things, but to
which he felt obligated to do something to show his agreement with some of their
goals. There was a kind of marriage of convenience or like-mindedness between
the Taiwanese and the members that they supported. … On a recurring basis, the
Taiwanese donors were willing to pony up money. …In every two-year election
cycle, which is when the fundraising occurs, members of the community would
make their own individual judgments about how well this was working out. This
was a relationship and understanding that was renewed incrementally. (Richard
Bush, interview with author, August 4, 2009)
An article in the Washington Post (“Solarz Raises Travel to New Heights; Foreign Policy
Specialist Uses Trips to Solicit Campaign Funds”, July 13, 1989) revealed Solarz’s fundraising
methods with Asian-Americans.
Although he has more than $ 1 million in leftover campaign funds and faced only
token opposition in recent elections, Solarz has mounted a wide-ranging fundraising campaign among ethnic American groups from the Philippines, Taiwan
and India over the past few years. … Robert M. Hathaway, a Solarz spokesman,
said the flow of funds in small amounts from the American-Asian community
started unexpectedly several years ago when Solarz was approached by one of the
groups, which offered to raise money for him because it liked his pro-democracy
stand against authoritarian rulers in the region. … Why does Solarz need to raise
money so vigorously, given his $ 1 million campaign bankroll? Hathaway cited
Solarz's concern that redistricting after the 1990 census could force him to run
against an incumbent in the expensive New York City media market.”
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When I sent Solarz this article, he replied that it was “a snide and cynical description of the
facts.” (Rep. Stephen Solarz, email to author, May 10, 2010)

Spreading Information through FAPA: Access and timing
The reason FAPA became so influential as “the voice” of the Taiwan democracy
movement, despite a great diversity of voices within the movement, and human rights activists in
general, is because FAPA monopolized access to Congress and became a useful tool for
Congress. Once FAPA arrived, it became the de facto path for all Taiwanese-Americans to
interact with members of Congress. “If … they monopolize … access to … members of
Congress, then they have the power to represent back to the group their description of what those
events are. And that becomes a tremendous resource for them in their organization. … We
wanted the U.S.-China normalization to work well.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author,
February 5, 2010) The timing helped FAPA become a critical tool for Congress to deal with
U.S.-China normalization. “The timing is so extraordinarily important. It really is that postVietnam War period, added to by the fall of the Shah and the fall of Somoza, and the Kaohsiung
incident and what followed it… it’s really that set of events which makes sort of the conditions
right, makes the soil right for things to be done at that moment in time.” (Edward Friedman,
interview with author, February 5, 2010)
Another element of FAPA’s success was providing important information to key
members of Congress. These included allies across the ideological spectrum. “In order to get
[resolutions] through… the most important thing is to come out of the subcommittee
unanimously [so that] …. even your most extreme hawk is on board on what you’re doing. [This]
makes it more likely that the full committee will rubberstamp it.” (Edward Friedman, interview
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with author, February 5, 2010) Friedman visited the staff of Senators Helms and Hayakowa
because they were hawks. The appropriate tactic to implement this strategy is to have the
moderates be the spark for resolutions, then have the extremists approve it. “If you don’t get [the
extremists] on board, you are going to have a fight at every level of the game.” (Edward
Friedman, interview with author, February 5, 2010)
Once FAPA identified the appropriate member of Congress to target, the organization
started to tell the member about the human rights abuses on Taiwan. Michael Fonte was a Senior
Policy Analyst at FAPA. He had connections with Peng Ming-Min at the University of Michigan
and had lived in Taiwan during the late 1970s. Fonte explains that the human rights abuses by
the KMT were obvious, so it was “relatively easy to get liberal Democratic congressmen
involved because of democracy, human rights concerns. It also was relatively easy to get
conservative members of congress, mostly Republicans, to support Taiwan because of anticommunism … It was an ‘easy sell’ for people who were concerned about democracy and
human rights to support the Taiwanese democracy movement, or FAPA.” (Michael Fonte,
interview with author, October 22, 2008)
Nancy Soderberg was the contact for FAPA in Senator Kennedy’s office. She explains
that FAPA quickly established itself as a credible source of information. “FAPA established its
credibility pretty early on and it worked with a lot of the other human rights groups in D.C., the
Asian groups that knew the issues…they were responsible… they were the most credible
interlocutor out there.” (Nancy Soderberg, interview with author, February 10, 2010) Kennedy
had a specific pro-democracy agenda with FAPA that included processes of political
liberalization. “We always focused on the issue of democracy: You have the right to run, have
the right to form a political party… civic rights, healthy …checks and balances among the
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various parts of government, a healthy press, the right to organize … international observers, free
and fair elections, that’s what the international community was pushing.” (Nancy Soderberg,
interview with author, February 10, 2010)
Once FAPA was able to successfully ensconce itself in the halls of Congress as a
recognized lobby on behalf of Taiwan, it faced a dilemma. As the official voice of the Taiwan
independence movement it spoke on behalf of independence activists, but it could not advocate
independence to Congress. If it drifted too far from independence, however, it would lose the
support of activists. On the other side, if the group went too far toward independence it would
lose the support of Congress. Yet FAPA has been able to balance this tension ever since its
founding.
Fonte offers two explanations for this balancing act. First, despite being a grassroots
organization, FAPA represents a small number of people in absolute numbers compared to other
ethnic lobbies, such as AIPAC and Cuban-American National Foundation. This works to its
advantage because it does not have to worry about pleasing a base that does not exist. Instead, it
can rely on individuals with high social and economic status to approach members of Congress,
in the same way that the Jewish community interacted with the government in the 1930s and
1940s (Silverman 1996). Fonte said FAPA learned from AIPAC’s example. “AIPAC’s ability to
get local communities of Jewish-American citizens to work with their local congresspeople was I
think the key element. … AIPAC is everywhere, and where Taiwanese would be they would be
as well. Because so many of the people who were activists were out of the New York and
Washington area, and AIPAC is such a formidable force, anyone who works in Washington
knows that. It clearly was an example to use.” (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October
22, 2008)
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Second, FAPA takes advantage of geographical dispersal: it claims a member with high
social and economic status is in every congressional district. This enables FAPA to call on
members to place pressure on their congressional representatives when necessary.
So what you had then was a very fertile pool of Taiwanese-Americans, very welleducated, very dedicated to seeing change come in Taiwan, People who are my
age, in their 60s… who had seen the worst of KMT abuses, were really adamant
that there had to be change in Taiwan. [They were] spread around the country,
many of them stayed within the university spheres … many of them stayed as
professors. They were scattered around the country because of their professional
interests…. They were very well educated… they communicated well. [This]
made for a mix out of which they could get congressional support. (Michael
Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)
Thus, professional success and their geographic dispersion allowed Taiwanese-Americans to tap
into geographic representation and get the attention of Congress. “Geographic dispersal was
very, very important. Most Taiwanese-Americans are not rich … but they are professional
people, and they were able to work hard and make enough money to be influential people in their
communities even if they were not rich…So they had connections in their local communities.
They were known in the communities as people who were of some substance.” (Michael Fonte,
interview with author, October 22, 2008)

Maintaining influence in Congress
There are two key strategies, one at the congressional level, and one at the organizational
level, that FAPA staff point to as generating successful outcomes. At the congressional level,
FAPA cultivates tightly-bonded friendships with members of Congess and their staff, especially
their staff. At the organizational level, FAPA is run by staff who are essentially a tightly-bonded
family, which brings issues to members who get very passionate about anything involving
Taiwan, no matter how apparently mundane it may seem to an outside observer. This passion
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springs from love for Taiwan, dedication to improving Taiwan’s condition, and intense loyalties
toward each other. The staff members have been involved with Taiwan issues since before
FAPA was founded, and they are often married to each other. By extension, they are often
married to Taiwan. The staffs bring this intense passion and dedication to Congress. They share
their love for Taiwan with congressional staff and members of Congress and thus build enduring
political support in Congress. All of this is an example of bonding social capital, both within
FAPA and in Congress.

Married to Taiwan
The employees at FAPA are often married both to Taiwan and to each other,
demonstrating the importance of affective relationships both in their concern for Taiwan and
their work on behalf of it. For example, Michael Fonte, the Senior Policy Analyst at FAPA from
1986 to 2002, came to Washington in late 1984 and started volunteering. “I had known Dr. Peng
when I came back from Taiwan. In 1970 I went to the University of Michigan. Dr. Peng had just
escaped from Taiwan. He was under house arrest there and Michigan gave him a place to stay.
So I got to know him there. … I helped him do an English-language newsletter…. I’ve been
connected with Taiwan for 42 years now [in 2008]. ” (Michael Fonte, interview with author,
October 22, 2008)
Coen Blaauw, the Public Relations Executive Director for FAPA, has been working at
FAPA for 21 years. He met his wife, Iris Ho, by working with her. They married in 2004. He
graduated from law school in the Netherlands and decided to study the legal status of Taiwan
because he wanted to distinguish himself from most other legal scholars who studied Japan.
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Moreover, he wanted to avoid the more mundane activities of being a Dutch lawyer. His initial
interest in Taiwan’s independence has become a love affair to which he has dedicated his life.
When I graduated from law school I think in 1988, Japan was very popular.
Everybody studied international law, so everybody wanted to do something about
Japan. And I just wanted to stand out, and I just wanted to do something else, and
nobody did something about Taiwan. That’s why I picked Taiwan. I could have
done Japan, but I picked Taiwan because I wanted to be different from all the
others. But then the moment I got involved I got to know the people, got to know
the issue, the more, I think it’s an important issue. … I could be a lawyer in
Holland and taking care of international, car crash litigation and pick up a new
issue every three days. But I think the Taiwan issue is one very important issue. I
always feel that no matter what, the problems that we face … ultimately Taiwan
will be a full, independent country… every day we get a little bit closer to the
ultimate goal. … I want to be there when it happens…I’ve invested 20 years of
my life into Taiwan and I don’t want to step out now suddenly…. It’s something
emotionally… my in-laws live in Taiwan… I’m riding on the tiger and I can’t get
off. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw says nearly everyone working at FAPA has been involved with Taiwan issues for at least
a decade. “It’s one big family. It’s a mission really. It’s a passion…It’s not a regular job…. It’s
a cause I want to dedicate my life to.” Gerrit van Der Wies, another employee at FAPA and also
of Dutch descent, has been writing on Taiwan issues since the late 1970s. Like Blaauw, he is
married to a Taiwanese woman.
In the late 1980s, when Blaauw started to learn about Taiwan, Europe was experiencing a
wave of political liberalization. He assumed Taiwan would quickly follow. However, he learned
that Taiwan is a tough issue in Asia because of its connection with Chinese identity. “Taiwan is
so ingrained in the psyche of the Chinese as being part of China.” Blaauw thinks Taiwan will
become independent only when China democratizes or the U.S.-PRC relationship ends. Until
that point, Taiwan will remain a “pawn in the hands of the big powers… like it has been for the
past 400 years.”
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Congressional strategy
Blaauw works with Ho on building relationships in the House. Gerrit Van Der Wies
works on building relationships in the Senate. Blaauw and Ho develop an idea of an issue they
care about, then together they draft a non-binding concurrent resolution. They identify House
members who will likely introduce the resolution as well as original co-sponsors. Once the
resolution is introduced, they recruit co-sponsors and then gradually find a markup in the
subcommittee. They see the resolution from the subcommittee to the full committee and then, as
Blaauw says, ultimately coach “the whole thing to the floor. So whatever it takes from beginning
to end, that’s what I do. I come up with the idea, and I’m not resting until it’s passed by both
houses of Congress, or especially the House, of course.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author,
April 4, 2010) Blaauw also writes speeches for members of Congress and press releases.
Blaauw identifies which members of Congress will be willing to champion causes for
Taiwan. He says Taiwan issues are seldom taken up by members of Congress if FAPA and other
Taiwanese organizations do not ask them. “Sherrod Brown, Congressman Andrews, RosLehtinen…are the people we’ve befriended, like we did with Solarz, Leach, and like we did with
Kennedy. We befriended these people on the grassroots level or here [in Congress]. We helped
them a little bit with their campaigns.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw said that, in the 1980s, when Taiwan still had martial law, it was easy to get members of
Congress to care about Taiwan. It was an “easy sell.” In contrast, “the issues we campaign now
are relatively -- to these members of Congress -- a little more luxury items… Taiwan trying to be
[in the] UN. Some of our members [of Congress] say, ‘We don’t like the UN. We want us to get
out of the UN. Why do you want to get into the UN?’ … in a way, our issues are a little bit less
severe at the moment and less on the human rights front. So it’s our challenge to make these
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members of Congress still interested in our issues.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April
4, 2010)
One challenge FAPA faces every day is figuring out which of the 535 members of
Congress will be most willing to act on behalf of Taiwan. FAPA has few staff, so the staff must
use guiding principles to select their target members.
Who do we pick? … The people who we know well, who we are friends with …
The first line of defense is the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
… They have foreign affairs aides who know the difference between Taiwan and
Thailand… So these are the people who really have been to Taiwan, they know
the issues. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw emphasized that any member of Congress who is willing to work on behalf of Taiwan
issues is welcome, regardless of committee assignment. He cited as one example Congressman
Andrews of New Jersey, who is on the Armed Services Committee, and advocated many issues
for Taiwan, but not all related to the military. Nevertheless, the priority is to keep the members
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee very informed.
Three more considerations help Blaauw identify a likely champion of Taiwan issues. The
first is seniority on a committee or seniority in Congress. Blaauw does not want to target the
most senior member, the chair of the committee or subcommittee, but he also does not want to
target a person who is new and has no seniority. The reason is because championing Taiwan
issues must help the member advance politically in Congress. Blaauw has observed that
members with lots of seniority and a leading institutional position, such as Whip or Chair, tend to
be more silent about Taiwan than members with less seniority because there is a higher political
price to pay from the leadership. Speaking out on Taiwan becomes too risky. In contrast,
members with some seniority, especially those who are ranking members or next in line to chair
a committee, will likely seize on Taiwan to amplify their voice in Congress. It is very easy to be
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ignored in an institution with 535 members, so Blaauw sees Taiwan as helping a member with
some seniority attract attention without the risk.
We think members of Congress who are really up in the leadership have to be a
little more careful… in sticking out their necks for issues like Taiwan because [of]
… the fact that they’re so senior. … a ranking member and the chairman will have
their positions. When they were not chairmen of the committees, they were a little
bit more willing to be outspoken. Now, whatever they say will be used and
challenged by everybody… so these chairs of committees are a little bit more
careful, and also the Speaker, the Minority Leader, the Majority Leader
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
The second consideration is whether the member of Congress is in the party that is not
occupying the White House. A member of the opposition party will have more incentive to
challenge the president on issues like human rights and democracy than a member of the
president's party.
At the moment, we have a Democrat in the White House, the Chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee is also a Democrat, and the ranking member
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen is a Republican. So she doesn’t mind to challenge
the Chairman. She also doesn’t mind to challenge the White House. If there
would have been a Republican in the White House, with Berman, a Democrat,
chairing the committee, then I would predict that Ros-Lehtinen, who is the
ranking Republican member on the committee, would be a little bit more careful
challenging or supporting Taiwan issues because she doesn’t want to get into
trouble with a Republican in the White House. (Coen Blaauw, interview with
author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw admits that FAPA benefits from divided government, when at least one house of
Congress is held by the opposition party. He remembers when Bill Clinton was president and
Rep. Tom Delay (R-TX), the House Majority Leader, became an outspoken supporter of Taiwan.
This changed when George W. Bush entered the White House. Suddenly Delay, whose party still
controlled the House, became quiet about Taiwan. (See also Javits 1970, Tower 1981)
Thus, Blaauw advocates divided government. It is not just Taiwan that benefits from a
divided government. Blaauw said that Tibet and other countries with causes that require
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members of Congress to go the “extra mile” and “put themselves a little bit on display to support
these issues” also benefit from divided government. “The effectiveness of FAPA on all issues
ultimately depends on the power relations between the White House and Congress and within
Congress itself. For example, during the 1980s, because there was a Republican president in the
White House, it was easier for Democratic members of Congress to criticize an opposition
president. Republican members of Congress can also criticize a Democratic president’s human
rights or security record. If FAPA continues to be sophisticated in aligning their issues according
to the power relations in American politics, they can continue to assert an impact.” (Lin 2006)
The third consideration is whether the member of Congress has a safe seat. In districts
that are closely divided between Republicans and Democrats, Blaauw knows it will be hard to
get members to support Taiwan issues because the voters may think the member is not working
for them. For a lot of members “foreign affairs is not something sexy. It looks bad to their
constituents. They don’t travel. … If you care about foreign affairs… that means you care
about people on the other side of the world. So foreign affairs is not really an attractive and a
sexy thing for members of Congress to be too proud of, to be outspoken about.” (Coen Blaauw,
interview with author, April 4, 2010) However, some members have safe seats. “If you’re a Dana
Rohrabacher from California and you have 99% Republicans in your district, you’re a safe
district. You can do whatever you want to. If you’re a Steve Chabot in Ohio’s first district,
which district is 50% Democrats, 50% Republicans, you have to be a little bit more extra careful
to stick out your neck for a foreign issue because it means that your constituents will not be
amused.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010).
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Building relationships with congressional staff
Another challenge FAPA faces every day is figuring out which staff to target for
cultivating close relationships. The member staff stay at most for a few years, then they move on
to another office, to the executive branch, or to the private sector. Blaauw says he deals with both
challenges by building friendships that last for years after the members of Congress leave Capitol
Hill.
The staffers are really the number one person to talk to because they’re the
specialist. … members of Congress you take a photo with and you shake hands,
and with staffers, you sit down and you brainstorm, you get stuff done. [It] is
relatively easy to meet up with staffers instead of members of Congress. (Coen
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw said staff exits are difficult to deal with after building up a relationship with staff that
have expertise on Taiwan. “The staffer that’s best is the one who’s likely to leave the office
first.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) Blaauw copes with staff departures
by building relationships with committee staff, who tend to stay longer. “The committee staff
tends to … stick around longer and be a little bit more senior…so it’s key for us, of course, to
know these people.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010) But even in committee
staff, there are problems associated with having too little seniority.
The problem is the members of Congress who are not on the House Foreign
Affairs Committee or who are at the bottom of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
They have junior staffers who also do foreign affairs, so it means he does armed
services issues, he does foreign affairs, he does tax and health…because the
Congressman has five staffers, and he just has to distribute all these 50 issues he
has to deal with every day amongst his staffers. So these guys it’s hard to keep up
with because they move around all the time and just go from one job to the next.
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Despite these challenges with staff exits, Blaauw still finds a way to make turnover work for the
benefit of FAPA.
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Sometimes what works out is that somebody …works for a Congressman in
Arizona, and he becomes the LD [Legislative Director] for a Congresswoman in
Minnesota…he was my pal in the Arizona Congressman’s office. He will still be
my pal when he’s being the LD for Minnesota. … [This] happened to me just a
few days ago. We gain a new friend because my friend, my pal, went to the other
office, and I’m going to ask him to see if he can help me there too. Sometimes it
works out well, but most of the time, we just lose these guys, or they go off the
Hill. It’s critical to know these staffers, it’s relatively easy to get to know them,
but there’s too much overturn…you cannot be friends with all these 435 offices,
it’s too tough, there’s just too much. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April
4, 2010)
Time constraints, then, limit the relationships that Taiwanese activists can form with
congressional staff. Blaauw, Ho, and Van Der Wies are just three people.. However, within these
limits they build strong connections.
Blaauw prefers to start a relationship with a staff member who has very little knowledge
about Taiwan because he knows that staff who are experts on Taiwan will likely have their own
specific ideas about what do to on Taiwan’s behalf, and these ideas may not match FAPA’s
goals.
It’s more beneficial to me if I walk into an office and somebody doesn’t know
anything about Taiwan, because if I go to somebody and talk to him about Taiwan
and he’s completely a blank slate, then whatever we tell them, then they will take
that as a basis for their… future action. … it’s easier to have an empty canvas.
So somebody who’s a specialist usually has his mind set in stuff which is hard to
apply. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw admits that for every staffer who leaves a member of Congress, the blank slate of the
new staffer offers an opportunity to develop an advocate for Taiwan. This simple human
connection seems to be the best way Blaauw builds friendships in Congress.
Blaauw spends the majority of his time keeping Congressional aides informed about
Taiwan and saving them the trouble of having to gather the information for themselves. He
provides information to 140 members of the Taiwan Caucus because “these are members of
Congress who have already shown a little bit of their colors.” This caucus is “a big chunk of
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potential support.” When we spoke, Blaauw was trying to get a resolution introduced about the
U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement. He drafted the resolution and looked for someone in the
Taiwan Caucus to introduce it. If a member of Congress introduced a resolution in the past, that
member is likely to introduce resolutions in the future. He looks for members on the relevant
committees. In this case, he was looking at members on the Ways and Means Committee. He
was also seeking out support from a Taiwan Caucus co-chair. His basic task is
to identify the right person for the right job. I don’t want to go to the Chairman of
the committee because I think that that will … probably not … work. Also I
don’t want to go to somebody who is too at the bottom of the committee because
then the resolution is not going to go anywhere. I want to find somebody who has
been outspoken for Taiwan who has a track record … in all modesty, I’m pretty
good at that sort of thing. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)

In the case of free trade Blaauw had to convince Democrats first to be taken seriously because
the Democrats did not generally support free trade agreements. The Democrats added credibility
to the resolution. Once he obtained support from a Democrat, Blaauw planned to get support
from a Republican, such as Ros-Lehtinen, who was, at the time the ranking member of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, “because she has some gravitas. She’s senior on the committee, so
she will lend a lot of credibility for lower Republicans on the committee for sure.” (Coen
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)

Cultivating relationships with substance and grassroots passion
Blaauw must approach Taiwan issues with two things in mind. The first is that Taiwan
issues must always be considered in the context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He
compares Taiwan-PRC issues with Israel-Palestine issues in terms of the context of every
discussion. Most members of Congress care about the PRC first and Taiwan second, if at all, so
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Blaauw focuses on bringing Taiwan back into the discussion of any issue related to the PRC. “If
China wouldn’t be there, we wouldn’t be having this campaign, we wouldn’t even be lobbying
today.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
The second thing to which Blaauw pays attention is the moral element of Taiwan issues,
because he knows, from past experience, that members of Congress and their staff want to deal
with issues that have feeling, not just with highly-paid lobbyists.
A couple years ago, we did the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act… a follow-up
of the Taiwan Relations Act initiated by Republicans in the Senate. … we had a
meeting with several lobby officers and … the lobby officers said, “This thing is
never going to go through the Senate. Why don’t you just forget about the whole
thing” … These lobbyists were hired by Taiwan’s government. … after the
meeting, the staffers for Jesse Helms, who was the Chairman at the time, said he
was so disgusted by the fact that these lobbyists …were being paid for. We were
the only ones who really cared about the substance… So he said, “From now on, I
am only going to listen to you guys, the grassroots FAPA. Forget about these
guys who were paid by the hour to get something tangible to show to their bosses
in Taiwan, to show that at least they did something.” (Coen Blaauw, interview
with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw said FAPA’s strength comes from the substance behind its advocacy. Members of
Congress are more savvy about who they meet with. “I even know some members of Congress
who say … ‘don’t set appointments for me with lobbyists who can bill their clients by the hour.’
… Members of Congress are getting smarter about it nowadays.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with
author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw gets lots of help from the grassroots organization that FAPA has built since 1982.
FAPA has 55 chapters across the United States. This organizational capacity helps members go
to the district offices of congressional representatives to ask for favors and talk. “If it were just
me here in Washington, D.C., and with Iris and Gerrit … I think we could get something done
because we are an established lobby efficacy organization, but having that capacity at the
grassroots level makes a huge difference.” This grassroots organization helps FAPA do with
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three or four staff what it takes TECRO twelve staff to accomplish. Blaauw told me what a
legislator from Taiwan explained to him.
He was talking to TECRO and he said, “How do you explain FAPA’s success?
They only have three staffers… You guys have 12 staffers, and FAPA is equally
successful and gets as much support from Capitol Hill as you do, maybe even
more.” … The [TECRO] representative said, “No, FAPA doesn’t have only three
staffers. They have over 2,000, 3,000 staffers all over the United States.” That’s
true. That’s why we get so much stuff done, because we are everywhere. (Coen
Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
This grassroots support is useful because the members are so passionate about any issue that
affects Taiwan. Taiwanese-Americans were, understandably, very passionate about ending
martial law, the White Terror, and human rights in the 1980s. Over the past 20 years conditions
have dramatically improved, but the passion remains.
Our members have been in the United States for 30 to 40 years. Their children
were born here. They are Americans. They have been Americans for the past
decades. But they still care about their homeland… about their family and their
friends. I’m always surprised how much Taiwanese-Americans care still about
Taiwan. I’m from Holland and I don’t really care much about Holland…there’s a
depth in their concern and their passion, and they cry all the time…when we have
meetings. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
With this high level of passion FAPA has never lost members, but instead gained them over the
past 20 years, Blaauw says. The members constitute families from all over the United States.
They were very disturbed about martial law in the 1980s, and they are just as passionate today
about issues that are not obviously about human rights abuses.
Even today the little things, the relatively smaller things compared to martial law
and white terror, like the … free trade agreement … with China that is currently
being promoted by the Obama administration… [the members are] probably as
passionate as [they were] under martial law. For the members, they just want to
see Taiwan become a normal country and they can be outraged about the fact that
President Chen cannot come to Washington, D.C. … they can be outraged about
the fact that… Taiwan only had week-long observership at the World Health
Assembly [in 2009] in Geneva under the name Chinese Taipei and they were not
allowed to vote. They are outraged about these things in an equal way as… when
Taiwan was in really … bad shape where people were thrown in jail all the time.

174

So passion and the concern is still there. (Coen Blaauw, interview with author,
April 4, 2010)
This passion does not always translate into congressional support because members of Congress
do not always share the same level of interest as Taiwanese-Americans. Blaauw admits that
FAPA’s job is tougher “at the moment” because members of Congress will say that, with martial
law over, there is no longer a compelling reason for Congress to come to Taiwan’s aid. Members
of Congress will point to bigger problems around the world than what is currently happening in
Taiwan or to Taiwan.
Still, despite the differences in passion, Taiwanese-Americans still get the attention of
members of Congress and their staff because of their high status and willingness to contribute
money. Blaauw said FAPA seeks out any Taiwanese-Americans who are willing to do
something. Fortunately, many Taiwanese-Americans have high social and economic status as
doctors, business professionals, lawyers, engineers, professors, and investors. This status gives
them an extra voice with members of Congress. They volunteer for congressional campaigns and
donate money to fund those campaigns. “Congressmen Steve Rothman from New Jersey at one
point a couple years ago in a… meeting with our members, said, you know, ‘If there’s anyplace I
want to have a heart attack, it’s here and it’s right now because I’ve never seen so many doctors
in one room’…. our members are all doctors, scholars and professors.” (Coen Blaauw, interview
with author, April 4, 2010)
To compensate for the lack of official representation, grassroots members of FAPA start
building relationships with members of Congress at a very early stage. Unlike Jewish voters who
elect members of Congress, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz, to represent their concerns about Israel
or Cuban-Americans who elect members of Congress from Florida and New Jersey to represent
their concerns about Cuba, Taiwanese-Americans do not have the voting power to elect their
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own members of Congress. Occasionally a Taiwanese-American gets elected to Congress, such
as in the case of former Rep. David Wu (D-OR), but that is rare. FAPA encourages its grassroots
members to cultivate relationships with politicians who are at the very early stages of their
careers so that these politicians become personal friends and loyal supporters of Taiwan in
Congress. An example is Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH).
He used to be a House member… elected in 1990. … in 1989 we were already
talking to him in Ohio, in his district of Elyria close to Cleveland, where we sat
down with him… he had never really done anything Taiwan-related, didn’t know
much. … he became our number one supporter in the House of Representatives
and later in the Senate. … we just sent people who knew him, who were anxious
to meet with him, who could take him for dinner… educated him from day one,
and that’s how we planted the seed for bigger Taiwan support… 20 years later.
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)

As the chart below shows, Sen. Brown has always had the luxury of a safe seat. In the House his
margin of victory fell below ten points only in 1994 during the Republican sweep of Congress.
In the Senate he was elected with a 13-point margin.
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FAPA is a registered under 501(c)(3), so it cannot give money to members of Congress.
However, members frequently give lots of money. The money provides extra support, but the
real support is the relationship, the friendship, that develops over decades. “I always say that the
secret to success is to make friends with members of Congress. You don’t say no to a friend.
And so we’re very smart …. honest and true. I think it’s just human nature, human interaction.”
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Michael Fonte echoes this point about seeking out congressional support at the very early
stage of a politician’s career. In the case of Sherrod Brown, a key member of FAPA helped
Brown understand Taiwan issues.
There is a man there – Masal Yu – who worked with Senator Brown before he
was even a congressman, helped him understand about what it was about Taiwan,
helped organize people in the district, I think west of Cleveland, and from that
beginning kept in constant contact with Sherrod Brown. And, you know, people
don’t forget the fact that you helped them when they were nothing. Same with a
congressman from Ohio named Steve Chabot, and the stories go on like that.
[There are] a number of people who are strong supporters of Taiwan in the
Taiwan Caucus in the Congress who were early on helped by TaiwaneseAmericans. … Robert Wexler, from Florida. Iliana Ross-Lichtenen from Florida.
Dana Robacher is one of the key people in the Taiwan caucus. He’s just an oldtime Republican conservative who’s anti-Communist and loves Taiwan because
it’s not China, shall we say. It’s different people, but the strongest supporters I
would say come from people who are touched by the Taiwanese story as told by
Taiwanese Americans. (Michael Fonte, interview with author, October 22, 2008)
Going to a member of Congress early pays dividends in political support for the duration of the
member’s career. FAPA members do not have to go to Congress to share information. FAPA
members can go to people who are running for Congress, when the politicians barely have any
support outside of a few close friends, and educate them, fund their campaigns, help them
understand the nature of Taiwan’s issues, to achieve a deep personal impact that will produce
political support in Congress. We can conclude that FAPA, recognizing its limited resources,
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pursues a long-term investment strategy. It invests early, when its limited resources mean much
more than they would to a well-established politician.

Explaining FAPA’s continuing congressional influence
Blaauw attributes FAPA’s success in Congress to its careful cultivation of relationships
among members and their staff. These relationships start by persuading members of Congress
that Taiwan’s issues represent “an American package of freedom, democracy, and human rights.
It’s an American piece of wrapping paper.” Blaauw says members of Congress and their staff
know American history, so they can easily recognize the American story in Taiwan’s story,
making it hard to say no to resolutions that represent Taiwan’s issues. Blaauw uses the language
of self-determination, freedom, human rights, democracy, safety, and security.
Blaauw drew a parallel between the American experience and Taiwan. When John
Adams was representing the American colonies to the French during the Revolutionary War,
Adams worked with French Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes. Adams articulated
Vergennes’s American policy: “He means… to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from
drowning, but not to lift our heads out of water.” (John Adams, David McCullough, 2001, 233)
Blaauw believes the United States plays the same role with Taiwan today, and he is, in effect,
playing John Adams’ role.
Blaauw calls Taiwan a “good product”, whereas the Chinese have a “very bad product”
in Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkistan, and prison camps. The Chinese can throw money at Congress,
but the money will not go far. Yet, while the issues have nearly unanimous support, the
challenge is to connect the general issues with specific resolutions. Blaauw’s job is to make this
connection explicit every day. “We don’t get rich from this, we don’t make money, it’s not for
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our own self-interest. It’s because we care about our brothers, sisters, families in Taiwan. It’s an
unselfish campaign that we’re involved in.” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
This emphasis on self-determination, freedom, human rights, democracy, safety and
security does not mention independence. That is a very strategic decision by Blaauw and FAPA.
Blaauw said the focus on self-determination helps shift the discussion to procedural issues
instead of outcomes.
The philosophy there… is it’s not up to us to determine someone’s future, it’s not
up to FAPA or to me Coen Blaauw being from the Netherlands in the first place
… So we believe it’s an American value, self-determination. Let the majority of
the people in Taiwan determine Taiwan’s future, whether that means unification,
whether that means independence, that’s only up to the people of Taiwan to
decide. So we believe that is a better way to sell our product, and ultimately, you
know, we believe that the people of Taiwan will vote for independence or will
choose independence, whether it’s through a referendum or any democratic
mechanism. … The current policy of the United States is that the future of
Taiwan should be determined with the express consent of the people of Taiwan.
(Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
Blaauw said the people at FAPA believe the United States is the only entity that can work with
the PRC to help Taiwan determine its own future.
In addition, the American political system, with its institutional separation, is ideal for
addressing these issues. FAPA focuses on Congress instead of the White House or the State
Department because the White House has few access points while Congress has many, and the
State Department represents foreign interests while Congress represents domestic interests.
Congress is the best place to put pressure on the White House, the State Department, and the
government of Taiwan. “We have the grassroots capacity, so we build up momentum in
Congress, and the bills we write and do, they usually authorize… the State Department to do
[something].” (Coen Blaauw, interview with author, April 4, 2010)
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Conclusion
In her study of FAPA’s successes and failures, Chen (2007) asks whether FAPA’s
success depends on “the nature of the campaign issues or the domestic structure of the United
States.” Chen examines five campaigns, including the blacklist campaign (1982-92), when
FAPA tried successfully to get the KMT to abolish its blacklist of citizens and non-citizens; the
birthplace campaign (1992-94,) when it tried successfully to let Taiwanese-Americans to state
"Taiwan" as their birthplace on their U.S. passports; the U.N. campaign (1992-present), when
FAPA promoted Taiwan's bid for participation in the United Nations; the WHO campaign (1997present), when FAPA campaigned for Taiwan's full membership of the WHO; and the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act (1999-2000), when FAPA campaign for passage of legislation to
improve Taiwan’s military arms. Chen concludes that FAPA’s success depends on its ability to
find champions in Congress and on the nature of the causes it advocates. (DeGregorio, 1997,
reaches the same conclusion, noting that a “network of champions” is critical.) Causes that
depart from human rights and self-determination concerns encounter obstacles in Congress. This
chapter has revealed why human rights and self-determination matter so much. Moreover, this
chapter reveals that both the nature of FAPA’s issues and the domestic political structure of the
United States are important.
FAPA’s strategy has become more sophisticated. Not only does FAPA “find champions
in Congress”, FAPA creates champions in Congress before they get to Congress. FAPA gains
access not only to the policy-making apparatus in the United States (Risse-Kappen 1999), FAPA
gains access to the political process that provides the input for the policy making apparatus. The
political process includes the uses of primary and general elections to select congressional
representatives. This is a key finding of this chapter. Congress will pass a concurrent resolution
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expressing the “sense of Congress” on a given issue, but that resolution starts with a human
being – a member of Congress, a staffer, a FAPA employee, a FAPA member – and FAPA
devotes its resources to the human being, both in Congress and on the campaign trail that turns
candidates into policy-makers (Lowery and Brasher 2004) Money becomes an important
component of this process (Kollman 1998). FAPA cannot contribute money to Congressional
candidates, but its members often contribute time and money (Lin 2006).
FAPA’s strategy from one campaign to the next reveals how it became more effective. With
the blacklist campaign, FAPA expanded its focus from Congress to the White House when Blaauw
wrote a letter to President George H. W. Bush in 1992.8 With the birthplace issue, FAPA expanded
its congressional efforts from resolutions to legislation. This was successful because it amended an
annual bill instead of creating stand-alone legislation (Chen 2007). The UN campaign failed because
it was too political and had no connection to human rights or self-determination. The WHO
campaign made explicit connection to human rights. The 1999 Earthquake and SARS epidemic
turned the issue into affective politics so that members of Congress were deeply personally affected.
Congress passed the law and Clinton signed it. The TSEA had a too obviously political agenda and it
was an issue that was difficult to portray as involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or legal
equality of opportunity (Chen 2007). With these lessons in mind, FAPA is focusing more on making
the human rights issue explicit to members of Congress, and putting those issues into non-binding
resolutions instead of legislation.

8

http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/china/1999_0182_F/c0034_01/c0034_01_238921/c0034_0
1_238921.pdf.s
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: Using the Power Game in Reverse to Change the Home Country
This study has attempted to make ten contributions to the literature. First, with regard to
Congress, this study aims to improve on Mayhew’s (1974) approach to studying Congress.
Mayhew argued that getting re-elected is the proximate goal for every member of Congress, and
that defeat is always a possibility. The findings of this study corroborate Mayhew’s argument,
but also give the other half of the story. There are obvious cases when members of Congress
have become so involved in foreign policy issues that they lose their bids for re-election.
Prominent examples include Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), who lost his re-election bid in
the 1970s after his constituents decided he focused too much on foreign policy and not enough
on Arkansas, and Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY), who lost his re-election bid in 1980 after
his opponent argued that Wolff cared more about foreign policy than his district. This study finds
that, for members of Congress who have safe seats, they have the luxury to focus on foreign
policy issues. Sen. Edward Kennedy, Sen. Claiborne Pell, Rep. Stephen Solarz and Rep. James
Leach all had safe seats, rarely getting less than 70% in an election cycle, and often having no
opponent. This was the case for many other members of Congress who got involved with
Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan and Uganda.9 Thus, these
political entrepreneurs could afford to absorb the transaction costs that are normally associated
with getting heavily involved in foreign policy issues (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
Rep. Solarz, as the most active political entrepreneur in this study, is the perfect example
of the benefit of a safe seat. Friedman explains Solarz
felt that he was in a uniquely fortunate position, for essentially as long as he
delivered on the issue of most concern to his constituency having to do with
Israel, he was a free agent on almost all other international issues to vote his
9

See Appendix B
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conscience, and he really had a conscience. … You did not want to get America
involved in ways that led to the quagmire in Vietnam, but you wanted to do what
you could to promote democracy and human rights and to fight against
authoritarianism. So he did have that as a global vision. He had that as a thrust
from his earliest time in politics.” (Edward Friedman, interview with author,
February 5, 2010)
Solarz may be an extreme version of a foreign policy entrepreneur, but any member of Congress
who has both a safe seat and strong moral convictions is likely to become a foreign policy
entrepreneur if he or she meets the requirements of the model outlined in chapter two. If a
member learns about human rights abuses in another country and is deeply personally affected
by it, s/he is likely to use whatever resources are available to end the abuses.
Second, this study develops the concept of political entrepreneurship by showing the
conditions under which it is most likely to happen, both in a formal political context, such as the
U.S. Congress, and in informal political life, in the cases of citizens and congressional staff.
Political entrepreneurs organize diverse coalitions of supporters to achieve goals that they cannot
achieve based solely on their own roles. The conditions include: the humanistic values of the
political entrepreneurs and their supporters; the appropriate historical moment or sequence of
events that makes entrepreneurship desirable despite risks; and the ability to assemble supporters
based on both rational and affective political considerations. Humanistic values are essential in
this study because a political entrepreneur is not just a politician who wants to win an election
with a bigger margin of victory, or a citizen who wants to help pass legislation. Political
entrepreneurs have specific targets that include human rights and democratic processes, both in
the United States and around the world. The appropriate historical moment or sequence of events
is important because the political entrepreneur responds to events and problems that are
important right now. As in business entrepreneurship, good timing often means the difference
between success and failure because good timing helps the political entrepreneur assemble the

183

right coalition of supporters to accomplish desired goals. A political entrepreneur uses both
rational and affective politics because he or she understands that supporters want to solve
problems and sustain affective relationships with the entrepreneur. A political entrepreneur uses
his or her affective relationships as leverage to solve problems.
The idea of good timing raises an important question: are we likely to find political
entrepreneurs today and in the future instead of during the specific historical time period from
the 1970s to the 1980s? To answer this question we need to consider what was important about
the 1970s and 1980s. We already know that many of the political entrepreneurs in the study used
their careers in Congress as an extension of their experiences in the social movements of the
1960s and 1970s. We could logically deduce that, once the people with those experiences left
Congress, the amount of political entrepreneurs would decrease. We also know that many
political entrepreneurs responded to human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s. We could
logically deduce that fewer human rights abuses in the present and future would lead to a
decrease in political entrepreneurs.
Writing in 2011, we can attempt to answer these questions: Who are the political
entrepreneurs today? Are there still human rights abuses around the world? The answer to both
questions is yes. One political entrepreneur today is Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), who was
appointed to the Senate in 2008 to replace Sen. Hillary Clinton. Sen. Gillibrand was the
organizing force behind the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, the law that prohibited gay and
lesbian soldiers from serving openly in the U.S. armed forces. She saw the law as a violation of
the human rights of gays and lesbians. She had important friendships with gays and lesbians.
These friendships motivated her to take this issue on as new senator. The issue had been dormant
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since 1993 when the Clinton administration first adopted it. Sen. Gillibrand became a champion
of gay rights and convinced the Senate to repeal the law in 2010.
Another political entrepreneur today is President Barack Obama. During a wave of
political revolutions in the Middle East and Africa, Pres. Obama used the U.S. military and an
international coalition to prevent Libyan President Colonel Muammar Qaddafi from killing
residents in Libya. Pres. Obama has also made public statements supporting dissidents in Egypt,
Syria, Bahrain, and other countries in the Middle East that are currently experiencing political
crackdowns.
Pres. Obama and Sen. Gillibrand demonstrate that political entrepreneurs still exist.
However, there seems to be a decline in political entrepreneurs since the 1990s for three reasons.
First, the people who were the most active political entrepreneurs, such as Rep. Solarz, left
Congress. Solarz was a representative of the humanistic values expressed by his generation of
politicians. Since the 1990s, many people who had formative experiences in the social
movements of the 1960s and 70s have left public life. They have been replaced by people who
have more narrow and rational considerations in public life, including a focus on staying in
office. Second, the conditions for getting elected and staying in Congress have changed since the
1990s. Congress has experienced three wave elections since 1990 that produced a change in
control of Congress: 1994, 2006, 2010. In the 1970s and 1980s Congress was controlled by
Democrats by large numbers. Thus, Congress has become more competitive, and this
competition has forced more members to focus on fundraising and maintaining their bases of
political support instead of addressing human rights problems in the United States and around the
world. Third, the world has liberalized and stabilized politically since the 1990s, with two
exceptions. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 revealed ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia that
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produced human rights violations, with Serbs fighting Croats in Bosnia and Kosovo. No
members of Congress responded to these events, but President Clinton ordered a military
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to stop Serbia’s human rights abuses. In Africa, Rwanda and
Somalia both experienced genocide and famine in the early 1990s. President George H. W. Bush
responded to the famine in Somalia with Operation Restore Hope. However, no members of
Congress responded to these events. Despite these exceptions, human rights abuses seem to have
decreased since the 1990s, meaning there are fewer events that create political entrepreneurs.
Third, this study demonstrates that members of Congress respond with their hearts as
well as their minds to issues involving other countries. As a result, ethnic interest groups do not
need votes or money. However, presence in a district is essential so that they can go to their
representatives and tell a powerful story that affects the member of Congress and/or the staff on a
deeply personal level. In this vein, this study also challenges the rational choice approach to
political science in general and U.S.-Taiwan relations in particular. Two such studies of U.S.Taiwan relations examine electoral support in a district, financial contributions, and presence of
U.S.-Taiwan trade in a district (Kastner and Grob 2009, Wu 2009). This study demonstrates that
the rational choice approach provides at best a partial understanding.
Fourth, this study reveals what is inside the “black box” of a member of Congress. Most
political scientists (see Hall 1996) take personal motivation as a given, as a function of ambition
and district interests, but this study reveals that personal motivation can depend heavily on a
member’s interaction with ethnic interest groups. This finding requires an inclusive approach for
scholars of American politics and Congress. In addition to studying only members of Congress
and their staff, scholars should study how members of Congress interact with different ethnic
groups in their communities and through their extended families. More immigrant groups are
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moving into congressional districts, making districts more representative of the world. More
people are marrying citizens from other parts of the world, creating global families. A member of
Congress who interacts with Indian-Americans, Nigerian-Americans, Asian-Americans,
Brazilian-Americans, etc., in his or her district or extended family will likely be exposed to a
global list of issues as these people communicate concerns about their home countries. It is
important for scholars to understand exactly which interactions become long-term affective
relationships that motivate members of Congress to take action.
Fifth, shifting focus from Congress to interest groups, this study reveals that ethnic
interest groups take advantage of what Smith (1988) called “the power game”. Politicians in
Washington bring a fight to the public and thus change the nature of the fight, an insight that
Schattschneider (1961) discovered when studying how crowds respond to street fights. The
crowd becomes the “semi-sovereign people”, and if a politician can get the crowd on his/her
side, he can win the power game. This study finds that FAPA, like other ethnic lobbies, gets the
crowd on its side of a political fight and thus changes the nature of the fight. Yet, unlike
members of Congress, FAPA does not “go public”. Instead, it mobilizes its passionate crowd to
place pressure on access points in government. To be precise, not only do the grassroots
Taiwanese-Americans play a decisive role, but their passion over every issue turns everything
into a fight. Since they are dispersed geographically, small groups in every member’s district
can bring the fight to any member of Congress. FAPA is just the organizer of the crowd, sending
it signals about where to direct its volunteer activity, its money, and its passion.
Sixth, this study demonstrates the intertwined nature of international, transnational, and
domestic politics. The cases of the Soviet Union, Uganda and Taiwan demonstrate that countries
with flagrant and sustained human rights abuses will prompt their citizens to seek refuge in host
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countries that provide political liberties and economic resources. Diaspora groups will settle in
host countries for decades, learning the political system and acquiring political power. This
political education and influence will likely translate into the host country’s foreign policy
toward the home country. This has already been studied in the case of Ukraine and Canada
(Schreyer 1994). Similar studies will likely demonstrate how international-transnationaldomestic politics work in other politically open, economically rich countries that attract refugees
and exiles from countries with oppressive regimes. In the case of Taiwan, Taiwanese-American
activists organized within an open, geographically-dispersed political system and put pressure on
Congress to tell Taiwan’s government to liberalize while the Reagan administration said nothing
(Cohen 1988, Chi 2002, Fu 1990).
Seventh, based on this interaction between international, transnational, and domestic
politics, this study helps international relations theorists to recognize the importance of non-state
actors in the international system. Moreover, the fact that non-state actors can have such an
impact casts the autonomy of the system as an independent force in doubt, making it more
reflective of countries’ foreign policies vis-à-vis their domestic politics than anything inherent in
the system itself (Cleveland 1979).
International relations theorists generally rely on three sets of ideas to explain
international relations and the foreign policies of countries. One intuitive idea is that
international relations can be reduced to each country’s foreign policy, which reflects its
domestic politics as a mirror or “Second Image” (Lowi 1967; Milbrath 1967; Rosenau 1961,
1963, 1968; Waltz 1959, 1979). A more radical idea is that international relations constitute a
system that is a causal force, with countries’ foreign policies and domestic politics reflecting the
international system as a “second image reversed” (Gourevitch 1978). A compromise between
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these two ideas is that foreign policy actors operate on the international and domestic levels
simultaneously as a two-level game (Putnam 1988) by linking domestic politics and international
relations through specific foreign policies (Rosenau 1969, 1973). These theories are inadequate
because they focus solely on state actors and international institutions that facilitate interactions
between state actors. They ignore non-state actors, including Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) and transnational actors who campaign for causes that cross national borders. A brief
examination of how these theories explain U.S.-Taiwan policy, from 1972 to 1979, will
demonstrate why they are limited if they do not include transnational activists.
If we view foreign policy as driven by the international system (“second image
reversed”), international relations scholars have three ways to explain America’s abandonment of
Taiwan: Realism, which includes Classical Realism, Systemic Realism, and Offensive Realism;
Liberalism; and Constructivism. Classical Realists explain that we must understand U.S.-Taiwan
relations as a victim of balance-of-power politics between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States had withdrawn its military forces
from Vietnam and feared increased Soviet influence in Asia and Africa. Recognizing the PRC
was a way to counter this influence by using “the China Card” against the Soviet Union (Sutter
and Baron 1979), especially as Soviet-American relations soured with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Systemic Realists take a similar approach, explaining that as the United States
withdrew from Asia it needed an emerging superpower to manage the region by placing pressure
on such states as North Korea and Vietnam. Offensive Realists explain that the United States
wanted to match its declining post-Vietnam military strength with PRC’s emerging military
strength to force the Soviet Union to worry more about potential conflict with the PRC than
about potential conflict with the United States in Europe. The PRC’s emerging military and
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economic power provided a critical distraction for the Soviet Union. Within this dynamic,
therefore, the United States was forced to sever its ties with Taiwan.
Liberal scholars shift the focus from the international system to the domestic conditions
in the United States and Taiwan to explain why American politicians thought a renewed
relationship with the PRC was beneficial for the United States even if it hurt America’s
relationship with Taiwan. The United States was facing enormous domestic political pressures
during the 1970s, and so an improved relationship with the PRC gave political capital to
American leaders in Congress and the executive branch (Kirby, et al. 2005). Congress and the
president (from the Nixon administration through the Carter administration) were vying for
control over American foreign policy as a reaction to the Vietnam War. Taiwan became a
political weapon for the executive branch against Congress. Congress wanted to be informed
about any changes in policy toward Taiwan, but the president refused to satisfactorily inform
Congress, instead keeping the negotiations completely secret (Sutter 1980).
Constructivists shift the focus from the international system to what was called “the
China Lobby” (Chao 1990; Koen 1974) in the United States: a collection of individuals and
politicians who helped the United States maintain ties with Taiwan. The United States had
maintained military, economic and cultural ties with the Nationalist government and the people
of Taiwan for 30 years after the KMT was forced to move from the Mainland to Taiwan. Many
individuals in “the China Lobby” had helped maintain these connections and worried about the
United States abandoning a friend and simultaneously sending a message to other countries that
the United States could no longer be trusted as a loyal ally. They interpreted the recognition of
the PRC as another signal after the end of the Vietnam War that American power in Asia was
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declining. They feared that America’s allies in Europe and the Middle East would no longer
consider America a reliable partner in maintaining peace and economic prosperity.
The different variants of Realism offer explanations for why the United States was
willing to sacrifice Taiwan to recognize the PRC. Liberalism offers an explanation for how the
recognition process took place, with a surprise announcement from President Carter without
bothering to consult with Congress. Constructivism offers an explanation for the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), which maintained unofficial American military, economic and cultural ties
with Taiwan after official ties ended. Thus, the period of time from Nixon’s visit to the PRC in
1972 until the passage of the TRA in April 1979 can be sufficiently explained by International
Relations theories. However, after April 1979 the theories lose their explanatory power to
account for changes in American policy toward Taiwan in the 1980s.
As I argued in the introduction, major international relations theories do not recognize the
value of non-state actors. Yet, as this study has demonstrated, non-state actors can be very
valuable in helping to direct the foreign policy of a country, in this case U.S. policy toward
Taiwan. Realism would ignore the presence of the Taiwan independence movement in the
United States. Liberalism would acknowledge Taiwanese-Americans as just another ethnic
interest group placing pressure on Congress, but it would ignore the transnational nature of that
pressure. Constructivism would acknowledge the relationship between “the China Lobby” and
the official representatives of the KMT, but it would ignore the relationships between the
members of the Gang of Four and the Taiwan independence activists. This study builds on
Constructivism, but improves it so that we understand why relationships matter.
Eighth, this study makes a contribution to International Relations theory by improving
our understanding of Constructivism. Specifically, this study adds bonding social capital,
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through affective relationships, to the study of international relations and foreign policy. Scholars
of international relations understand that international relations have an emotional component
when it comes to waging war (Femenia 2000). This study has demonstrated that international
relations have emotional components for everything else when the subject connects in any way
with human rights. When foreign policy makers learn about human rights abuses, they often use
their emotional desire to see the abuses stopped to change an aspect of their country’s foreign
policy. Foreign policy actors keep plugging away until the human rights abuses stop or until the
actors run out of tools to use. In the cases of members of Congress who changed U.S. foreign
policy toward Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan and Uganda, the
only country that did not stop its abuses was the Soviet Union. For those countries that did stop,
it took many years of activity by the foreign policy maker. Bonding social capital becomes an
essential concept for explaining why foreign policy makers persist in trying different tools,
despite evidence that their efforts do not produce immediate results. The relationships that
foreign policy makers create with each other in Congress, in their offices, and with ethnic
interest groups, provide them with energy and staying power.
Ninth, this study gives scholars of U.S. human rights policy a more effective method to
study foreign policy legislation. Instead of merely studying the laws themselves and the political
processes that shaped those laws (Forsythe 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991; Forsythe and Welch
1986), scholars can use the model developed in chapter two to identify the causal chain that
ultimately produces a specific foreign policy. The first element of the model is international
provocations: a country must do something that violates the internationally recognized human
rights of its citizens. Second, a member of Congress must receive information about this
violation. Third, a member of Congress must be deeply personally affected. Fourth, a member of
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Congress must be positioned in such a way that the effort of eliminating the violation is easy.
The second and third elements of this model can point scholars to productive areas of research.
International human rights violations are easy to find, but NGOs that report on them, and
refugees who flee from them, present great opportunities for scholarship. Researchers can
examine the personal lives of members of Congress, including their formative years before
entering Congress, their relatives, and their interaction with staff. The third element demonstrates
that a member of Congress is deeply personally affected by a human rights abuse because of his
or her human relationships. Scholars can learn a great deal about American foreign policy by
tracing these human relationships.
Tenth, this study helps us resolve some debates about the proper roles of the presidency
and Congress in foreign policy. Frank and Weisband characterized the shift of foreign policy
control, from the presidency to Congress, as a revolution. The institutional and behavioral
changes in the House and the Senate made a difference in American domestic and foreign policy,
but there is much disagreement among scholars and critics about whether the changes are in the
best interests of the United States. On the one hand, critics claim that the Congress has become
too powerful, constraining the executive branch (Crovitz 1990; Jones and Marini 1988). On the
other, supporters of Congress argue that it is merely the servant of the executive branch in
foreign policy (Koh 1988; Hinckley 1994; Weissman 1995). Yet, in order to truly appreciate the
shift of influence from the executive branch to Congress, we must understand all the ways
Congress influences American foreign policy, with legislation constituting just one mechanism.
Others include simple and concurrent resolutions, informal advice, consultation, direct dealings
with foreign governments, public appeals through the press, hearings, floor statements, letters,
and lawsuits against the president (Burgin 1993). “Congress is a player in the foreign policy
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arena and can influence policy. Sometimes legislation achieves intended results; sometimes
legislation succeeds in unexpected ways; sometimes the threat of legislation generates desired
actions; and sometimes nonlegislative mechanisms accomplish members’ goals.” (Burgin 1993,
350)
The shift from the executive branch to the legislative branch in foreign policy presented
mixed results, Franck and Weisband argue, because the executive branch is inherently better at
some activities than Congress, while conversely Congress is inherently better at some activities
than the executive branch. They note that congressional legislation has virtues that the executive
branch cannot match: publicity, legitimacy, immutability, comprehensiveness, and universality.
Unlike the executive branch, congressional activity is publicly debated. When Congress passes
legislation and the president signs it, the law acquires a legitimacy that is unmatched by a
bureaucrat or a cabinet secretary. The huge effort to pass legislation renders change very
difficult, except in extraordinary circumstances, thus giving a measure of order and predictability
to foreign policy. Given this immutability, legislators try to foresee all possible contingencies
and account for them in the law, thus making law comprehensive. Finally, the comprehensive
reach of the law makes the application of the law universal. The executive branch, in contrast, is
much more suited to interacting with countries outside of the public eye because of the
sensitivity of negotiations at high levels. This secrecy gives the executive branch flexibility for
rapid responses, and these responses are necessarily particular to special circumstances.
Fundamentally, Franck and Weisband argue that congressional legislation is appropriate
when American foreign policy requires a framework for dealing with all countries, but not when
a specific country temporarily presents a unique foreign policy challenge to the United States. “A
rule of thumb might be that legislation should not be used to prohibit Presidential initiatives in
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unforeseeable circumstances. … Similarly, the legislative quality of comprehensiveness can be
useful in advancing a policy where the contingencies are essentially foreseeable: economic
assistance, nuclear exports, trade.” (Franck and Weisband 1979, 161) The rise of Congress in
controlling American foreign policy was, the authors say, a necessary corrective to the de facto
bifurcation of the Constitution, in which there was “one set of principles governing the
distribution of power over domestic affairs, another for foreign relations” (Franck and Weisband
1979, 156). Yet, Congress should still recognize the limitations of legislative power in the
foreign policy arena. The Washington Post criticized the activities of “435 Secretaries of State”
in the House, and Harvard Professor Stanley Hoffmann wrote in the New York Times that
individual members of Congress insisted on having their own policy on every foreign issue
(Franck and Weisband 1979, 211).
This study has presented six cases of congressional activity in foreign policy targeted at
specific countries: Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and Uganda,
starting in the late 1970s and continuing to the present day. These cases help us evaluate the
concerns about Congress that Franck and Weisband express. They present a persuasive argument
that congressional legislation has the virtues of publicity, legitimacy, immutability,
comprehensiveness, and universality. They recommended that congressional legislation is
appropriate when American foreign policy requires a framework for dealing with all countries,
but not when a specific country temporarily presents a unique foreign policy challenge to the
United States. Yet, in the cases presented in this study, each case presented a unique foreign
policy challenge to the United States that was successfully addressed by congressional
legislation.
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For Cambodia, Rep. Solarz (D-NY) worked with Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) to change
the refugee laws so that 15,000 Cambodians could enter the United States immediately as a
group. Next, Solarz worked with Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA) to pass legislation authorizing $5
million in economic aid and lethal aid to the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR) in Cambodia.
Solarz created the UN Interim Trusteeship Perm Five Plan that, with the Senate’s endorsement,
helped the UN administer democratic elections in Cambodia. Finally, the Senate provided covert
lethal to the NCR and overt economic aid to the children of Cambodia.
For El Salvador, Congress provided Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Salvadorans in
the Immigration Act of 1990. Congress has extended TPS for El Salvador and used TPS for other
countries experiencing civil unrest. Congress also passed legislation in November 1990 that used
military assistance to El Salvador to pressure the government to investigate human rights abuses
and reach a peace agreement with the FMLN. Rep. Moakley (D-MA) sponsored legislation to
shut down the School of the Americas (SOA) that had trained the military police who killed
Jesuit priests in El Salvador. This legislation failed to become law, but it started a dialogue with
the Pentagon that ultimately changed the leadership and culture at the SOA.
For South Africa, Congress passed Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) over
President Reagan’s veto. The CAAA became the catalyst for President F. W. De Klerk to release
Nelson Mandela from prison and end Apartheid. By 1991 President George H. W. Bush lifted
sanctions. South Africa ended its state of emergency and allowed opposition political parties.
For the Soviet Union, Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) and Sen. Clifford Case (R-NJ) helped
create the U.S. Helsinki Commission to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Accords, which was an international alliance that
monitored human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. Representative Thomas Vanik (D-OH) and
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Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) helped pass the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974
Trade Act, which made American-Soviet trade policy contingent on Jewish citizens being
allowed to leave the Soviet Union. The Helsinki Accords helped changed global norms on
human rights, thus speeding up the demise of Communism (Thomas 1997).
For Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which recognized the
importance of human rights and democracy in Taiwan. In 1982, in response to the killing of Prof.
Wen-Cheng Chen, Congress passed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act which denied
arms to any country engaged in a “consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment
directed against individuals in the United States.” In 1983 Congress passed a resolution calling
for Taiwan’s future to “be settled peacefully, free of coercion and in a manner acceptable to the
people on Taiwan.” In 1985, in response to the assassination of Henry Liu, Congress passed a
resolution calling for an extradition agreement and cooperation between American and Taiwan
authorities to solve the murder. Congress passed an amendment to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986, calling for democracy on Taiwan. Also in 1986 Congress
passed a resolution calling on the Taiwan authorities to allow the formation of genuine
opposition parties, end censorship and guarantee freedom of speech, expression and assembly,
and move towards full representative government. In 1987 Congress passed an amendment to the
State Department Authorization Bill calling for sustained progress “towards a fully democratic
system of government on Taiwan.” Taiwan ended martial law in July 1987. In 1992 Congress
passed a resolution stating the need to end the blacklist so that Taiwan-born residents of the
United States could return to their homeland. The KMT phased out the blacklist system that year.
For Uganda, Congress passed a resolution condemning Uganda after the murder of an
archbishop. Congress successfully placed pressure on the State Department to stop issuing visas
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to Uganda citizens who worked for President Idi Amin. Congress also successfully placed
pressure on the FAA to deny certification to Amin’s pilots after they trained in Texas. Congress
passed a resolution urging the president to support and implement measures to discourage United
States support of Uganda. In response to this resolution, the coffee industry started a boycott to
deprive Idi Amin of coffee revenues, which provided a majority of Uganda’s export income.
This resolution also sent a signal to Tanzania to send a military force after Amin, which caused
him to flee Uganda.
These six cases demonstrate that congressional legislation and resolutions that are
specifically targeted to a country can have a big, and sometimes immediate, impact on the target
country’s domestic politics and international relations. In the case of binding legislation this is to
be expected. In the case of non-binding congressional resolutions, this is both puzzling and
surprising. Since non-binding congressional resolutions lack the force of law, we should expect
them to have less impact than binding legislation signed into law by the president. Yet, in the
cases of Taiwan and Uganda, non-binding resolutions that advocated specific processes or results
in the target country had just as much, if not greater impact, than binding legislation. One
explanation is that a non-binding resolution communicates congressional intent more clearly than
binding legislation because a resolution has broader scope while binding legislation has a
narrow, technical focus. Another explanation is that binding legislation is necessarily rare
because it is difficult both to pass and to get signed into law. In contrast, a non-binding
resolution is easy to pass and does not require a presidential signature, meaning that Congress
can pass many resolutions about a variety of topics regarding a target country. If many members
of Congress submit resolutions over a period of months or years, this sends the target country
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messages that accumulate and place pressure on the government. Countries that depend heavily
on the United States for trade and military assistance will likely respond to this constant pressure.
One final point closes this study. From an analytical perspective, it is important to
understand the role of political entrepreneurs in the United States, both in public life, such as the
U.S. Congress, and in private life as citizens. From a normative perspective, the influence of
citizens and congressional staff has increased since the 1970s. Scholars assume that members of
Congress lead their staff, but, as Smith (1988) notes, the staff often have much more power than
members of Congress. This can be both good and bad for members of Congress. It is good when
members of Congress have expert staff who can write great legislation. Members of Congress
can take the credit when the political process works, and blame their staff when the political
process fails. Staffs become the scapegoats when they do things that show members of Congress
in a bad light. Yet, it is worth thinking about whether staff should have this much power and
influence. The only way to reduce the power of congressional staffs is to increase the number of
members of Congress. The Senate is fixed constitutionally at two senators per state. That leaves
the House as a potential growth area. The size of the House has remained fixed at 435 since 1910
for no legal or constitutional reason, even though the population of the United States tripled.
Scholars should explore the impact of increasing the size of the House so that it is more
representative of the population of the United States.
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Appendix A: Methodology
Research Design
The United States served as the focal point of the transnational activity of TIM in this
dissertation. Even though TIM established a presence in several countries where its members had
immigrated and organized, including Japan, the Philippines, Canada, Sweden, and other
European countries, the largest concentration of Taiwanese is in the United States.
Data collection
Interviews were done with key FAPA employees. Interviews with key congressional
figures, included former Rep. Solarz, former Rep. Leach. Interviews with congressional staff
included Nancy Soderberg, former aide to Sen. Kennedy, and Edward Friedman, former aide to
Rep. Solarz. Public interviews included Fulton Armstrong, former aide to Rep. Leach, and
Thomas Hughes, former aide to Sen. Pell. Interviews were also done with scholars of U.S.Taiwan-China relations, including Robert Ross, Robert Sutter, and Pei-Te Lien.

Every interviewee answered the following questions.

I am doing this research because I want to explain why American interest groups, especially
those with limited resources and members who frequently travel across national borders,
manage to have much greater influence than would otherwise be expected. The Taiwan
Democracy Movement and its grassroots lobby, FAPA, are perfect examples of this because the
key activists traveled between Taiwan, Japan, Europe and the U.S. to promote democracy in
Taiwan, specifically an end to martial law. I want to know how FAPA went from nothing to the
2nd most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill in only 10 years.
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Questions:
1. What information, if any, did you provide TIM activists about the best way to develop the
organization and resources of FAPA?

2. What explains congressional support for the legislative agenda of FAPA?

3. How did the Taiwan Democracy Movement make Congress aware of its existence?

4. How did the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) make Congress aware of its
existence?

5. In your opinion, who were the most effective activists in the Taiwan Democracy Movement or
in FAPA?

6. In your opinion, do you believe the Taiwanese Democracy Activists learned anything from
other ethnic interest groups, including but not limited to the Cuban-American Lobby and the
Israeli-American Lobby?

7. In your opinion, how did FAPA become an effective lobby?
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Appendix B: Safe seats
Member of Congress
Rep. Don Bonker

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1974
93980
0.609192
22
58774
0.380981
1516
Total
154270
1976

145198
57517
2357
205072
82616
58270
140886

0.708034
0.280472

42

0.586403
0.413597

17

1980

155906
92872
248778

0.626687
0.373313

25

1982

97323
59686
5049
162058

0.600544
0.3683

24

1984

150432
61219
211651

0.710755
0.289245

43

1986

114775
41275
156050

0.735501
0.264499

47

1992

134486
88889
20320
4719
3844
252258

0.533129
0.352373

18

1994

93147
86422
7777
2430
189776

0.490826
0.45539

4

Total
1978
Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. Sherrod Brown

Total

Total

202

Member of Congress
Rep. Sherrod Brown

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1996
148690
0.608127
25
87108
0.356263
8707
Total
244505
1998

116309
72666
188975

0.615473
0.384527

23

2000

170058
84295
5837
3108
263298

0.645877
0.320151

32

2002

123025
55357
178382

0.689672
0.310328

37

2004

201004
97090
298094

0.674297
0.325703

35

2006

2257369
1761037
830
4019236

0.561641
0.438152

13

1956

149096
102781
13415
265292

0.562007
0.387426

18

1962

141657
117129
258786

0.547391
0.452609

9

1968

173482
114394
287876

0.602628
0.397372

21

Total

Total

Total

Total

Sen. Sherrod Brown

Total
Sen. Frank Church

Total

Total

Total

203

Member of Congress
Sen. Frank Church

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1974
145140
0.560717
14
109072
0.421376
4635
Total
258847
1980

214439
218701
6507
439647

0.487753
0.497447
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1954

64,716
33,127
359
120
98,322

0.658205
0.336924

32

1956

87,353
37,860
125,213

0.697635
0.302365

39

1958

57,354
21,280
238
78,872

0.727178
0.269804

46

1960

76,812
30,369
124
74
144
96
107,619

0.71374
0.28219

43

1962

59,688
24,134
83,822

0.71208
0.28792

43

1964

102,413
16,585
345
119,343

0.85814
0.138969

72

Total
Rep. Charles Diggs

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

204

Member of Congress
Rep. Charles Diggs

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1966
60,660
0.830322
67
12,393
0.169637
3
Total
73,056
1968

81,951
12,873
94,824

0.864243
0.135757

73

1970

56,872
9,141
3
66,016

0.861488
0.138466

73

1972

97,562
15,180
501
685
113,928

0.856348
0.133242

72

1974

63,246
8,036
832
289
72,403

0.873527
0.11099

76

1976

83,387
9,002
449
366
285
198
93,687

0.890059
0.096086

80

1978

44,771
11,749
23
56,543
81,498
66,380
3,102
1,778
152,758

0.791804
0.207789

59

0.533511
0.434544

10

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. Millicent Fenwick

1974

Total

205

Member of Congress
Rep. Millicent Fenwick

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
137,803
0.668603
35
1976
64,598
0.313421
499
1,723
1,483
Total
206,106
1978

100,739
38,108
138,847

0.72554
0.27446

45

1980

156,016
41,269
2,465
1,549
201,299

0.775046
0.205013

57

1962

87002
80865
575
168442

0.51651
0.480076

3

1964

127963
78767
206730

0.618986
0.381014

23

1966

86953
58816
145769

0.596512
0.403488

19

1968

108588
78819
747
552
188706

0.575435
0.417681

16

1970

83207
61682
783
145672

0.571194
0.423431

15

Total

Total
Rep. Donald Fraser

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

206

Member of Congress
Rep. Donald Fraser

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
135108
0.658421
41
1972
50014
0.243733
15845
4233
Total
205200
1974

90012
30146
1887
122045

0.737531
0.247007

49

1976

138213
50764
1824
1070
536
3189
195596

0.706625
0.259535

45

182,499
31,942
214,441
1950 Unopposed

0.851045
0.148955

71

1956

331,689
68,016
399,705

0.829835
0.170165

65

1962

214,867
98,013
312,880

0.686739
0.313261

37

1968

349,965
241,731
591,696

0.591461
0.408539

19

1978

132,594
25,785
2,321
1,059
161,759

0.819701
0.159404

66

Total

Total
Sen. J. William Fulbright

1944

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. William Gray III

Total

100

207

Member of Congress
Rep. William Gray III

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1980
127,106
0.964181
95
2,396
0.018175
2,326
Total
131,828
1982

120,744
35,205
2,726
158,675

0.760952
0.221869

54

1984

200,484
18,224
1,587
220,295

0.910071
0.082725

83

1986

128,399
2,096
130,495

0.983938
0.016062

97

1988

184,322
12,365
196,687

0.937134
0.062866

87

1990

94,584
8,118
102,702

0.920956
0.079044

85

1970

114276
70955
185231

0.616938
0.383062

23

1972

139697
78381
218078

0.640583
0.359417

29

1974

199278

100

100

1976

121562
91655
8589
221806

0.548056
0.413221

13

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. Michael Harrington
Total

Total

Total

Total

208

Member of Congress
Sen. Mark Hatfield

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
354,391
0.517537
3
1966
330374
0.482463
Total
684,765
1972

494671
425036
919707

0.537857
0.462143

7

1978

550165
341616
891781

0.616928
0.383072

23

1984

808152
406122
1214274

0.665543
0.334457

33

1990

590095
507743
1097838

0.537506
0.462494

7

1952

595,288

0.562263

13

460,884
1,912
651
1,058,735

0.435316

1958

597,040
278,271
7,592
2,257
1,662
886,822

0.673235
0.313785

36

1964

875,950
337,138
1,213,088
879,385
170,790
9,255
7,377
1,066,807

0.722083
0.277917

45

0.824315
0.160095

66

Total

Total

Total

Total
Sen. Henry "Scoop"
Jackson

Total

Total

Total
1970

Total

209

Member of Congress
Sen. Henry "Scoop"
Jackson

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1976
1,071,219
0.718403
47
361,546
3,389
19,373
28,182
7,402
1,491,111

0.242468

1982

943,665
332,273
72,297
20,251
1,368,486

0.689569
0.242803

44

1962

1,162,611
877,669
50,013
5,330
1,439
23
2,097,085

0.554394
0.418519

14

1964

1,716,907
587,663
4,745
2,700
13
2,312,028

0.742598
0.254176

49

1970

1,202,856
715,978
10,378
5,944
451
1,935,607

0.621436
0.369898

26

1976

1,726,657
722,641
26,283
15,517
157
2,491,255

0.693087
0.290071

40

Total

Total
Sen. Edward Kennedy

Total

Total

Total

Total
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Member of Congress
Sen. Edward Kennedy

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1982
1,247,084
0.608106
22
784,602
0.382589
18,878
205
Total
2,050,769
1988

1,693,344
884,267
15,208
13,199
207
2,606,225

0.649731
0.33929

31

1994

1,265,997
894,000
14,484
4,776
688
2,179,945

0.580747
0.410102

17

2000

1,889,494
334,341
308,860
42,113
13,687
8,452
2,473
2,599,420

0.726891
0.128621

60

2006

1,500,738
661,532
3,220
2,165,490

0.693025
0.305488

39

1976

109,694
101,024
486
211,204

0.519375
0.478324

4

1978

79,940
45,037
978
125,955

0.634671
0.357564

28

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. James Leach

Total

Total

211

Member of Congress
Rep. James Leach

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1980
133,349
0.640759
30
72,602
0.348862
1,374
786
Total
208,111
1982
89,595
0.592004
19
61,734
0.407911
13
Total
151,342
1984
131,182
0.667678
33
65,293
0.332322
Total
196,475
1986
86,834
0.663742
33
43,985
0.336212
6
Total
130,825
1988

112,746
71,280
1,670
20
185,716

0.607088
0.383812

22

1990

90,042
151
90,193

0.998326

100

1992

178,042
81,600
1,667
261,309

0.681347
0.312274

37

1994

110,448
69,461
1,213
2,264
75
183,461
129,242
111,595
1,394
2,277
88
244,596

0.602024
0.378615

23

0.52839
0.456242

7

Total

Total

Total

Total
1996

Total

212

Member of Congress
Rep. James Leach

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
106,419
0.565433
14
1998
79,529
0.422559
932
1,252
76
Total
188,208
2000
164,972
0.617896
25
96,283
0.360624
5,564
171
Total
266,990
2002

108,130
94,767
4,178
96
207,171

0.521936
0.457434

7

2004

176,684
117,405
5,586
206
299,881

0.58918
0.391505

19

2006

101,707
107,683
209,390

0.48573
0.51427
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1972

70,571
67,143
23,177
2,397
163,288
94,804
11,344
10
106,158
103,901
34,547
7,862
3,058
3
149,371

0.432187
0.411194

2

0.893046
0.10686

79

0.69559
0.231283

46

Total

Total

Total
Rep. John Joseph Moakley

Total
1974

Total
1976

Total
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Member of Congress
Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
Rep. John Joseph Moakley
1978
106,805
0.918058
86
6,794
0.058399
2,709
30
Total
116,338
1980
104,010
0.999654
100
36
Total
104,046
1982

102,665
55,030
2,527
3
160,225

0.640755
0.343455

30

1984

153,132 Unopposed
120
153,252

100

1986

110,026
21,292
17,953
149,271

0.737089
0.14264

59

1988

160,799 Unopposed
243
161,042

100

1990

124,534
52,660
23,803
200,997

0.619581
0.261994

35

1992

175,550
54,291
15,637
8,084
72
253,634

0.692139
0.214053

58

1994

146,287
63,369
42
209,698

0.697608
0.302192

39

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
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Member of Congress
Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
Rep. John Joseph Moakley
1996
172,009
0.722266
45
66,079
0.277466
64
Total
238,152
1998

150,667 Unopposed
888
151,555

2000

193,020
48,672
6,998
66
248,756

0.775941
0.195662

58

1976

108061
49828
5794
163683

0.660185
0.304418

36

1978

80875
43269
124144

0.651461
0.348539

31

1980

113439
64296
177735

0.638248
0.361752

27

1982

92296
53376
5053
150725

0.612347
0.354128

26

1984

131923
59610
7223
198756

0.663743
0.299915

37

1986

88612
52452
141064

0.628169
0.371831

25

Total

Total
Rep. Donald Pease

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

100
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Member of Congress
Rep. Donald Pease

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1988
137074
0.698071
39
59287
0.301929
Total
196361
1990

93431
60925
10506
164862

0.566722
0.369552

20

1960

275,575
124,408
399,983

0.688967
0.311033

37

1966

219,331
104,838
324,169

0.676595
0.323405

35

1972

221,942
188,990
2,041
458
413,431

0.53683
0.457126

8

1978

229,557
76,061
305,618

0.751124
0.248876

51

1984

285,811
107,545
393,356

0.726596
0.273404

45

1990

225,105
138,947
10
364,062

0.618315
0.381658

23

1974

80,828
14,838
10,180
5,391
111,237

0.726629
0.133391

59

Total

Sen. Claiborne Pell
Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Rep. Stephen Solarz

Total
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Member of Congress
Rep. Stephen Solarz

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1976
110,624
0.836641
67
21,600
0.163359
Total
132,224
1978
64,514
0.760429
62
12,524
0.147621
4,323
3,478
Total
84,839
1980

77,704
16,813
4,250
2,723
1,666
103,156

0.753267
0.162986

59

1982

65,390
13,392
2,324
865
3,159
85,130

0.768119
0.157312

61

1984

78,455
37,408
3,939
4,155
1,390
125,347
57,704
10,941
2,106
3,385
74,136
77,988
23,926
3,610
3,317
108,841
45,412
7,954
2,034
3,603
59,003

0.625902
0.298436

33

0.778353
0.14758

63

0.716531
0.219825

50

0.769656
0.134807

63

Total

Total

Total
1986

Total
1988

Total
1990

Total
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Member of Congress
Rep. Charles Vanik

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1954
76,201
0.759905
51
24,076
0.240095
Total
100,277
1956
96,106
0.716322
43
38,060
0.283678
Total
134,166
1958

93,987
22,956
116,943

0.803699
0.196301

21

1960

103,460
38,326
141,786

0.729691
0.270309

45

1962

79,514
20,027
99,541

0.798807
0.201193

59

1964

113,157
12,416
125,573

0.901125
0.098875

81

1966

81,210
18,205
99,415

0.816879
0.183121

63

1968

102,656
84,975
187,631

0.547116
0.452884

9

1970

114,790
45,657
160,447

0.715439
0.284561

43

1972

126,462
64,577
3,463
3,342
197,844

0.639201
0.326404

31

1974

112,671
30,585
143,256

0.786501
0.213499

57

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
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Member of Congress
Rep. Charles Vanik

Sen. Lowell Weicker

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1976
128,535
0.727325
48
42,727
0.241774
5,461
Total
176,723
1978
87,551
0.660403
43
30,930
0.233307
6,966
7,125
Total
132,572
1970
454721
0.417432
8
368111
0.337925
266497
Total
1089329
1976

785683
561018
14407
1361108

0.577238
0.412177

16

1982

545987
499146
30212
8163
1083508

0.503907
0.460676

4

1988

678454
688499
12409
4154
1383516

0.490384
0.497644

-0.7

1964

96,503
93,883
190,386

0.506881
0.493119

1

1966

81,959
81,122
163,081

0.502566
0.497434

1

1968

98,226
75,910
14,556
188,692

0.520563
0.402296

12

Total

Total

Total
Rep. Lester Wolff
Total

Total

Total
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Member of Congress
Rep. Lester Wolff

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1970
94,414
0.544063
16
66,196
0.381456
12,925
Total
173,535
1972

109,620
103,038
212,658

0.515476
0.484524

3

1974

101,247
50,528
151,765

0.66713
0.332936

33

1976

112,422
60,567
8,958
181,947

0.617883
0.332883

28

1978

80799
44304
9,503
134606

0.600263
0.329138

28

1980

80209
89762
169971
83,932
79,572
6
163,510

0.471898
0.528102

-5

0.513314
0.486649

3

1980

113,080
102,591
891
843
9
217,414

0.520114
0.471869

5

1982

96,842
73,315
1,111
693
171,961

0.563163
0.426347

14

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total
Rep. Howard Wolpe

1978

Total

Total

Total
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Member of Congress
Rep. Howard Wolpe

Election Year
Vote totals
percentage Margin
1984
106,505
0.529286
5
94,714
0.470689
5
Total
201,224
1986

78,720
51,678
2
130,400

0.603681
0.396304

21

1988

112,605
83,769
1
196,375

0.573418
0.426577

15

1990

82,376
60,007
7
142,390

0.578524
0.421427

15

Total

Total

Total
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